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This dissertation explores the University of Kentucky’s efforts to develop and implement 
an “action program” in eastern Kentucky in the 1960s.  By the late 1950s, Kentucky’s 
political, business, and academic leaders had identified eastern Kentucky as the state’s 
problem area, and they sought strategies to bring the region into the economic and 
cultural mainstream.  This generation of post-war leaders had an uncompromising faith in 
the power of knowledge, technology, and planning, and University leaders saw their 
action program as a university-wide effort to address what most would argue was 
Kentucky’s ugliest problem.  This study begins with an examination of the rushed and 
disorganized Kellogg Foundation-funded Eastern Kentucky Resource Development 
Project (EKRDP) in 1960.  With the national “rediscovery” of Appalachia in the early 
1960s and the passage of the Equal Opportunity Act (EOA) and the Appalachian 
Regional Development Act (ARDA) in 1964 and 1965, University leaders reframed their 
thinking about how to engage eastern Kentucky in the midst of a War on Poverty.  
Institutional support for the EKRDP dwindled, and administrators tried to shift the 
responsibility of the eastern Kentucky program to the newly developed Center for 
Developmental Change (CDC).  However, the leadership of the CDC lacked stability, the 
faculty who had been the driving force behind the Center did not want to be tied down to 
Appalachian projects, and the changing expectations for faculty ushered in by the 
“Oswald Revolution” did not reward interdisciplinary work.  
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of my graduate committee, Ronald Eller continues to have a profound influence on my 
thinking and writing about Appalachia.  Richard Angelo has always pushed me to see the 
bigger picture and to ask the really difficult questions.  Likewise, Tracy Campbell 
reminded me that every worthy project must adequately respond to the “so what?” 
question, and David Hamilton encouraged me to expand my field of vision and make 
valuable connections between my work and scholarship in other areas.  Terry 
Birdwhistell frequently helped me to put things in perspective, both intellectually and 
personally, and I was often buoyed by his encouragement and his example.  I could not 
imagine a better “coach” than John Thelin.  I have learned that the most influential 
scholars are often the best teachers and the nicest people.  That is true of Dr. Thelin, and I 
am grateful for his guidance throughout these many years. 
 I am thankful to Ruth Bryan and Matt Harris in the University of Kentucky 
Special Collections Library for tracking down valuable source material and suggesting 
additional avenues for investigation.  As my supervisors, Philipp Kraemer and Charles 
Shearer both encouraged my continued studies and provided opportunities for me to 
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pursue the work.  Colleagues at Transylvania University, notably Mike Nichols and 
Michael Covert, frequently asked about my progress and encouraged me to press on.  
Kim Chaffer Schroeder, a long-time friend and colleague, was a constant cheerleader and 
provided a valuable example as she worked toward and completed her Ph.D.  Jim and 
Cathy Haubenreich and other members of our small group at church followed my 
progress closely and were always quick with an encouraging word.  My in-laws, Kay and 
David Beals, asked often about my work and provided summer get-a-ways for my family 
so I could concentrate on the project.  My sister-in-law, Ashlie Arkwright, and I swapped 
stories of our research successes and failures, as we followed similar timelines for 
completion of our dissertations.  My parents, Edwin and Nancy Goan, have provided 
their full support at every step in my educational journey.  They, too, have provided 
opportunities for my family to leave me to my research and writing, and their confidence 
in my work has been unwavering. 
 My children have sacrificed much to my Ph.D. work, but their support has been 
without fail.  At thirteen, ten, and eight, Addison, Eli, and Grayson have different levels 
of understanding of why their dad has spent so much time “dissertating,” but through this 
experience and others, they are beginning to understand the transformative quality of 
education and the value of seeing long and difficult projects through to their completion.  
Finally, this work is dedicated to my wife Melanie.  As a historian, she read every word 
of this project and posed valuable and challenging questions for me to consider.  As my 
life partner and best friend, she has done all of the other things, the things that frequently 
go unnoticed by anyone but me, that have allowed me to concentrate time and energy on 
my research and writing and produce a work of which we can be proud.  While the words 
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on the page are mine, the fact that those words exist is the direct result of Melanie’s love 
and her willingness to bear far more than her share of our life’s responsibilities. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
 
Many see American history as the never-ending march toward progress.  
Technological innovations and intellectual achievements advance civilization, new 
questions and challenges emerge, and then new science and new knowledge advance 
society again.  Success is measured in production, in urbanization, in consumption, and in 
the belief in new ways of thinking and living.  The traditional gives way to the modern, 
and private enterprise, the market, and good government facilitate growth and 
development. 
 Belief in this ideology was never stronger than in the quarter-century following 
World War II.   Careful planning, the world’s most advanced science and technology, and 
new ways of thinking about society’s thorniest problems brought the American people 
out of the Great Depression, vanquished two evil empires, rebuilt Europe and Japan, and 
created unprecedented prosperity at home.  The generation of post-war leaders believed 
they could accomplish anything with a well-constructed plan built on knowledge and 
technology.  They could even send a man to the moon.1 
 In post-war America, the academy took its place at the center of the American 
faith in the relationship between knowledge creation, planning, and progress.  University 
scientists played a fundamental role in the research that fueled the winning war effort, 
and in the period following World War II, a robust research economy developed with 
unprecedented levels of support from external sources.2  The 1950s saw the development 
                                                 
1 Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time: From World War II to Nixon – What 
Happened and Why (Garden City: Doubleday, 1976). 
2 John R. Thelin, A History of American Higher Education (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004), 260-316; Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant 
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of what Clark Kerr called the “federal research university” which benefited from millions 
of dollars of federally sponsored projects, particularly in the sciences.3  During this same 
period, large foundations began to shift their philanthropy to the social and behavioral 
sciences.  Basic research persisted but applied research gained in stature, and the 
knowledge economy that emerged provided the intellectual foundation for Cold War 
policies and practices designed to demonstrate American superiority, sustain prosperity at 
home, propagate American values abroad, and continue the march of progress.4 
Appalachia did not fit neatly into this ideology of progress.  As Ron Eller argues, 
by World War II, a pattern of growth without development plagued Appalachia. Natural 
resource extraction allowed the region to experience rapid expansions in job growth at 
times, but the internal capacity needed to sustain the prosperity of expansion was never 
developed.  World War II brought a flurry of activity.  With many men heading off to 
war and many others moving to the Midwest to work in defense plants, those who stayed 
behind found new opportunities for jobs.  Per capita income was on the rise and full 
employment seemed a reality.  Still, significant structural issues remained.  Outside 
interests owned and controlled much of the region’s vast natural resources, depriving 
mountain communities of tax revenue and residual economic benefits.  The lack of 
diversification exposed Appalachia to the fluctuations in national and international 
                                                                                                                                                 
Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993); Joshua Freeman, American Empire: The Rise of Global Power, 
the Democratic Revolution at Home, 1945-2000 (New York: Penguin, 2012). 
3 Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1963). 
4 Thelin, A History of American Higher Education, 260-316; Geiger, Research 
and Relevant Knowledge. 
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markets, and many local political leaders were comfortable with the status quo as it 
provided them with substantial personal benefits.5 
 Immediately following the war, the boom continued, but by 1948 the coal market 
was entering another bust cycle, and opportunities began to dry up.  Union wage 
agreements and mechanization exacerbated the condition of the industry, massive 
numbers of people moved out of the region, and joblessness and poverty spread.  
Mountain people became more dependent on government assistance, and the expansion 
of welfare programs strengthened the sometimes corrupt and always powerful political 
patronage system.6 
 In the mid-1950s, several Kentucky government agencies and private 
organizations began serious conversations about the challenges confronting eastern 
Kentucky.  Many of the leaders of these groups came of age during the Depression and 
World War II.  They were steeped in the American post-war faith in planning, 
development, and progress.  Surely, they believed, thoughtful application of these 
principals could solve the region’s ills.7   
There was no consensus, however, on the root causes of the “eastern Kentucky 
problem” and how to alleviate it.  Some blamed the region’s geography, its relative 
isolation, and its patterns of industrial and transportation development.   They favored 
physical infrastructure investments – highways, water systems, and industrial parks.  
                                                 
5 Ronald D Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945 (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2008), 9-17; See also John Alexander Williams, Appalachia: A 
History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 312-326; Harry Caudill, 
Night Comes to the Cumberlands: A Biography of a Depressed Area (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1962), 219-248. 
6 Eller, Uneven Ground, 17-38; Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands, 273-
300. 
7 Eller, Uneven Ground, 40-52. 
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Others blamed mountain culture which, they argued, preserved anachronistic values and 
prevented people from pulling themselves out of poverty.  This group wanted education 
and job training.  Some advocated for “total development” – investments in both physical 
infrastructure and human capacity.  All perspectives stressed the need for an Appalachia 
more integrated into the mainstream, both culturally and economically, and all suggested 
that the region’s problems resulted from a lack of resources, whether economic or 
cultural, not from structural inequalities.8   
The Council of Southern Mountains (CSM) and its annual conference had long 
provided a venue for discussions among those interested in modernizing the mountains, 
but those conversations took on a greater sense of urgency in the 1950s.  The CSM 
favored “cooperative community development” with broad programs of education and 
job training.  The CSM challenged leaders to develop public-private partnerships to find 
collaborative solutions to the lack of human capacity in the region.  Throughout the 
1950s, the CSM sponsored workshops for teachers, social workers, and community 
leaders.  They emphasized the ability of individuals to overcome social and cultural 
barriers, the value of volunteerism, and the importance of schools as community-building 
institutions.  In 1956, with the backing of the CSM, Willis Weatherford, Sr., a Berea 
College trustee, assembled a group of interdenominational faith leaders and proposed 
they take collective action to assist those hurting in the region.  Then, in 1958, again with 
the CSM’s support, Weatherford launched the Southern Appalachian Studies Project, 
funded in large part by a $250,000 Ford Foundation grant, to examine the challenges 
facing the region.  That project led to the publication of the highly influential The 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
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Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey in 1962.9  The contributors to The Southern 
Appalachian Region sought to produce the “most comprehensive survey of the southern 
Appalachians ever undertaken” and “to find agencies to use the results of the survey in 
setting up constructive programs which would bring the level of Appalachian life up to 
national standards.”10  Relying on the culture of poverty and modernization theories, the 
scholars hoped to bring this “problem” region into the mainstream. 
Alternatively, political and business leaders tended to favor infrastructure 
development.  In 1956, the Kentucky Agricultural and Industrial Development Board 
commissioned a study to assess the condition of the state’s natural resources, focusing 
principally on coal and timber, with an eye toward suggestions for industrial growth.  The 
Kentucky Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees), under the leadership of President 
John D. Whisman, met with regional business, government, and industry leaders as well 
as state development officials and policymakers to discuss cooperative long-term 
planning efforts.  Those discussions led to the creation of the Eastern Kentucky Regional 
Development Council.11   
Following the devastating winter floods of 1957, these conversations intensified.  
The state commissioned the Eastern Kentucky Flood Rehabilitation Study to examine the 
problems caused by the floods as well as the long-term barriers to economic growth in 
                                                 
9 Eller, Uneven Ground, 41-48; Shannon H. Wilson, Berea College: An Illustrated 
History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), 152-53; The Southern Appalachian 
Region: A Survey, ed. Thomas R. Ford (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962); 
Thomas Kiffmeyer, “Looking Back to the City in the Hills: The Council of the Southern 
Mountains and a Longer View of the War on Poverty in the Appalachian South, 1913-
1970,” in The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History, 1964-1980, eds. Annelise 
Orleck and Lisa Gayle Hazirjian (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 359-386. 
10 Southern Appalachian Region, 5-6. 
11 Eller, Uneven Ground, 46-47. 
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the region.  The Kentucky Department of Economic Development issued its Action Plan 
for Eastern Kentucky, and Acting Governor Harry Lee Waterfield established the Eastern 
Kentucky Regional Planning Commission, pledging state support for its staffing and 
program development.  All of the commissioners had been involved in Whisman’s 
Eastern Kentucky Regional Development Council, and in 1958, he was named the 
Commission’s executive director and moved the group’s work from flood relief efforts to 
strategic area development.12   
In September 1959, the Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission 
released Program 60, its comprehensive action plan for eastern Kentucky for the next 
decade.  The plan was wide-ranging including improvement strategies for planning and 
zoning, flood control, transportation, healthcare, housing, education, job training, and 
economic diversification.  Program 60 made clear that federal, state, and local 
governments, civic organizations, businesses, and private citizens all had a part to play in 
the region’s development.  Central to the plan was the concept of multi-county area 
development councils, comprised of key local leaders who would cooperate on both 
project planning and execution.13 
By 1960, concern over the problems in Appalachia had extended well beyond the 
region’s borders.  Regional leaders, including Whisman and the Appalachian governors, 
had highlighted the mountain’s challenges to federal policymakers, and media coverage 
of John Kennedy’s West Virginia primary campaign planted Appalachia as a problem 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 47-48. 
13 Eller, Uneven Ground, 46-52; Eastern Kentucky Regional Development 
Commission, Program 60 (Frankfort: Eastern Kentucky Regional Development 
Commission, 1959).   
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region in the American mind.14  As Eller notes, “The rediscovery of Appalachia as a 
cultural and economic problem was an embarrassment and a challenge to a generation 
confident of its ability to shape a better world.”  Hoping to bring Appalachia closer to 
mainstream America, policymakers and intellectuals made the region a “domestic testing 
ground” for economic development strategies and a “laboratory for experimentation in 
human behavior modification”15 
 In 1960, the University of Kentucky sat at the nexus of these powerful forces.  
The University had been created in 1865 as a land-grant institution under the Morrill Act 
of 1862, and for nearly 100 years it had made service to the state and its people one of its 
key objectives.  Passage of the Hatch Act in 1887 funded the creation of agricultural 
experiment stations and extended the reach of the university to the far corners of the 
largely rural state, as did the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, which provided a funding 
mechanism for the Cooperative Extension Service.16   
 Timber baron E. O. Robinson’s creation of the E. O Robinson Mountain Fund in 
1922 and the resulting gift of the Robinson Forest to the University of Kentucky in 1923 
strengthened the University’s ties to the eastern part of the Commonwealth and provided 
an important base of operations at Quicksand.  The forest, consisting of 15,000 acres of 
previously timbered land, located in primarily in Breathitt County and the Quicksand 
                                                 
14 Eller, Uneven Ground, 53-62; Williams, Appalachia, 335-339. 
15 Eller, Uneven Ground, 2.  
16 J. Allan Smith, The College of Agriculture of the University of Kentucky: Early 
and Middle Years, 1865-1951 (Lexington: University of Kentucky College of Agriculture 
Cooperative Extension, 1981); Nevyle Shackleford, Robinson Substation: A Short 
History (Lexington: University of Kentucky College of Agriculture Cooperative 
Extension, 1970); Randy Weckman, Robinson Station, Quicksand, Kentucky: A History 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky College of Agriculture Cooperative Extension, 
2001); Wayne D. Rasmussen, Taking the University to the People: Seventy-Five Years of 
Cooperative Extension (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2002). 
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Substation offered UK experts a spot to demonstrate modern agricultural and forestry 
practices in keeping with the Mountain Fund’s stated goal of ensuring “the betterment of 
the people of the mountain regions of Kentucky. “17      
The university’s sense of mission had deep roots.  When combined with the 1960s 
optimism and faith in progress and with the nation’s newfound interest in Appalachia, the 
opportunities to create real change in Eastern Kentucky could not be ignored.   Like most 
of their contemporaries, University leaders were ardent believers in the power of 
knowledge, technology, and planning.  They understood their role as an intellectual 
engine.  As the land-grant university in the most visible Appalachian state, they felt an 
extra burden to apply their knowledge to the “other America” within the borders of their 
Commonwealth.18  As University of Kentucky President Frank Dickey said to the 
meeting of The Council of Southern Mountains: 
Certainly a people with resources and human capabilities to send satellites 
spinning around the sun or to develop weapons capable of exterminating mankind 
should be able to negotiate successfully the obstacles to the development of a 




                                                 
17 David Barrett Gough, “The Value of the Commonwealth: An Ecocritical 
History of the Robinson Forest” (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 2011), 53-61; J. Allan 
Smith, The College of Agriculture of the University of Kentucky; Nevyle Shackleford, 
Robinson Substation; Randy Weckman, Robinson Station, Quicksand, Kentucky; Minutes 
of the University of Kentucky Board of Trustees, 13 April 1923, Special Collections 
Library, University of Kentucky, Lexington. 
18 Michael Harrington included Appalachia as part of the “other America” in his 
highly influential study on poverty in the United States; see Michael Harrington, The 
Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1962). 
19 “Developing the Intellectual Resources of the Appalachian South”, 17 
November 1962, Address to the Council on Southern Mountains Meeting, Frank Dickey 
Papers, Box 24, Speeches and Papers, 1962-1963 Folder, Special Collections Library, 
University of Kentucky. 




 This dissertation contributes to two historiographies, offering a focused addition 
to the small but rich historiography of the politics of progress in Appalachia and adding a 
highly contextualized Appalachian development case study to the historiography of 
southern higher education.  Despite the enormous national attention paid to the 
Appalachian region in the postwar period, few historians have trained their analytical 
lenses on Appalachia in the years following World War II.  Certainly, many historians are 
uncomfortable addressing the issues of the recent past, preferring to leave that work to 
the domain of social scientists, but the scholarship of post-1945 United States history, 
and post-1945 southern history in particular, shows that historians can and should apply 
their particular craft to the questions and issues of this period.  While few scholars have 
tackled the questions of recent Appalachian history, fewer still have addressed the 
politics of progress in the region in the latter half of the twentieth century.  This 
dissertation engages directly in that conversation. 
 David Whisnant offers the first comprehensive examination of development in 
modern Appalachia.  A highly emotional work, Modernizing the Mountaineer: People, 
Power, and Planning in Appalachia is a carefully researched collection of nine loosely 
connected case studies.  Whisnant addresses the missionary impulses that came together 
through the work of The Council of the Southern Mountains.  He examines federal efforts 
in the region through the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Area Redevelopment 
Administration, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the Appalachian Regional 
Commission, and he analyzes the alternative approaches that emerge through the 
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Appalachian Volunteers, the Congress for Appalachian Development, and in the response 
to the Kentucky River Area Development District.20 
 Whisnant’s criticism is scathing.  He views all of these efforts as unsuccessful, if 
not outright failures.  The organizations and programs failed, he argues, because they 
relied on the assumptions of the planners who saw Appalachian culture as backward and 
deviant.  For these developers, Appalachia was either undeveloped or underdeveloped.  
They sought to bring the region into the national mainstream while ignoring the fact that 
its very integration into national markets as a source of natural resources and labor had 
caused many of its systemic challenges.  Whisnant posits that the planners’ approaches 
were culturally insensitive and, as a result, culturally destructive.  At their worst, 
developers feigned an appreciation for mountain culture as a cover to pursue their own 
objectives.  Clearly, planners refused to question the political, social, and economic 
structures in which they functioned.  Rather, they embraced those structures, and those 
that did offer structural critiques, such as the Appalachian Volunteers, failed to make any 
substantial impact, in part because of the hegemonic environment in which they worked. 
 Some might fault David Whisnant for his passion.  Writing history requires the 
scholar to make moral judgments and to take positions on issues, but even those who 
appreciate the subjective quality of the craft might find Whisnant over the top and a bit 
too angry at times.  Some may be uncomfortable with the uneven quality of his analysis, 
finding certain case studies more compelling than others.  Some may wish for an 
alternative to the types of development Whisnant describes; he offers none.  However, 
                                                 
 20 David E. Whisnant, Modernizing the Mountaineer: People, Power, and 
Planning in Appalachia, rev. edition (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1994). 
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Modernizing the Mountaineer is a powerful critique and an excellent starting point in 
understanding the historiography of progress in Appalachia. 
 In contrast to Whisnant’s structural blasphemy, Michael Bradshaw worships at 
the altar of structures, with the political structure chief among the gods.  Bradshaw’s The 
Appalachian Regional Commission: Twenty-Five Years of Government Policy is an 
organizational history whose approach is as traditional as the ones he supports in his 
arguments.  Bradshaw criticizes the theoretical frameworks for regional development that 
existed in the 1950s and early 1960s as lacking sophistication and paying far too much 
attention to economic analysis and far too little to political considerations.  The author 
describes the struggle between the competing ideologies of the free market and of 
government intervention, and he asserts that the way to bring these ideas together is 
through the existing political process.  For Bradshaw, the ARC model resulted from 
practical political forces working to bring together federal and state governments in a 
model unique to American public policy.21   
 Bradshaw asserts that the Commission fulfilled its legislative charge by 
improving physical infrastructure.  Second, he argues that the basic conditions in the 
region improved.  While he attributes much of this improvement to external economic 
forces, he purports that the Commission’s infrastructure development allowed people to 
take advantage of these changes.  Finally, he contends that the experiences of the ARC 
demonstrate that the role of a regional development commission must be reactive and 
pragmatic.  Ultimately, Bradshaw believes the ARC points the way to new models of 
regional planning and development where the political process, not economics, is central 
                                                 
 21 Michael Bradshaw, The Appalachian Regional Commission: Twenty Five Years 
of Government Policy (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1992). 
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to action.  These models, he asserts, may offer a starting point for our approach to the 
newly developing challenges in all of rural America. 
 Like Whisnant, Bradshaw offers no alternatives to development as it has been 
pursued in the region.  However, unlike Whisnant, Bradshaw’s lack of alternatives stems 
from his belief that the ideal model has already been discovered.  Bradshaw relies too 
heavily on ARC documents, his use of evidence is often difficult to follow, and he fails to 
contextualize the ARC in the philosophies and assumptions that undergirded its work as 
well as in the larger public policy landscape of its time.  However, it should be 
Bradshaw’s unfailing belief in the existing political structure that concerns historians the 
most. 
 Readers alarmed by Whisnant’s anger and frustrated by Bradshaw’s conservatism 
will take comfort in Ronald Eller’s Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945.  To be sure, 
Eller is much closer to Whisnant than to Bradshaw, but his scholarship is more balanced 
than both.  Eller argues that by World War II, a pattern of growth without development 
plagued Appalachia.  Natural resource extraction allowed the region to experience rapid 
expansions in job growth at times, but the internal capacity needed to sustain the 
prosperity of expansion was never developed.  In general, the region did not benefit from 
the expanding national business climate of the 1950s, and Eller illustrates that by the 
latter part of that decade, many state and local leaders began to look for solutions to the 
development problems they perceived.  He skillfully shows how the actions of state 
leaders fused with the intellectual and political currents of the day to focus national 
attention on Appalachia through the War on Poverty.22 
                                                 
 22 Eller, Uneven Ground. 
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 Eller asserts that the Keynesian model of government-induced growth as well the 
culture of poverty theory guided intellectuals and policymakers in their approach to 
Appalachia as a national “problem.”  He also shows how these strains of thought along 
with the more empowering notions of some OEO programs competed within the War on 
Poverty.  Eller posits that while most intellectuals and policymakers never acknowledged 
structural inequalities, some OEO administrators and many OEO staffers and volunteers 
did.  As the OEO and the War on Poverty died on the political vine, some citizens 
continued to question the status quo.  As Eller puts it, “the War on Poverty generated a 
degree of independence and assertiveness that undermined old traditions of deference to 
authority and laid the groundwork for collective action on a variety of labor, health and 
environmental issues.”23 
 It is the Appalachian Regional Commission, however, that Eller asserts played the 
most critical role in the modernization of Appalachia, a role that extended well beyond 
the demise of the War on Poverty.  The ARC was rooted in growth theory - the belief that 
government policies should maximize production and consumption and produce full 
employment.  The resulting higher levels of productivity would produce greater social 
equality.  Additionally, growth pole theory influenced ARC development strategies.  This 
approach, Eller contends, assumed that urban life was the ultimate goal for all peoples 
and prepared individuals for a modern consumer existence either by bringing that 
lifestyle to them in a growth center or by forcing them to migrate to distant cities or 
nearby growth centers.  The growth center model as well as the political realities of the 
federal definition of Appalachia resulted, Eller argues, in a pattern of uneven growth that 
                                                 
 23 Ibid, 227. 
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favored the northern and southern parts of the region and further increased the gap 
between the haves and the have-nots.24   
 While Eller’s story is broad and sweeping, Thomas Kiffmeyer focuses his lens 
more narrowly in Reformers to Radicals: The Appalachian Volunteers and the War on 
Poverty.  Launched in 1964, the Appalachian Volunteers (AVs) spurred young optimistic 
Americans to action as they answered President Kennedy’s call, convinced that they 
could effect change.  Mobilized to share the prosperity of the nation with those who had 
been left outside its reach, anti-poverty groups such as the AVs immersed themselves in 
struggling communities, building and renovating substandard homes and schools and 
offering health information, remedial education, and job training.25 
 Kiffmeyer argues that the AVs took as their ideal mainstream American values 
and looked to integrate struggling Appalachian residents within this vision of a 
prosperous, ever-improving nation.  Rooted in the culture of poverty model that critiqued 
mountain values for supposedly holding the area’s people back and preventing them from 
fully participating in the good life that modern America seemed to offer, the AVs, at least 
initially worked within the prevailing system.  As the AVs radicalized, however, they 
found themselves increasingly at odds with existing power brokers including school 
superintendents, political leaders, and coal operators.  Kiffmeyer, like Eller, demonstrates 
                                                 
 24 John Alexander Williams covers similar ground in the last chapter of his 
survey, Appalachia: A History.  By his own admission, Williams draws much of his 
examination of postwar development in Appalachia, particularly regarding the ARC, 
from Eller’s research (n.47, 415).  In fact, Williams provides little new in terms of 
interpretative perspective except for his argument that federal defense contracts would 
have made a more suitable form of “reparations for damages done to the region through 
its contributions of energy and raw materials to the national economy” than have transfer 
payments (382).   
25 Thomas Kiffmeyer, Reformers to Radicals: The Appalachian Volunteers and 
the War on Poverty (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008). 
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that monies funneled into the area, whether through the OEO or ARC, too often became 
tools for local elites, providing a form of patronage and ultimately protecting the status 
quo.  Although Kiffmeyer takes as his focus a grass roots organization and relates a story 
that centers on the disfranchised, the voice of the poor remains obscured by the focus on 
change agents who too often spoke for the people they were intending to help, thus 
failing to let them speak for themselves.                 
 While not part of the Appalachian historiography per se, Alice O’Connor’s 
Poverty Knowledge is a necessary read for anyone asking questions about the postwar 
politics of progress in Appalachia.  Her fascinating account traces the evolution of 
poverty knowledge from its modern origins in the Progressive Era through “the end of 
welfare as we know it” with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.26  Appalachian scholars may find it frustrating 
that she mentions the region only once in her analysis, a clear weakness of a work that 
gives so much attention to the War on Poverty.  Nonetheless, O’Connor works through 
the intellectual and political constructions of poverty in the twentieth century, and she 
examines how those constructions are applied through government policies.  Her 
examination of poverty knowledge in the 1950s and 1960s provides a beautiful 
companion to Eller’s analysis of the same period, and essentially the same issues, in 
Appalachian history. 
 Just as Eller continually laments the failure of intellectuals and policymakers to 
acknowledge structural inequalities, O’Connor levels a similar charge against the 
                                                 
 26 Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the 
Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 
284. 
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intellectuals and policymakers responsible for the production of poverty knowledge at the 
national level.  Poverty knowledge, she asserts, is fundamentally ideological.  A product 
of the new liberalism that emerged in the late nineteenth century, poverty knowledge 
provides a protection against laissez-faire industrial capitalism, but it is committed to the 
maintenance of a capitalist economy.  O’Connor sees poverty knowledge as highly 
political wherein the power to create knowledge rests primarily with groups of white 
male social scientists who are less likely to have experienced poverty and who are in a 
position through their control of the poverty industry to replicate, through exclusion of 
practice, the social inequalities they seek to eradicate.  Additionally, poverty knowledge, 
O’Connor posits, functions in its own market where the growth of the poverty research 
apparatus ties the research agenda and its findings to the needs of the funders.  Finally, 
O’Conner argues that poverty knowledge with its increasing emphasis on “scientific” 
approaches loses its historical and political context.   
 While Whisnant, Eller, and O’Connor all offer powerful critiques of market 
capitalism, Richard Couto’s Making Democracy Work Better: Mediating Structures, 
Social Capital, and the Democratic Prospect assumes a critique of market capitalism and 
moves directly to offering practical approaches to addressing the development concerns 
of the Appalachian region.  Couto fashions his work as the competition between the 
democratic promise of limited government and market economies and the democratic 
prospect of increased social and economic equality and communal bonds.  In a very real 
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way, the achievement of the democratic prospect represents healthy development or 
community progress.27 
 Couto seeks to explain the region in terms of American social capital.  American 
public policy, he offers, tends toward a market approach to social capital, with its central 
purpose being the production, reproduction, and distribution of a labor force.  Rejecting 
social and political theorists’ approaches to social capital, Couto sees social capital less as 
a means to defend against intrusive governments or to provide services abandoned by 
limited governments and more as a way to work within the context of government to 
mitigate the destructive elements of the market.  Therefore, Couto argues in his 
evaluation of twenty-three community-based organizations that these mediating 
structures facilitate development within the context of structural inequality. 
 One might then see Jess Stoddart’s Challenge and Change in Appalachia: The 
Story of Hindman Settlement School as a full-scale historical case study supporting 
Couto’s perspective on Appalachian development.  Stoddart provides a fairly traditional 
organizational history, arranged chronologically with chapters grouped according to 
institutional leadership.  Despite her personal connections to the school (her mother and 
uncle were alumni), she does not shy away from healthy criticism of its people and its 
programs.  Stoddart argues that throughout its history, Hindman Settlement School has 
provided projects or services that others could not or would not offer.  In this way, the 
                                                 
 27 Richard A. Couto, Making Democracy Work Better: Mediating Structures, 
Social Capital, and the Democratic Prospect, with Catherine S. Guthrie (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
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school has consistently served, to use Couto’s term, as a mediating structure in Knott 
County.28 
  Scholars who have examined the politics of progress pay little attention to higher 
education.  This is especially true in the Appalachian historiography.  Of the handful of 
historians who tackle the politics of progress in post-war Appalachia, only Eller discusses 
higher education, and he does so nominally.  This dissertation corrects that oversight by 
providing a study of how one institution, its faculty, and its staff actively engaged in 
development efforts in eastern Kentucky.   This study clearly connects to and builds on 
the foundational scholarship of Eller, Couto, and O’Connor.  Eller’s work is the jumping 
off point, and his understanding of development in the mountains undergirds this work.  
The subject of this study – the University of Kentucky’s action program in the mountains 
– was the creation of the social scientists O’Conner examines and could have served as a 
mediating structure, as Couto describes them, had it not wholeheartedly embraced the 
existing power structures that functioned in the mountains.  
In 1987, John Thelin called for an examination of southern higher education and 
state and regional economic development that goes beyond boosterism.29  Nearly three 
decades later, this area remains largely unexplored.  Only Amy Wells has contributed to 
the conversation with her excellent work on emerging universities in the South.  Wells 
argues that the national model for emerging universities prevailed in the South but only 
after a contest between competing notions of what a southern university should be.  The 
debate over the future shape of the southern university led to the establishment of the 
                                                 
 28 Jess Stoddart, Challenge and Change in Appalachia: The Story of Hindman 
Settlement School (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 2002). 
29 John R. Thelin, “Southern Exposure: House Histories with Room for a View,” 
The Review of Higher Education 10 (Summer 1987), 357-368. 
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Southern Regional Education Board.  More than other scholars, Wells delineates the role 
of philanthropic foundations in the shaping of southern universities.  While her work 
focuses on an earlier period, her concern with the debate over regional planning efforts in 
the South speaks to some very important unexplored areas in the modern South, notably 
the linkage that Thelin desired.30  This dissertation explores that linkage by examining 
the University of Kentucky’s action program for economic and social development in 
eastern Kentucky. 
By definition, this dissertation is an institutional history, and higher education 
scholars are keenly aware of the form’s flaws.  Often written by insiders, house histories 
sometimes shy away from a critical approach, and many times they fail to place their 
respective institutions into larger social, political, economic, cultural, and 
historiographical contexts.  However, this dissertation follows the lead of a group of 
southern house histories that apply a critical eye and see the connection to social, 
political, economic, and cultural forces as essential to understanding the stories that 
should be told. 31   
At the head of the class is Thomas Dyer’s The University of Georgia: A 
Bicentennial History, 1795-1985.  Dyer adroitly connects the University’s development 
                                                 
30 Amy E. Wells, “Contesting Ground: Howard Odum, the Southern Agrarians, and 
the Emerging University in the South During the 1930s,” History of Higher Education 
Annual  21 (2001), 79-101;  Amy Wells, “From Ideas to Institutions: Southern Scholars 
and Emerging Universities in the South” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 2000). 
31 For a discussion of the merits and shortcomings of institutional histories, see 
Thomas G. Dyer, “Higher Education in the South since the Civil War: Historiographical 
Issues and Trends,” in The Web of Southern Social Relations: Women, Family, and 
Education, ed. Walter J. Fraser, Jr., R. Frank Saunders, Jr., and Jon L. Wakelyn (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1985), 127-145; Roger L. Geiger, David B. Potts, and W. 
Bruce Leslie, “Exploring our Professional Backyards: Toward Writing Recent History of 
American Colleges and Universities,” History of Higher Education Annual  20 (2000), 
79-91; John R. Thelin, “Southern Exposure: House Histories with Room for a View.”  
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to the state’s social and political environment, and he roots his discussion in the 
historiography of American higher education and, to a lesser degree, in the historiography 
of the American South.  While he is concerned primarily with political and administrative 
activities, Dyer avoids the standard organization by presidential administration as well as 
the house history’s typical emphasis on physical plant development and its reliance on 
reams of statistical data.  One might criticize Dyer for giving less attention to issues of 
student life, but in the end, his is a very well-crafted and balanced work that effectively 
argues that, by the mid-1980s, the University of Georgia had emerged as a true research 
university.32 
In certain sections of Gone with the Ivy: A Biography of Vanderbilt University, 
Paul Conkin matches Dyer’s analytical acumen.  Conkin reveals an institution in the 
midst of a century-long identity crisis, struggling to find a place in the pantheon of 
national private research universities.  He connects Vanderbilt to Nashville, to the city’s 
people, to the larger South, and to the Methodist Church, and he shows how these 
relationships impacted the institution’s development.  Conkin is at his best in dealing 
with the intellectual life of Vanderbilt and in tackling the controversial issues of athletics, 
development, academic freedom, women’s rights, and segregation.  On the other hand, 
Conkin struggles with managing the wealth of archival data at his disposal, and his 
analysis is occasionally mired in excessive detail.33 
                                                 
32 Thomas G. Dyer, The University of Georgia: A Bicentennial History, 1785-
1985 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985).  
 
33 Paul K. Conkin, Gone with the Ivy: A Biography of Vanderbilt University 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985). 
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Robert McMath, et al’s Engineering the New South: Georgia Tech, 1885-1985 
likewise attempts to set the institution in a larger context.  This is particularly true as the 
authors make valuable connections between curricular concerns at Georgia Tech and the 
larger national trends in engineering education and as they explain how an emphasis on 
engineering education stifled the development of research and graduate education.  There 
is little here, however, in terms of historiographical context, and that is this work’s most 
significant shortcoming.  McMath, et al argue that Georgia Tech contributed significantly 
to the realization of the New South ideology and to the economic development of the 
region after World War II.  However, they offer little evidence to support that assertion.  
A better connection to the larger historiography, particularly the historiography of the 
South, might lead the authors to an understanding of how Tech does or does not play that 
role.34 
James Riley Montgomery, Stanley J. Folmsbee, and Lee Seifert Greene’s To 
Foster Knowledge: A History of the University of Tennessee, 1794-1970 also lacks 
historiographical context.  The history does place the events at the university into a larger 
political context, particularly with regard to how the three geographic divisions in 
Tennessee impact support of higher education.  Like Dyer and McMath, et al, 
Montgomery and his colleagues effectively delineate the battles between agriculturalists 
                                                 
34 Robert C. McMath, Jr., Ronald H. Bayor, James E. Brittain, Lawrence Foster, 
August W. Giebelhaus, and Germaine M. Reed, Engineering the New South: Georgia 
Tech, 1885-1985 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985). 
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and industrialists that were so critical in shaping the form of southern public universities 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.35  
Published in 1997, Peter Wallenstein’s Virginia Tech, Land-Grant University, 
1872-1997: A History of a School, a State, and a Nation shares many of the desirable 
characteristics of the institutional histories of the 1980s.  As well as any of the other 
historians discussed here, Wallenstein effectively connects his subject institution to the 
political context of its home state.  Likewise, he makes useful connections between 
Virginia Tech and the other public research universities in Virginia, analyzing how they 
interacted in addressing issues of common concern.  While his organization is more 
traditional, Wallenstein’s analysis of race and particularly of gender are refreshing when 
cast in the light of previous house histories.36 
In A History of the University of South Carolina, Henry Lesesne is unapologetic 
for his traditional house history form, but he pulls no punches in his critique of the 
University.  He shows how segregation and resistance to civil rights consistently held 
back efforts to expand access and academic offerings.  As well as in any other house 
history, Lesesne discusses the restrictions administrators placed on free speech during the 
1950s and early 1960s as the university struggled with the “Negro issue,” and he shows 
the constant tensions between the University’s attempts to meet the needs of the state and 
its efforts at reaching for national prominence.  Essentially he poses, yet does not answer, 
a question with huge contemporary policy implications: how does a public flagship 
                                                 
35 James Riley Montgomery, Stanley J. Folmsbee, and Lee Seifert Greene, To 
Foster Knowledge: A History of the University of Tennessee, 1794-1970 (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1984). 
36 Peter Wallenstein, Virginia Tech, Land-Grant University, 1872-1997: A History 
of a School, a State, and a Nation (Blacksburg: Pocahontas, 1997). 
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university in the South achieve national prominence while remaining a university of the 
state not a university simply in the state.37 
 Like Lesesne, Charles Mohr and Joseph Gordon appropriately take their 
institution and its leaders to task in Tulane: The Emergence of a Modern University, 
1945-1980.  In the end, Mohr and Gordon suggest that Tulane has emerged as a 
successful modern university, but their implication is that the institution’s trajectory 
could have been much different.  Mohr and Gordon gracefully explore the intersection of 
Tulane’s dependence on federal contracts, post-war anticommunism, and the 
maintenance of southern racial norms.  The authors argue convincingly that a tricky 
triangulated system developed in the 1950s at Tulane.  Heavily dependent on federal 
research expenditures, Tulane diverted federal attention to their segregationist ways by 
encouraging and fully cooperating with anticommunist investigations.  With few actual 
communists on campus, segregationist board members were able to focus the attention on 
individuals or groups who sought to subvert the boundaries imposed by racial 
segregation.38 
This dissertation shares the view of several studies that state higher education and 
economic policies are central to notions of progress in post-World War II America.  
David Samsing’s work on Mississippi joins Peter Wallenstein’s Virginia Tech study as 
excellent southern examples of this relationship.  David Sansing evaluates the 
development of Mississippi’s state system of higher education.  He illustrates vividly 
how a society and its values shape its educational institutions.  This is a story of 
                                                 
37 Henry Lesesne, A History of the University of South Carolina (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2001).  
38 Clarence L. Mohr and Joseph E. Gordon, Tulane: The Emergence of a Modern 
University, 1945-1980  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001) 
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persistent political interference in institutional governance, interference generally 
designed to maintain white, male hegemony.  Although the black point of view is largely 
absent, Sansing does an exceptional job of delineating the socio-political context in 
which this system emerged and existed.39 
Outside the South, only a few studies have linked state higher education policies 
to notions of progress in post-war society, likely because it requires such complex 
negotiations of political, economic, cultural, and social analyses.  Lois Fisher’s work on 
Idaho and Washington moves only slightly beyond a basic narrative, but she does show 
how different sets of geopolitical forces in very similar states can result in very different 
state systems of higher education.  Judith Glazer’s article on Nelson Rockefeller and the 
development of the SUNY system in New York is very traditional in its approach but 
useful in showing how various groups and their agendas impact the realization of public 
higher education policy.  Carol Everyly Floyd’s work on Illinois is even more analytical 
in that respect by revealing the complex interplay between the executive and legislative 
branches of government, the state higher education coordinating body, faculty and 
administrators at individual institutions, public interest organizations, and individual 
members of the public.40 
                                                 
39 David G. Sansing, Making Haste Slowly: The Troubled History of Higher 
Education in Mississippi (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1990); Wallenstein, 
Virginia Tech, Land-Grant University, 1872-1997. 
 40 Judith S. Glazer, “Nelson Rockefeller and the Politics of Higher Education in 
New York State,” History of Higher Education Annual 9 (1989), 87-114; Carol Everly 
Floyd, “Centralization and Decentralization of State Decision Making for Public 
Universities in Illinois,” History of Higher Education Annual 12 (1992), 101-118; Lois 
A. Fisher, “The Role of Politics in the Organization and Development of Public Higher 
Education in Idaho and Washington,” History of Higher Education Annual 5 (1985), 111-
132. 
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However, it is John Aubrey Douglass and Richard M. Freeland who set the 
standard and provide some useful models for similar work that needs to be written on the 
South.41  Freeland’s massive volume, Academia’s Golden Age: Universities in 
Massachusetts, 1945-1970, deals less with the development of a state system of higher 
education and more with the natural market-driven system that emerged in a state long 
dominated by private institutions.  Freeland discusses the increasing homogeneity of 
institutional type as universities sought prestige through research and graduate education 
at the expense of undergraduate teaching and learning.  He correctly argues that the move 
from local to national recruitment strategies increased class stratification despite 
administrators’ pronouncements that their admissions policies were more “democratic.”  
John Aubrey Douglass notes that the “context of policymaking – the interplay between 
the academy and state and local government, and ultimately the taxpayer – is historically 
one of the most important influences on the organization, funding, and mission of 
American higher education.”42  In his study of California, Douglass carefully explicates 
the evolution of the state’s elaborate tripartite higher education system and masterfully 
illuminates the intricacies of the interplay he describes.  While by strict definition, they 
write top-down policy history, Douglass and Freeland appropriately ascribe agency to 
citizens, faculty members, and students.  In turn, they show the social policy implications 
decisions have on “real” people. 
                                                 
 41 John Aubrey Douglass, The California Idea and American Higher Education 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); John Aubrey Douglass, “Californians and 
Public Higher Education: Political Culture, Educational Opportunity and State 
Policymaking,” History of Higher Education Annual 16 (1996), 71-104;  Richard M. 
Freeland, Academia’s Golden Age: Universities in Massachusetts, 1945-1970 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
 42 Douglass, “Californians and Public Higher Education: Political Culture, 
Educational Opportunity and State Policymaking,” 72. 
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Purpose and Organization of Study 
 
This study examines the University of Kentucky’s efforts to develop and 
implement an “action program” in eastern Kentucky in the 1960s.  An action program is 
an extension of applied research, where University personnel not only create or interpret 
knowledge but they serve as actors in the field through consultation and direct 
involvement in programming.  Action programs were not new to the University of 
Kentucky or land-grant universities generally in 1960.  Cooperative Extension had been 
delivering forms of action programs for nearly a half century, but University leaders 
fashioned this action program as a university-wide effort to solve what many would argue 
was Kentucky’s ugliest problem.43  
 This study mostly follows a chronological narrative.  Chapter 2 examines the 
origins of the University’s action program in eastern Kentucky.  This chapter addresses 
the conversations among a group of influential social scientists in the late 1950s who 
sought to create a mechanism at the University for “planned change.”  The realization of 
their vision was delayed, but their ideas would influence the University’s approach to the 
mountains for many years.  Chapter 2 also traces the efforts of the College of Agriculture 
to expand Extension work to specifically address the needs of eastern Kentucky.  Those 
interests, in the context of a politically favorable environment, led to the rushed 
development of a successful Kellogg Foundation proposal. 
Chapter 3 describes the implementation of the University’s action program 
through a modified Extension program for eastern Kentucky and the Kellogg Foundation-
supported Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Program (EKRDP).  While the 
                                                 
43 Rasmussen, Taking the University to the People. 
  27 
 
development of the modified Extension program was thoughtful and orderly, the 
development of the EKRDP was haphazard and reactive.  Both were big on ideas and 
short on substance.  The plans proved difficult to execute in concert, and neither provided 
the expected results. 
 The fourth chapter explores the changing landscape at the University and in 
Appalachian public policy in 1964 and 1965.  During this period, the passage of the 
Equal Opportunity Act (EOA) and the Appalachian Regional Development Act (ARDA), 
the creation of the University’s Center for Developmental Change (CDC), and continued 
concern over the EKRDP reshaped institutional leaders’ thinking about the University’s 
action program and its relation to the War on Poverty.  This chapter examines the 
important Carnahan House Conference where the University reconfirmed its commitment 
to a total university action program in the region while shifting the leadership of the 
eastern Kentucky effort to the CDC.  The chapter also explores the highly 
interdisciplinary Grannie’s Branch proposal and its demise amid contradictory and 
changing policies. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the University’s eastern Kentucky efforts in the second half 
of the 1960s.  University confidence in the EKRDP had steadily eroded, and a leadership 
change in early 1965 prompted the complete reexamination of the program.  This chapter 
explores the scathing 1965 CDC evaluation of the EKRDP, the President’s Committee on 
the EKRDP that sought to recast the project, and the ultimate end of the program in 1968.  
The fifth chapter also examines the CDC’s involvement in the eastern Kentucky program 
after 1965.  Though the University had tapped the Center to lead the eastern Kentucky 
effort, the CDC lacked stability, the faculty who had been the driving force behind the 
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Center did not want to be tied down to Appalachian projects, and the changing 
expectations for faculty work ushered in by the “Oswald Revolution” did not reward the 
interdisciplinary action necessary for the program’s success.  The failed Kellogg 
Foundation proposal in 1966 and the departure of Edward Weidner in 1967 effectively 
ended any hope of a CDC-led action program in eastern Kentucky.  The chapter 
concludes with an examination of funding for research and sponsored projects in eastern 
Kentucky from 1965-1970. 
This dissertation addresses several key research questions in the examination of 
the University of Kentucky’s action program in eastern Kentucky.  Why did the 
University pursue an action program?  Who provided leadership to the effort, how did it 
develop, and what forms did it take?  How did the action program evolve throughout the 
decade, and how did forces, both internal and external, shape its evolution?  Ultimately, 
the study seeks to determine if the action program was successful in effecting systemic 
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Chapter 2 - The Origins of the University’s Action Program 
  
The Idea of Planned Change 
 
World War II was a watershed in American history for many reasons, not the least 
of which was the opportunity it provided for individuals and organizations to take stock 
and think intentionally about how to move forward in the context of a new world order.  
In the late 1940s, as an outgrowth of the Committee for Kentucky, a group of University 
of Kentucky faculty led by Dean Weist in the College of Commerce began regular 
meetings on post-war planning topics.1  There was a growing notion on campus, as there 
was nationally, that social science research should have broader application.  The 
formation of the Department of Rural Sociology emerged, in part, from these discussions 
as did the Bureau for School Service in the College of Education, the Bureau of Business 
Research in the College of Commerce, the Bureau of Government Research in the 
Political Science Department, the Bureau of Community Service in Sociology, and the 
Social Research Consultation Service, also in Sociology.  During this same period, Dean 
                                                 
1In 1943, following the election of a Republican governor and a Democratic 
legislature, Kentuckians concerned that partisanship would lead to government inertia 
created the Committee for Kentucky.  As the war came to a close, the Committee geared 
up, taking stock of where the state stood and planning ways to move forward  The group 
began a massive public relations campaign and published a detailed study in 1949 
designed to rally the state to embrace a new future.  The Committee continued to function 
until the early 1950s, when it dissolved and donated the remains of their treasury to the 
University of Kentucky's Bureau of Community Service.  See Harry W. Schacter, 
Kentucky on the March (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949); Minutes of the University 
of Kentucky Board of Trustees, 17 March 1950, Special Collections Library, University 
of Kentucky, Lexington.   
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Frank Welch and some faculty in the College of Agriculture began to rethink the form of 
applied research and service practiced through Cooperative Extension.2  
By the late 1950s, a core group of UK faculty had coalesced around the idea that 
the University needed to take a more active role in “planned change.”  The group 
included rural sociologists Thomas Ford, Lee Coleman, James Brown, and Howard 
Beers, A.D. Albright in the College of Education, agricultural economist Eldon Smith, 
and David Blythe in Civil Engineering.  The entire group, except for Albright, had 
extensive experience in Appalachia, and most of the group had considerable international 
research experience as well.  The faculty believed that the complicated economic, 
political, and social problems of the twentieth century required multidisciplinary 
approaches.  The core group was small but incredibly influential, and their ideas would 
shape the University’s approach to eastern Kentucky and to rural development for many 
years to come.3 
Thomas Ford, Lee Coleman, and Howard Beers led the earliest conversations, and 
in 1956, the three began to consider the need for a center for social change at the 
University.  Beers worked throughout much of the 1950s on international development 
projects, first in India with the Ford Foundation, then in Indonesia with the Rockefeller 
Foundation and later as chief of party for a University of Kentucky contract team in 
                                                 
2Thomas R. Ford, interview by Grace M. Zilverberg, 5 November 1984, Charles 
T. Wethington University of Kentucky Oral History Collection, Louie B. Nunn Center 
for Oral History, University of Kentucky Libraries; Howard W. Beers, interview by 
Grace M. Zilverberg, 18 February 1985, Charles T. Wethington University of Kentucky 
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Indonesia.  He wanted to ensure the University’s continuation of work in this area.  Ford 
and Coleman had a greater interest in comparative studies of Appalachian and similar 
regions around the globe.  Ford, who did his doctoral research in the Peruvian highlands, 
was particularly interested in the role of mining and its impact on change.  Ford and 
Coleman also understood the state’s quickly evolving political and business climate and 
hoped to capitalize on the nascent interest in Appalachian development.4 
In 1957, Coleman drafted an extensive outline for a new University center for 
social change and shared the document with like-minded colleagues.  However, despite a 
warm reception from fellow faculty members, the group never pushed the concept 
forward, largely because they were pulled in other directions.  In 1958, Beers returned 
overseas where he remained for most of the next eight years.  Ford accepted the role as 
research director for the Ford Foundation’s Southern Appalachian Studies Project, 
something that occupied his attention from 1958 through 1962, and Coleman took a leave 
and then returned as head of Department of Sociology and Rural Sociology.  As a result, 
for the next few years, the University’s activities toward planned change existed largely 
within the College of Agriculture.5  
 
The College of Agriculture and Eastern Kentucky Development 
 
Beginning in October 1959, a group of faculty and Extension administrators in the 
UK College of Agriculture formally met to discuss how the Extension Service might 
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modify its programs in eastern Kentucky to meet the particular needs there.  Frank 
Welch, Dean of the College of Agriculture, served on the Kentucky Agricultural and 
Industrial Development Board and followed closely the activities of the Department of 
Economic Development.  He was also a Kellogg Foundation advisory board member in 
the late 1950s and encouraged the Foundation’s interest in eastern Kentucky projects.  
Like John Whisman, Welch believed that Appalachia was an underdeveloped region 
where the physical and human resources had potential but had not yet been adequately 
tapped to serve its population.   The mountains needed cooperative and strategic area 
development that brought together all levels of government with community leaders, that 
connected knowledge to practice, and that moved beyond the county boundaries that so 
often defined politics and policymaking in Kentucky.  Welch believed the state land-
grant university, through its Extension Service, could, and should, play a vital role in this 
process.6 
Nonetheless, as 1959 came to a close, the College of Agriculture had not 
developed specific plans to seek Extension solutions to mountain problems, and Welch 
and his associates had no definitive programmatic intentions.  Yet, on December 11, 
1959, speaking before a special United States Senate hearing on unemployment in 
Pikeville, J. Phil Smith, mayor of Jackson and chairman of the Robinson Agricultural 
Substation Advisory Board, called for a “national experiment in rural development.”  
Smith outlined in considerable detail an eight-county “total resource development 
program” based at the Robinson Substation in Quicksand in Breathitt County.  The 
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program, administered by the UK College of Agriculture, would help the region 
overcome its dependence on coal while developing water, forest, and agricultural 
resources and building the manufacturing and tourism base.  Smith called for federal 
funding for the project, and he embraced Whisman’s area development model for its 
organization saying that “rather than consider one small county or one small trade area 
for resource development” the idea should “include a larger area.”7 
 Welch and Smith had certainly discussed these ideas before Smith’s remarks at 
the hearing as they were incredibly consistent with the early conversations of the group 
exploring future Extension work, but later correspondence reveals that Smith’s public 
proposal took Welch off-guard.  Smith had been pushing the College of Agriculture to 
further develop the Robinson Substation and upgrade its facilities.  The slow pace of 
change frustrated Smith, and he seized upon the opportunity at the hearing, in the context 
of the larger conversations regarding eastern Kentucky development, to elevate the 
importance of the Substation.  He forced Welch’s hand, and it worked.  When asked by a 
reporter immediately after the hearing to comment on the plan, Dean Welch and Charles 
Derrickson, Superintendent of the Robinson Substation, both “gave a wholehearted 
endorsement of the program.”8 
 Though his proposal surprised Welch, Smith provided the Dean with the push he 
needed to act in a time of political opportunity.  Other than the matter of funding – Welch 
favored private foundation support over federal government support because he believed 
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it provided him with more control – Welch agreed with most of the elements of Smith’s 
proposal.  Welch had laid the groundwork for the Kellogg Foundation to support an 
eastern Kentucky program, and the political climate was ripe for exactly this type of plan.  
Not only did Program 60 have broad-based public support, but the new Governor, 
eastern Kentuckian Bert T. Combs, had promised to make the Program 60 goals 
priorities in his administration.   
 The Dean asked UK agricultural economists Eldon D. Smith and Robert W. Rudd 
to draft a proposal for submission to the Kellogg Foundation for a total resource 
development program in eastern Kentucky.  Smith and Rudd worked from December 
1959 through late January 1960 outlining a plan before Welch pulled them from the 
project and turned final proposal preparation over to J. Allen Smith, Director of Public 
Information for Agricultural Extension, and Ernest Nesius, Associate Director for 
Agricultural Extension.  Smith and Rudd objected to the speed at which they had been 
asked to do their work.  The idea that those preparing the final proposal might use 
“whatever parts of the presently developed manuscript they deem appropriate” troubled 
them.  The document had not been “refined editorially” and their recommendations 
“might have been altered or modified” if given more time and study.  Furthermore, they 
strongly asserted that planned modifications to Extension activities to support the project 
must be clearly articulated. 9 
 Welch discussed the forthcoming proposal with Emory Morris, President of the 
Kellogg Foundation, at a Kellogg board meeting in late January, receiving an enthusiastic 
response.  Welch promised delivery in early February.  The haste with which Welch and 
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his colleagues worked is best exemplified by a series of similar letters from Welch to 
Governor Combs, Lieutenant Governor Wilson Wyatt, J. Phil Smith, Thomas Ballantine, 
the President of the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce, B.F. Reed, the Chairman of the 
Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission, and Burl St. Clair, President of the 
Kentucky Farm Bureau.  Welch provided suggested copy for the men to use in their 
statements of support to the Kellogg Foundation for the project.   Noting that the project 
outline was not yet complete, Welch asked the men to “give approval to this on faith.”10 
All six complied.  Five prepared their letters immediately with Combs waiting 
four days until his staff had reviewed a request for state funding for the project.  None of 
the six saw the actual proposal before it was mailed to the Kellogg Foundation, a fact that 
would create some difficulties for Welch and the project later.11  John Whisman, 
attaching a note to Reed’s letter of support, did express some concern with the plan as he 
understood it.  He acknowledged his positive discussions with Phil Smith regarding the 
use of the Robinson Substation as a hub of development activity, but he questioned how 
the project could work as part of the Combs’ administration’s “coordination of efforts 
within a total program for the region.”  Fearing that a number of interests could 
independently pursue worthwhile but uncoordinated endeavors and thus produce little in 
results, Whisman asked to meet with Welch “immediately” upon the former’s return from 
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a trip to Washington.  He also strongly encouraged Welch to attend the March 7 meeting 
of the Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission so the group could discuss the 
proposal. 12 
On February 12, with the proposal still not complete, Welch asked UK President 
Frank Dickey to send his letter of support to the Foundation’s President in advance of the 
proposal.  Dickey’s letter emphasized that the University not only had an interest in but 
an obligation to pursue an action program in eastern Kentucky.  While many had studied 
the area and much was known about the region and its people, Dickey asserted that 
“never has an action program been outlined and attempted” and that the University was 
taking the “first step in one of the most exciting and profitable projects” of which it had 
been a part.13  On February 16, only two months after Smith set the ball rolling, Welch 
submitted the proposal to Emory Morris at Kellogg.14 
 The University’s proposal was not subject to a set funding cycle timeline, and the 
Kellogg Foundation had not provided Welch with a specific deadline.  However, there 
are several possible explanations for Welch’s interest in moving so quickly with the 
Kellogg proposal, though none are explicitly borne out in the documentary evidence.  
Phil Smith’s comments at the public hearing in Pikeville certainly forced Welch’s hand.  
Welch could have reacted less favorably to Smith’s comments, but in doing so, he would 
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have risked alienating a key ally.  Welch also believed in the idea, and failing to fully 
support it from the start might have jeopardized its possible execution later.  He 
understood that the political environment, with Combs’ recent election and the 
Governor’s full support of Whisman’s ideas in Program 60, was ripe for moving the plan 
forward.  The ideas undergirding an action program in eastern Kentucky had broad 
support, but they had not yet been dragged through the political process and picked apart.  
Effectively, the University could get out in front of that.   
Welch may have also felt a need to get out in front of Whisman’s growing 
influence and the possible impact of multi-county area development councils on the work 
and power of Extension personnel in the region.  He and others at the College of 
Agriculture were also concerned about the involvement of Adron Doran, the President of 
Morehead State, in the roll-out of Whisman’s area development vision.  That concern 
was evident just a few weeks after the submission of the Kellogg proposal.  Charlie 
Dixon and Joe Mobley from the College of Agriculture attended the Annual Conference 
of the Southern Mountains in Gatlinburg.  They reported that “there seemed to be 
considerably more recognition of the importance of economic development in the 
Appalachian area and the factors which are involved in the problem situation.”  Adron 
Doran was the keynote speaker at the conference, and Dixon and Mobley perceived a 
swipe at UK when Doran suggested that a “host of state and federal agencies are all 
working on their individual programs independently or in conflict.”15  Ernest Nesius was 
much stronger in his criticism, contending that Doran was doing “his level best to 
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associate himself with all positive economic developments, agriculture and otherwise, 
insofar as what happens in Eastern Kentucky.”  Nesius cited Doran’s membership on 
Whisman’s Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning commission and its idea of a 
government agency to coordinate all of the development activities in the region.  Nesius 
proclaimed that Doran “figures this is the best way he knows to get the University out of 
Eastern Kentucky” and called on Welch to become more visibly involved in “climate 
forming” activities “in order to stave off the inroads of various groups.”16   
Finally, Welch may have moved with such speed because he understood the 
funding realities of an action plan in eastern Kentucky.  While he was confident he could 
depend on significant support from the Kellogg Foundation, he knew that state support in 
large measure was also necessary.  Combs would present his first biennial budget to the 
Kentucky General Assembly in mid-February, and Welch needed to ensure that support 
for the University’s action plan was included.  There was a narrow window he could not 
afford to miss. 
 
The Appalachian Resource Development Project 
 
The University of Kentucky College of Agriculture’s proposal to the Kellogg 
Foundation for the “Appalachian Resource Development Project” was grand in scale and, 
not surprisingly considering the speed at which it materialized, relatively short on details.  
The proposal embraced “an action-oriented program aimed at the overall economic and 
institutional development of an area characterized by severe conditions of 
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unemployment, underemployment, and low incomes.”17  The plan was built on two 
assumptions – “that opportunities for significant improvement exist within the area” and 
that “given an understanding and appreciation of these opportunities, along with technical 
and other assistance, appropriate action will be taken by relevant agencies, groups, and 
individuals to realize these potentials.”18  There was no shying away from eastern 
Kentucky as a problem region, claiming that “it is at once a problem of education, a 
problem of political structure and organization, a problem of culture and interaction of 
people, a problem of motivation or lack of motivation, and a problem of the application 
of science and technology to local conditions.”19 
The project faulted federal “programs of activity,” such as the Small Business 
Administration, the old Farm Security Program, the Farmers Home Administration, and 
the Rural Development Program, that made people feel good about doing “something” 
but that failed to address the root causes of the challenges faced in the mountains.20  
Principal among these causes, the College believed, was the culture of the mountain 
people.  The Appalachian Resource Development Project promised to be different.  
Citing extensive experience in the region, the College believed “much could be done to 
alleviate these conditions through an intensive program of total resource development, 
including the stimulation and strengthening of motivation on the part of the people 
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themselves.”21   The College expected the project to be a national model for the 
improvement of impoverished areas with inadequate resource utilization.22    
 The project targeted thirty eastern Kentucky counties where the project would put 
together “a package of technical and organizational skills not hitherto available.”23  The 
energy of the program would be directed at the most likely opportunities for resource 
development and institutional change using a team of coordinated specialists under the 
direction of the Dean of the College of Agriculture and with the immediate supervision of 
a project lead located at the Robinson Substation.   The project demanded much of this 
team of specialists.  The team was expected to discover “pockets of opportunity” and 
guide the “whole bloc” of organizations and government agencies toward “concentrated 
economic or social progress.”  After potential projects were identified, the specialists 
would present plans of action to local leaders, provide or arrange for the necessary 
training, and then “assume an aggressive leadership role” in working with organizations 
and government agencies, “the efforts of which in this area have so far been relatively 
ineffectual.”24  
An advisory committee consisting of University representatives and key local 
leaders would assist the specialists in the organization, execution, and evaluation of the 
program.25  The plan recognized the areas of need for specialized assistance might 
change as “new vistas of opportunity emerge,” but the initial team of specialists would 
consist of ten staff members in the following areas: industrial development; community 
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improvement and planning; adult career guidance and job placement; youth organization, 
education and vocational guidance; soil, water, and crop management; horticulture; 
commercial poultry and eggs; meat animal and milk production; forest management and 
utilization; marketing, management, and transportation.26 
The success of the project depended on modifications in the county Extension 
program.  The proposal’s description of the modified Extension effort seems intentionally 
vague, likely because it was not fully formed, but the general idea was for county agents 
to become conduits between the project specialists and the programs they developed and 
county officials and organizations.  County agents, then, would work most closely with 
local leaders in “group decision-making” and with individuals and families in need of 
“direct information to meet their particular kinds of problems.”27 
The College sought support from the Kellogg Foundation for a period of seven 
years, beginning on July 1, 1960 and ending on June 30, 1967.  The project required 
additional office, laboratory, and demonstration space as well as new equipment at the 
Robinson Substation.  According to the proposal, the College would invest $200,000 in 
the first two years of the project to meet those needs.  The College would also fund all of 
the non-personnel operating costs associated with the project.  The proposal sought 
Kellogg’s support to fund the salaries for the specialists and some secretarial staff.  UK 
would begin to take over support of the specialists’ salaries, adding one each year 
beginning in the third year of engagement.  The University sought $754,000 from 
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Kellogg while committing $1,700,000 of institutional funds over the course of the 
project.28 
On March 24, 1960, Glenwood Creech, a UK alumnus and Vice President for 
Agriculture at Kellogg, notified Dean Welch that the Foundation was committed to 
support the Appalachian Resource Development Project as described in the proposal.  
Creech’s letter outlined some very typical terms of support and added, “We feel that this 
project will be of much value to Eastern Kentucky and as a demonstration program of 
improvement to other areas of inadequate resource development.”29 
At this point, the Appalachian Resource Development Project was little more than 
a collection of big ideas.  Moving from the idea stage to project launch proved much 
more difficult than Welch and Dickey likely imagined.  Less than one week after 
Kellogg’s notification of support, the University requested permission to push the project 
start date back by six months.   Citing concerns over the present housing situation at 
Quicksand, the need to construct office and laboratory facilities, and the time required to 
recruit and hire “the type of personnel that we will want identified with the program,” 
Welch and Dickey proposed a January 1, 1961, effective date.  Following an exchange of 
several letters and phone calls, the Foundation approved the deferred start with an 
expression of strong concern.30 
The Foundation grew more concerned when the University balked on publicity 
for the project.  “We may have a little problem about the press release here,” Welch 
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wrote to Creech on April 9, noting that the “Governor had been told on a confidential 
basis that we would be given these funds but that no publicity was to be given to this.”  
Combs was concerned with how the announcement might impact the roll out of his larger 
eastern Kentucky program.  Welch agreed to take the matter up with Combs, and the 
Foundation issued a press release on April 26.31 
However, Combs was not satisfied with the resolution of the situation involving 
the press release as he made clear to Welch and Dickey at a meeting on May 13 called 
specifically to address the matter.  In fact, there was very little regarding the project that 
satisfied him.  The Governor believed he had been misled, though likely unintentionally, 
regarding the project plan, and he expressed regret at lending his support to the proposal 
without first seeing it.  He felt very strongly that the project would compete with several 
state agencies charged with work in eastern Kentucky.  He was especially concerned with 
the interference of project specialists in the activities of the Eastern Kentucky Regional 
Planning Commission, the Forestry Department, and the Department of Economic 
Development.  At worst, this interference would limit the success of these agencies, but 
at the very least, Combs argued the duplication of effort would create confusion.  
Furthermore, Combs suggested that the higher grant-supported salaries paid to the project 
specialists might induce talented state employees to leave for positions with the 
University.  Following up with Combs after the meeting, Welch wrote, “we think some 
understandings were clarified, and we would hope that all could be clarified so that we 
here at the University can work effectively and in full confidence with all public agencies 
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serving Eastern Kentucky.”  Welch assured the Governor that the University had no 
intention of competing with any state or federal agencies and agreed with the need for 
mutual cooperation. 32 
 Welch attempted further damage control in the days following the meeting with 
the Governor.  The Dean communicated with Combs, John Whisman, Robert Bell in 
Lieutenant Governor Wyatt’s office, Bruce Kennedy, the Commissioner for Economic 
Development, and Morehead State President Adron Doran who served on the Eastern 
Kentucky Regional Planning Commission.  In each communication, Welch addressed the 
Governor’s concerns with the project and asked for cooperation and support in its 
implementation.  Combs and members of his administration continued to offer public 
gestures of support to the Appalachian Resource Development Project, but privately they 
maintained their misgivings. 33  Others vocalized the same concerns.  Just before the 
formal launch of the project, S.C. Van Curon, the influential editor of the State Journal in 
Frankfort, harshly criticized the University’s management of the project.  He accused the 
University of building an unnecessary bureaucracy with taxpayer money, of getting 
around constitutional pay restrictions by hiring a consultant, and of duplicating efforts 
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already performed by the Eastern Kentucky Development Commission and the state 
Forestry Department. 34 
 Many eastern Kentuckians, fatigued by frequent surveys and studies of their 
region, saw the project as just another hollow attempt by academics to identify the 
problems of the region while providing no solutions.  The Menifee County Journal 
offered a satirical portrait of experts solving problems in a conference room far from 
eastern Kentucky.  “When things do not play out as expected, the committee of experts 
say in unison ‘We’ll conduct a survey!’”35  Extension administrator Mike Duff shared 
with Dean Welch that “the term ‘survey project’ is as distasteful to some business and 
political leaders as the word ‘dance’ is to conservative religious leaders,” and the Tri-City 
News in Harlan County editorialized, “ Why do we need other studies?  Why not use the 
money to put into practice some of the worthwhile ideas which have been offered, rather 
than to spend money and effort on another survey only to have it put in a file along with 
its many predecessors.”36 
 The University’s response to this concern was clear and consistent.  Writing in 
Kentucky Farm News, Welch explained, “The project is an action-oriented approach to 
the economic problems of eastern Kentucky. It will not be a study, not a survey, but a 
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program designed to find and develop resources not now being fully utilized.”37  Welch, 
Dickey and others echoed this response in every description of the project.  They also 
made clear who was initiating the action as the Lexington Leader reported from a 
ceremony at the Robinson Substation in December 1960.  “Dean Welch said this program 
was not a survey but a program of action which will be carried out, not by the Kellogg 
Foundation, as many here had believed, but by the University of Kentucky.”38  In its role 
as the state’s land-grant university, UK intended to fulfill its responsibility to the 
Commonwealth through action, but exactly what that would look like was still unknown 
to all in 1960. 
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Chapter 3 - The Implementation of the University’s Action Program 
  
The University was clearly committed to pursuing an “action program” in eastern 
Kentucky, but there was anything but clarity in how that action would be organized.  One 
of the greatest challenges in the implementation of the action program was the lack of 
coordination between two important processes - the development of a modified Extension 
program in eastern Kentucky and the development of the Appalachian Resource 
Development Project.   The two were inextricably linked.  In fact, the latter depended 
heavily on the execution of the former, and many of the same players were involved in 
both discussions.  Nonetheless, while there was a clear recognition of their 
interconnectedness, the processes played out largely independently.   
 
A Modified Extension Program in Eastern Kentucky 
 
The small committee of faculty that began meeting in the fall of 1959 to consider 
a modified Extension program in eastern Kentucky realized that its work would 
necessarily be influenced by the Kellogg proposal.  At its February 18, 1960, meeting, the 
first held after the ARDP idea was developed, the members noted that the “package of 
technical services available at Quicksand” was a “factor which enters into making the 
needed approach” for modified Extension.1  Over the next month, the core committee 
created brief outlines for seven Extension planks to “test” with a larger group of faculty, 
Extension specialists, and county agents at a March 14 meeting.  The committee opened 
the March 14 meeting opened with a discussion on the Appalachian Resource 
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Development Project proposal followed by a conversation on the probable impact of the 
project on Extension and “the need for modifying our programs to fit into these 
proposals.”2  However, despite assertions that the two plans must be linked, there was 
little connection between the planks the group developed and discussed and the 
framework for ARDP. 
From the discussions with the larger test group on March 14 emerged a series of 
“general conclusions” around which the core group constructed the modified Extension 
framework.  Most significantly, the group determined that Agricultural Extension would 
need to become more of a general Extension service, with its activities extending beyond 
agriculture.  Extension workers would serve more as “coordinators, cooperators, 
stimulators, and encouragers.”  Their most important job was overcoming the 
individualistic attitude of many in the region by teaching and implementing a “pattern of 
community cooperation.”  The group asserted that agents would need intensive training 
on how to motivate people and mobilize key community leaders.  They also contended 
that this work demanded greater skill levels than those currently expected of county 
agents, and if implemented, the modified program would require additional training for 
existing agents as well as the elimination or curtailing of some of Extension’s present 
activities.3 
When the core committee met again on April 11, they reviewed the feedback on 
the seven planks and agreed to move forward with the existing set.  The committee 
charged Ernest Nesius and the Extension Program chairmen with drafting the overall 
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philosophy, objectives, and scope of the new program as well as revised job descriptions 
for the agents.  The group appointed seven subcommittees, one for each of the planks, 
and directed them to draft the purpose and the requirements needed to accomplish each 
one. They also discussed the development of a program manual, and they set a timeline 
for training personnel in the modified method.4   
The core committee did not meet in May.  Instead, on May 23, the group led a 
general discussion in Quicksand on the modified program and the proposed planks with 
all county agents in eastern Kentucky.  The committee offered seven planks: an intensive 
program in the basics of living; an education program on the technical services of other 
agencies; leadership in action and decision-making; assistance in adult career guidance; 
development of specialized agricultural sources of income; close cooperation with 
community and industrial development projects; and an educational program for youth 
development. The feedback from the agents prompted the core committee to recognize 
that the planks still needed considerable work.  Consequently, at their June meeting, the 
core committee pushed back their training timeline, moving the target for completion of a 
training manual from July 1 to September 1 and moving on-campus training for agents 
from August 1-5 to September 20-23.5  Concerned with the progress and the quality of 
the training materials, Ernest Nesius asked UK rural sociologist James Brown to draft the 
training manual and to plan the first day of the September training workshop.  Brown had 
been involved in the core group from the earliest conversations about the development of 
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the modified Extension program, but Nesius’ move gave Brown considerably more 
influence in the process than he had before.6 
In mid-September, the College of Agriculture distributed Brown’s training 
manual to county Extension agents in eastern Kentucky to review in preparation for 
training later that month.  While suggesting that the “the role of Extension remains 
basically the same in that it is educational, its basic purpose being to change attitudes, to 
broaden horizons, and to increase knowledge and skills,” the document boldly embraced 
a broader view of Extension work that was “much less closely related to agriculture.”  
The modified approach was necessary, Brown argued, because the challenges of eastern 
Kentucky demanded it.   To tackle these challenges, Extension had “to become more 
closely related to the general University” and “draw upon the vast resources of 
knowledge and skill of a growing, developing university.”  Extension personnel, the 
guide asserted, must call on “specialists and teachers in all colleges of the University,” 
explaining that this was “most notably true” in eastern Kentucky where “big social, 
economic and psychological adjustments … involve whole persons, whole communities, 
whole areas, and hence the whole range of knowledge.”7 
The training guide contended that “modifying the traditional pattern” for 
Extension required “reorganizing and emphasizing certain ideas and principles.”  Brown 
noted that maximum results are not accomplished by a single organization but rather by 
relevant educational, civic, and business groups working together.  The best decisions are 
achieved when people apply analytical and technical know-how to their own resources, 
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and the Extension agent is responsible for “educating people and groups to help 
themselves.”  Additionally, the University expected Extension agents to be active leaders 
in their communities and to be “a person in the center” of local decision-making 
activities.  Not surprisingly, there was a strong paternalistic bent to this document.  In 
relationships between Extension workers and members of mountain communities, the 
document assumed agents would make all of the valuable contributions with their 
neighbors receiving much and contributing little.8 
Brown outlined five objectives for a modified Extension program in eastern 
Kentucky.  First, Extension would help people “face facts and situations realistically, 
recognizing not only their limitations but the scope and value of their inner strengths and 
the availability of many resources to help them.”  Second, Extension educational 
activities would provide families and individuals with relevant programming.  Third, 
Extension agents would maintain a leadership role within both lay and professional 
groups.  Fourth, agents would assist in the establishment of group action, including the 
training of leaders, and fifth, in keeping with the College’s culture of poverty perspective, 
Extension should “create a progressive, hopeful attitude among the people of the area 
which will lead them to recognize their resources, strengths, and possibilities so that they 
can take their rightful place in American society.”9 
The scope of the modified Extension program, according to manual, would be 
determined by the particular needs of a county, by the limitations of the agent’s 
knowledge and skills, by the specialists available to them, and by the limitations of the 
“horizons of the people with whom the agents work.”  In many cases, Brown argued, the 
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ignorance of the persons with whom agents work requires the agents “to awaken or 
arouse” recognition and interest in the problems and opportunities.  The manual stressed 
the role of the Extension agents as educators but reminded them that education is a part of 
action and that action would be achieved through the “big, rough blocks of the total 
program,” otherwise known as the “planks.”  The modified Extension manual offered the 
original seven planks discussed at the May meeting in Quicksand.  Only one of the seven 
planks dealt specifically with agriculture.10 
The training guide had big ideas, it had bold pronouncements, and it had its seven 
planks, but it had no real specificity and no permanence.  The first sentence explained, 
“The following pages give you a description of the thinking to date of a group of 
committees which have been trying to formulate suggestions for a modified Extension 
Program for Eastern Kentucky.”  These committees had been at work, in one form or 
another, for almost a year.  In the manual, Brown expressed that this was not “the 
modified program for Eastern Kentucky, but a modified program.”  The program to be 
implemented was still being formed, and the framers called on the county agents to help 
shape it – “You are expected to be creative partners in the formation of the total program, 
and you will note that some important aspects of the program have deliberately not been 
worked out even in outline form, because these aspects are clearly a part of your area of 
experience and responsibility.”11   
On Tuesday, September 20, over 100 Extension agents from eastern Kentucky as 
well as Extension specialists and administrators based in Lexington gathered on the 
University’s campus to begin the process of giving greater shape to the modified 
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Extension program.  For four days, they met to discuss the mountain’s challenges that 
gave rise to this new approach and the ways they might tackle those ills.  James Brown 
planned the first day of training and invited President Dickey to open the session. With an 
address titled, “The Role of the University of Kentucky as a Whole in the Eastern 
Kentucky Program,” Dickey argued that the entire University had a responsibility to 
actively contribute to solutions to the region’s thorniest problems.  Extension, Dickey 
noted, was an extension of the whole University not just the College of Agriculture. 12  
Brown then chaired two discussion panels.  In the first, four faculty members outlined the 
present conditions in eastern Kentucky.  Brown explained existing social and cultural 
structures, Warren Haynes presented on coal mining, Earl Mayhew talked about 
agriculture and forestry, and Paul Street discussed education.  Then, in a second session, 
H.A. Ritchie from the United States Soil Conversation Service, John Whisman from the 
Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission, and sociologist Howard Beers 
responded to the faculty panel.  In preparation, Brown asked both groups to keep in mind 
three critical questions.  First, why is a “modified program in the Extension considered 
wise and necessary?”  Second, how can all colleges and departments within the 
University “cooperate with and help Eastern Kentucky’s people in solving their pressing 
problems,” and third, how can the whole of the University “best cooperate and promote 
the work of other agencies and organizations?”13  In the afternoon session, Alda Henning, 
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Chairman of Home Economics Extension, and S.C. Bohanan, Chairman of Agricultural 
Extension, presented a summary of the development of the modified program to date, 
including the planks, and facilitated a discussion.  On Wednesday, Henning and Bohanan 
reviewed the previous afternoon’s session and led another discussion followed by 
afternoon break-out groups on the seven planks.   On Thursday, the groups tacked the 
planks with guided questions of greater specificity, and on Friday, the groups reported 
back to the whole body.14 
While the training conference was very well planned and executed, little in the 
way of additional direction emerged from the discussions.  The groups discussed a 
number of ideas, but the College of Agriculture provided Extension workers with no 
additional guidance, either at the conference or in the months after it, on the 
implementation of the modified Extension program.  The county agents were largely left 
to their own devices with some assistance from their district leaders.  This was part 
design – the belief that the modified program needed the agents as “creative partners” 
drawing on their “experience and responsibility” – and part the result of a hastily 
conceived and poorly developed framework for the Appalachian Resources Development 
Project, with which the modified Extension program was tied.15 
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Developing the Appalachian Resource Development Project 
 
Regardless of the result, the planning process for the modified Extension program 
was orderly and thoughtful.  In contrast, the planning process for the Appalachian 
Resource Development Project was haphazard and reactive.  Immediately after receiving 
confirmation of Kellogg’s support, Dean Welch’s directed S.C. Bohanan, Chairman of 
Agricultural Extension Programs, to begin the search for staff specialists.  Welch and 
Bohanan had real concerns about their ability to hire competent specialists willing to live 
at Quicksand in Breathitt County.  They were less concerned about finding a qualified 
project supervisor who would be based in Lexington, intending to fill that position closer 
to the project launch.  However, they started these searches without knowing how the 
program would be organized and how the reporting lines would be structured.  Some 
interested College of Agriculture faculty quickly expressed concern.  They argued that a 
highly skilled, and highly compensated project lead be selected first.  The project lead 
could not only help develop the program but also hire the specialists in keeping with the 
supervisor’s vision for the project’s implementation.16 
 Soon Bohanan saw the challenge in moving forward in hiring without key 
program details worked out, noting in late April that “the question is continually arising 
as to the pattern to be followed in operating the program at Quicksand.  Those whom we 
are interviewing would like to know how it is to be supervised and how each individual 
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will fit into the total program.”  He encouraged Welch to develop some definitive plans 
and offered his own suggestions as a starting point for discussion.17 
Bohanan argued for the integration of the project staff into the “total College of 
Agriculture program.”  He favored academic appointments for each specialist, allowing 
them to look to that department for subject matter and support.  The specialists would 
report to the appropriate department chairmen.  There should be regular meetings of the 
specialists, the department chairmen, and the Extension district leaders.  These meetings 
would serve the purpose of coordinating the program and connecting the project’s 
activities with other Extension efforts across the Commonwealth.  Bohanan rejected the 
necessity of a project lead, instead proposing that one of the specialists act as a 
coordinator.  This coordinator would have no authority over the others, aside from the 
ability to call them together for meetings, to chair those meetings, and to help facilitate 
communication.  Despite considerable disagreement among the faculty and staff, Welch 
had not staked out a firm position on these matters, so he followed Bohanan’s lead.18  
 Confusion continued, however, especially after several faculty members were 
asked to assist with the program planks for the modified Extension program with no 
understanding of how the modified program would connect to ARDP.  Eldon Smith 
summed up the frustration, “I have been unable to obtain a clear statement from anyone 
regarding the purpose of the planks, by whom they are to be used, and the total 
administrative setting in which the program is to be implemented.”  Smith, noting that he 
was speaking after conversations with several colleagues who shared all or part of his 
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perspective, raised some important questions regarding the path the project’s 
development had taken.  He asked if the basic approach outlined in the project proposal 
for leadership through the Dean and a project director was “being abandoned in favor of a 
segmented administration through usual district agents and subject matter department 
channels” and if so who was managing the program’s redesign?  Were the planks 
intended to establish reporting lines for the specialists?  Did the many committees at 
work designing planks replace the advisory board originally outlined?  How would 
specialists responsible to department heads coordinate with other specialists in a 
meaningful way?  Were the planks to provide a framework for the specialists or were 
they to provide only a framework for the modified Extension program?  If the specialists 
“require technical abilities of the order suggested by the proposal,” could the University 
really expect a group of people lacking that technical knowledge to design a program for 
those specialists, and if the project is fundamentally about coordination, how can the 
program be executed without hiring a highly trained and exceptionally skilled leader? 19  
Smith’s critique was right on the mark, and Welch backed off Bohanan’s 
recommendations.  Instead, he asked the well-respected rural sociologist James Brown 
for his ideas on the project’s implementation.  This move is significant in one very 
important way.  As he had demonstrated in his work on the modified Extension program 
in eastern Kentucky, Brown favored broadening the conversation.  In the case of ARDP, 
he shifted the thinking from a College of Agriculture project to a University project 
administered through the College of Agriculture.  While that distinction was ultimately 
lost in the implementation of the Appalachian Resource Development Program, Brown’s 
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introduction of that narrative guided the University’s official philosophy toward applied 
knowledge and action in eastern Kentucky throughout the 1960s. 
Brown called the project an “exciting, challenging opportunity,” but he noted that 
“our pressing need at the moment is planning.”  In keeping with the work he had been 
performing on the modified Extension program, Brown saw ARDP as a total university 
program and suggested a university-wide committee to plan for the program and to 
produce a sourcebook for use in policymaking and execution.  He stressed the importance 
of evaluation, and somewhat amazingly, he seems to be the first to finally suggest the 
need to coordinate the ongoing efforts of the modified Extension with those of ADRP, 
especially with regard to training county agents to prepare for the reality of executing 
both in concert.20  Welch responded simply, “I think this is a good idea.  Would you 
suggest some names so we can get started?”21 
Brown did, and on August 2, Welch invited thirty-one faculty and staff members 
from across the University to participate in the Appalachian Resource Development 
Project planning committee.  The program launch was five months away, and Welch 
correctly noted that “much needs to be done in terms of formulating the administrative 
and operational framework, preparing for specific projects and programs of activities, and 
selecting the appropriate personnel for the program.”  Following Brown’s lead, he 
explicitly expressed for the first time that the project would be “formulated in such a way 
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as to involve the total resources of the University.”  Calling the first meeting of the group 
for August 13, he named S.C. Bohanan its chair.22 
At the committee’s first meeting, Bohanan asked Brown to discuss the project’s 
concept and its essential elements.  Brown first emphasized that this was a “total 
university effort,” necessarily administered through Extension because of its presence in 
every Kentucky county.  However, the emphasis was on the entire institution, and there 
was an opportunity for colleges and departments to contribute in multiple ways.  Brown 
further noted that the program was designed to serve a specific and well-defined area 
with the intention of being a model for not just Appalachia but other depressed areas.  
The program was to be dynamic, continually evolving, and the “resource to be developed 
is ‘people.’”  Like others before him, he stressed this was “an education action program” 
with work “in the most strategic areas.”  After some discussion, the group agreed “that 
these concepts outlined by Dr. Brown were acceptable and should serve as guides for 
further development of the program.”  An executive committee of the group, with 
representatives from across campus was formed, and they agreed to meet in one week’s 
time.23 
 The primary purpose of the executive committee meeting on August 22 was to 
consider the specialist positions needed for the project and to make any “desired 
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recommendations or changes.” 24  The project proposal had little specificity, but it had 
been very specific on the areas of expertise required for the specialist positions, the 
majority of them being in agricultural fields.  Given the broader, university-wide 
approach endorsed at the previous meeting, the committee now seemed willing to 
consider different specialty areas.  However, S. C. Bohanan, the committee chair, 
remained wedded to his original intentions for the program’s organization.   Bohanan, 
Chair of Agricultural Extension Program, was reluctant to move away from the project’s 
agricultural focus, and he continued to believe the specialists should report to their 
respective academic departments in the College of Agriculture, not through the Extension 
administration or to the Dean’s office. 
 In a September 12 letter to Welch, copied to the project’s executive committee, 
Brown made clear his concerns with Bohanan’s position.  Calling the project, “the 
greatest opportunity we at the University of Kentucky have ever had to help the people of 
eastern Kentucky,” he implored Welch to give his “strength, direction, support, and 
decision.”  Asking Welch to, at the very least attend the meetings of the executive 
committee, Brown went further and urged the Dean to become the chairman of the group.  
Brown questioned the balance of agricultural and non-agricultural specialists.  While the 
group agreed that “people developing” was the most important emphasis, they decided 
more than half of the specialist would focus on agriculture.  “I do want to be on record,” 
he wrote, “as opposing the present composition of the list of specialists.  I (and, I am 
sure, some other members of the Executive Committee) think the list should be revised 
again much more carefully.”  The discussions regarding the revised model for Extension 
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for eastern Kentucky moved away from agriculture, and Brown wondered how that 
would mesh with the Appalachian Resource Development Project which he saw as 
agriculturally heavy.  Brown dismissed concerns that the Kellogg Foundation would 
object to substantive changes to the program and encouraged the involvement of the 
Foundation’s Glenwood Creech in the discussions.  Additionally, he questioned the 
influence of the lay advisory committee, chaired by banker and Jackson mayor J. Phil 
Smith, “We have a far greater obligation to the people of Eastern Kentucky than to the 
power structures, which often are handicaps and among the greatest detriments to 
progress in the area.”  Responding to apparent concerns of committee members that 
College of Agriculture politics made it difficult to drop agricultural specialties, Brown 
said, “I don’t know much about this, but it is a poor basis for spending this much money 
on an experimental program, and I cannot believe that you would seriously entertain such 
limitations.” 25 
 Welch did not respond to Brown, prompting a handwritten, private follow-up two 
days later.   
For several weeks, as you know, I have been trying to see you about the Eastern 
Kentucky project.  After the Executive Committee meeting last Friday, I have 
repeatedly tried to see you….In my opinion, the project as originally conceived 
and submitted to the Kellogg Foundation was not carefully enough thought out – 
though considering the little time spent on it and the limited knowledge of eastern 
Kentucky of those formulating it, it wasn’t too bad.  Your assurance that changes 
could be made was most important to me, just as I was and am, distressed that you 
have apparently decided no changes can be made.”26 
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Brown provided Welch with a list of scholars with considerable knowledge of eastern 
Kentucky and suggested the Dean consult with them so that his “decisions will be 
informed and realistic.”27 
 There is no record of a formal response from Welch or a consultation with the 
eastern Kentucky scholars Brown recommended Welch involve.  The Appalachian 
Resource Development Project’s executive committee moved forward with the elements 
that most concerned Brown, and when the project launched at the beginning of 1961, 
plans called for more than half of its specialists to serve in agricultural fields.  The 
executive committee, with Bohanan as its chair, continued to function as a permanent 
advisory board.  However, though not the reality of the project, Brown’s narrative of a 
total university program continued to rule the day.  At the groundbreaking for the 
project’s new building at the Robinson Substation, President Dickey remarked that the 
University was created for this sort of activity and that only the University with the 
support of all of its resources across the colleges and departments could put together this 
type of program.28  A few weeks later in an announcement to the University community, 
Dickey noted that the project was “far broader than agriculture and home economics.  It 
will offer all colleges, departments, and divisions of the University an opportunity to 
contribute to the effort.”  He went on to say, “We believe that this is somewhat unique 
and a very intensive approach to serving our major underdeveloped area of the State 
represents a challenging opportunity to the entire University.”29 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Nevyle Shackelford, “Dirt Turned for Eastern Kentucky Resources Plant,” 
Lexington Leader, 7 December 1960, 2. 
29 Frank Dickey, “Eastern Kentucky Program Launched,” n.d., Correspondence 
1961-62 (2), Kellogg Foundation Folder, William A. Seay Papers. 
  63 
 
Launching the Appalachian Resource Development Project 
  
The Appalachian Resource Development Project launched on January 1, 1961.  
The program employed only three staff specialists, and no project lead had been 
identified.  For several months, the specialists had no clear reporting lines and no office 
space, and the modified Extension program designed to support their efforts was still 
little more than a shell.  The University’s total action program in eastern Kentucky was 
off to an inauspicious start. 
In a January 1961 letter to Glenwood Creech at the Kellogg Foundation, Dean 
Welch shared the tremendous difficulty the University had in finding qualified 
professionals for the ARDP specialist posts.  The project required a high level of 
technical expertise, and few possessed the adequate skill sets.  Some qualified applicants 
“lacked the dedicated interest and the personality to fit into the Eastern Kentucky 
situation.”  He did not acknowledge that some of those willing to tackle those challenges 
and move to Quicksand may have been concerned at the lack of order to the project.  
Welch voiced his concerns at staffing the needs of the project in the first year and 
requested permission from the foundation to use some of the funds allocated for 
permanent personnel for temporary consultants instead.30  The Foundation approved the 
request.31 
Housing for ARDP specialists was a significant concern for University 
administrators as they believed that the lack of adequate housing for specialists and their 
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families was a barrier to staff recruitment.  While Dean Welch and President Dickey 
noted this concern to Kellogg officials in asking for the deferment for the project start 
date, the University did not begin to pursue a housing solution until five months later.  In 
September 1960, the University submitted a proposal to the Robinson Mountain Fund for 
financial support to build ten residences at a total cost of $160,000.  The proposal noted 
that the Kellogg Foundation had not made funds available for this purpose nor had the 
University secured state appropriations for residential construction.32  The Robinson 
Fund declined to support the proposal. 
Writing to Phil Smith in March 1961, acting Dean William Seay – Welch left the 
University early in 1961 for a post at the USDA - noted that the project could not 
“achieve maximum teamwork and coordination until the specialists are housed at Jackson 
or Quicksand.”33  The University once again approached the Robinson Mountain Fund in 
June 1961, with a more modest proposal.  Dean Seay requested $50,000 from the 
Mountain Fund in gifts and $15,000 in low-interest loans.  The monies would be used for 
site development ($1,500), to build four residences ($15,000 each), and to install a new 
well system at the Substation ($3,500).  The Robinson Fund approved the proposal, 
construction began on June 19, and the work was complete in early September.   
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Thanking Ross Sloniker, Chairman of the Robinson Mountain Fund, Seay explained, 
“This will enable us to overcome one of the major problems associated with the 
launching and execution of the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Program.”34 
While administrators found the recruitment of specialists difficult, they also 
struggled with what to do regarding the project’s leadership.  As early as April 1960, 
several influential faculty members began to mention Mike Duff as a possible director for 
the project.  Duff was an eastern Kentucky native, a University of Kentucky graduate, 
and a former UK Extension agent who had just returned to Kentucky after completing his 
Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin to assume a role in Extension administration.  James 
Brown and Ralph Ramsey called Duff “imaginative, creative, hard-working, and 
responsible.”  He is “action-oriented,” they wrote, and believed in “change of the right 
sort.”  Brown and Ramsey argued that Duff spoke in words “that Mountain people will 
understand and respond to,” and that he had the respect of the county Extension agents in 
eastern Kentucky.35  
Duff had been an early supporter of the project, he had sought out information 
regarding the original proposal, and he wrote to Welch in March 1960 to endorse the 
program, noting that it was “properly oriented in total concept and tailor-made to the 
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situation.”36  He offered his full support.  Duff was not involved in the discussions 
regarding the project in the spring and summer of 1960, though he was active in the 
development of the modified Extension program and he was part of the general advisory 
committee Welch called at Brown’s suggestion in August of that year.  More than anyone 
else, Duff sought opportunities to positively promote ARDP in the region before its 
launch.  Throughout the fall, Duff spoke to several civic groups, outlining the program 
and how it might benefit the people of eastern Kentucky.   
On October 28, Duff forwarded Dean Welch a copy of a speech he had given in 
Hazel Green at a meeting of the Kentucky Regional Group of the Council of the Southern 
Mountains.  Duff’s speech outlined the eastern Kentucky program in keeping with the 
Kellogg proposal and the conversations in the advisory committee meetings.  Welch 
replied, “This is an invigorating, stimulating program.  Where and how would you like to 
fit it into our Eastern Kentucky Development Program?”37  Duff responded, “The 
speech is about the Eastern Kentucky Development Program as I understand it.”  He 
proceeded to argue that the application of “the ideas of this speech is a matter that your 
project director and the specialists will have to decide,” but “I feel the chances of success 
are greater than I dared dream before.”38  The exchange was bizarre, but it shows both the 
                                                 
36 Mike Duff to Frank Welch, 19 March 1960, Correspondence 1961-62 (2), 
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37 Mike Duff, “Iron Shoes and Work Clothes to Fit Us for the Eastern Kentucky 
Resource Development Programs,” speech given to the Kentucky Regional Group of the 
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38 Mike Duff to Frank Welch, 2 November 1960, Correspondence 1961-62 (2), 
Eastern Kentucky Folder, William A. Seay Papers. 
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general confusion that still reigned over the program as well as Duff’s interest in taking a 
leadership role.   
 Others, especially S.C. Bohanan, opposed the idea of Duff as the project director.  
Having consulted with Duff’s Ph.D. advisor at the University of Wisconsin, Bohanan 
wrote to William Seay that he agreed with the advisor’s opinion that “Mike would make 
an excellent specialist” but he doubted “making him a leader of any kind.”  Duff, 
Bohanan argued, was “too busy to stop and think.”39  Of course, Bohanan had opposed a 
project director from the start, and he argued against other names brought forward as 
well.   
Ultimately, Welch sided with Bohanan, and in early 1961, the Dean named R. 
Keith Kelley as ARDP Chairman.  Kelley was a District Leader in Extension, a position 
he would continue to hold.  He was based on-campus in Lexington, and he would 
continue to work primarily from his University office.  The three existing ARDP 
specialists, and those to follow, had appointments with their respective departments at the 
University, so Kelley had no line authority over the team at Quicksand.  His task was to 
organize the team’s meetings, monitor workflows, facilitate communication, and serve as 
a contact person to those outside the project. 
In his 1961 annual report, Kelley noted that “considerable time, during the first 
year of operation was devoted to development of operational and procedural policies 
designed to carry out the basic purpose of the project,” but the program was fully staffed 
with 13 specialists by August 15, and “during the year, practically all colleges and 
departments of the University have been called upon for consultant and program 
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assistance.”40  The modified approach to Extension had been adopted, and county 
Extension agents were “providing leadership at the county level in the development and 
execution of programs and projects involving the use of the specialist team.”41  Four 
residences had been built at Quicksand and one remodeled, and plans were complete to 
construct a new office and laboratory building in 1962, paid for through University funds.  
Kelley mentioned the ongoing professional development for the project specialists, 
including visits from Theodore Schultz from the University of Chicago and Rupert Vance 
from the University of North Carolina.  Kelley listed few accomplishments in 1961 – and 
all were tasks that seemed appropriate for traditional Extension not a new program with 
broader goals - but he stressed that planning for several upcoming initiatives was 
underway, and he explained the project’s emphasis was on the future. 
Kelley’s public perspective on the project was bright, but the real picture was not 
so rosy.  From the earliest days of the project, Deans Welch and Seay had struggled to 
gain the full support of Phil Smith, Jackson’s mayor and chair of the local advisory 
board.  Writing to J.B. Clarke, another member of the advisory board, Welch said of 
Smith, “Phil called me the other day threatening to resign from the committee, which is 
the second or third time he has done so.  Frankly I do not know what is discouraging Phil.  
We have tried to work closely with him to keep him informed about our plans.”42  Likely, 
Welch was clearly aware of why Smith was disgruntled.  Smith had favored an eight- 
county program with a focus on the area immediately surrounding Quicksand.  He had 
                                                 
40 “Annual Report of the Appalachian Resource Development Project,” 1961, 
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Library, University of Kentucky, Lexington. 
41 Ibid., 2. 
42 Welch to J.B. Clarke, 30 December 1960, in Correspondence 1961-62 (2), 
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very publically backed Charles Derrickson, the Robinson Substation Superintendent to 
serve as the project chair.  He recommended some possible specialists who ultimately 
were not hired, and the University did not follow his plans for the construction of new 
facilities at Quicksand.  Frequently, Smith questioned Kelley’s competency, even at 
luncheon talks he gave to civic organizations, and he expressed concern with the 
irregularity of Kelley’s visits to Quicksand, once prompting Dean Seay to reply, “We are 
trying for maximum teamwork and cooperation under present circumstances…. Mr. 
Kelley is staying in close touch personally with each specialist.”43 
 Within the University, there was concern that faculty and staff did not understand 
the university-wide nature of the project and the expectation that they would participate.  
In early March, Dean Seay asked President Dickey to take a very public position on the 
importance of involvement in the project.  President Dickey agreed to more aggressively 
promote the concept to the University, including highlighting it in the next staff 
bulletin.44 
 Within ARDP itself, specialists expressed a multitude of concerns.   Some 
wondered what exactly they were expected to do in their new roles.  Some questioned the 
support of the Extension administration.  Some were frustrated with the administrative 
structure, or lack thereof.  Still, others cited communications failures among the specialist 
team and also with county agents.  Dean Seay wrote to all members of the ARDP staff in 
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December 1961.  He called their work a “very difficult and challenging assignment” and 
praised their “real progress in establishing a solid base upon which we can build and 
execute an effective program of service to the people of Eastern Kentucky.”  Addressing 
directly the concern over Kelley’s scarcity at the Substation, Seay designated specialist 
George Armstrong as a “coordinator, an equal working among equals” who would chair 
meetings and manage workflow in Kelley’s absence.45 
  
The Beers Evaluation 
 
In 1962, the University renamed the Appalachian Resource Development Project.  
Its new name was the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project (EKRDP), but a 
more specific name did not allay Dean Seay’s concerns.  When Seay heard that former 
UK faculty member and developmental change expert Howard Beers was returning to the 
United States temporarily from his work in Indonesia, Seay negotiated a consulting 
contract with Beers.  The contract called for Beers to provide in-service training to staff 
that included “a world-wide perspective on community and area development,” ideas and 
suggestions for individual projects, assistance with evaluation techniques, and 
discussions of “solutions to major problems confronting the staff.”  Beers was also to 
evaluate the project’s first eighteen months of operation and provide counsel and advice 
to the project chairman and other personnel.46 
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 Beers spent most of July and some of August 1962 learning about EKRDP and 
assessing its progress.  At the outset of his report, he stressed the importance of the 
project’s university-wide approach, and he noted the increased realism among eastern 
Kentucky leaders regarding the challenges of the region.  He was impressed with the 
“quality and quantity of group thinking” behind the modified Extension approach and 
saw the EKRDP as a “broadening and deepening rather than a complete reformation of 
Extension.”47  Some had heard of the “Quicksand Project” or the “Kellogg Project, but 
Beers found little knowledge of the EKRDP throughout eastern Kentucky, even among 
local leaders.  He observed in the project what he deemed three false dichotomies – 
human resource development vs. physical resource development; economic development, 
centering on income vs. social development, centering on quality of life; and research vs. 
action.  Beers supported a total resource development approach.  He suggested there need 
not be tension between these seemingly competing objectives, and that EKRDP 
initiatives could adequately pursue them all if properly planned and executed.48  
 Among the EKRDP specialists, Beers observed a “feeling of isolation within the 
Extension service.”  Some felt “suspended” or “set apart” from the regular Extension 
office, and Beers suggested that may be connected to the widely-held view of the 
Quicksand specialists as a team, a group that worked together on common projects.  
However, this definition of team was not the project’s intent, and Beers correctly 
questioned whether the group did or should function as a team.  Some members of the 
EKRDP group told Beers they doubted the support of the Extension administration to the 
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modified approach and to the EKRDP. As for the work at Quicksand, Beers queried if the 
right mix of specialists had been achieved, noting the strong human resource orientation 
of the project but its heavy agricultural staffing.  He also questioned how county agents 
really fit into the modified approach.49  
 While it was too soon for an overall evaluation of the entire project, Beers found 
the lack of any evaluation activity alarming.  “To set the stage for evaluation,” he 
commented, “the goals of each activity should be made as clear as possible at the outset 
and this has not yet been done.”  Evaluation planning, Beers cautioned, must “begin now 
without further delay.”50  
 With a more concerned tone, Beers pointed to several “points of strain.”  He 
observed internal tensions around some team members’ lack of Extension experience, 
and he warned non-native staffers to pay particular attention to their “fotched-on” 
tendencies.51  Beers noted a real struggle, both within the EKRDP staff and among 
eastern Kentucky Extension agents, between the area and the county approaches.  He 
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raised and then confirmed the commonly held belief of district leaders, state extension 
specialists, and county agents that the EKRDP staff had a poor working relationship with 
almost everyone, including each other, and he surmised that some of that was owing to 
the lack of clarity in how the EKRDP fit in the hierarchy of relationships to other 
Extension entities, University colleges and departments, government entities, and 
community groups.52 
In his final analysis, Beers provided a “list of considerations” of “primary 
importance to consider.”  EKRDP, he asserted, was important and deserved continued 
support.  The project’s separate identity provided it with “freedom for exploration 
without undue restraints from tradition and orthodox Extension structures” but the nature 
and extent of that separate identity must be reviewed periodically.  Future staff must have 
the skills and experiences to carry out modified Extension work in “its overall breadth,” 
and careful efforts to facilitate the relationships of existing staff were essential.  Finally, 
Beers argued that the “EKRDP’s aspiration to serve as overall extension representing the 
whole University is yet incompletely fulfilled and will require continuing effort and 
broadened backing for achievement.”  Reorganization within only the College of 
Agriculture would not be enough to insure the long-time success of EKRDP.53 
 Beers’ evaluation had little impact on the operation of the EKRDP.  Project 
documents over the next two years show a business as usual approach.  Kelley’s 1962 
and 1963 annual reports as well as a March 1964 article in Extension Service Review use 
almost identical language in praising the project’s philosophy, enumerating lists of 
activities which mirrored traditional Extension work, and reminding the reader that the 
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problems in eastern Kentucky were complex and difficult to solve.54  As the 1963 report 
cautioned, “even after three years of operation, evaluation and reporting on the project 
must be largely limited to a look at encouraging trends and promising movements.”55 
 Though the modified Extension Program and the EKRDP were the only eastern 
Kentucky action programs of considerable scale funded by the University during this 
period, the University did envision another major initiative.  Early in 1961, the University 
submitted a substantial proposal, involving several UK colleges, to the Ford Foundation 
for an action program to “improve the communication skills of public school students in 
depressed coal mining areas.”  The Ford Foundation applauded the proposal but denied 
funding the work.  The Foundation did not believe the program was “capable of 
widespread adoption in other school districts facing similar problems.”  Essentially, the 
Foundation did not believe the work in the coal fields would translate to urban or other 
rural school districts.56 
 While its flagship action program continued to spin its wheels, the University of 
Kentucky remained committed to an action orientation toward eastern Kentucky.  
However, 1964 would bring considerable changes to the national perception of 
Appalachia, to Appalachian public policy, and to the University’s intentions for its action 
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program.  UK had been engaged in the opening salvos of the fight but a national War on 
Poverty was about to launch, drawing even more attention to the role the University 
would play in the battle. 
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Chapter 4 - The University of Kentucky and the War on Poverty 
 
1964 and 1965 were pivotal years for the University of Kentucky’s action 
program in eastern Kentucky.  With the passage of the Equal Opportunity Act (EOA) and 
the Appalachian Regional Development Act (ARDA), the University hoped to join the 
War on Poverty in the mountains with the support of free-flowing federal dollars.  New 
University President John W. Oswald and his Executive Vice President A.D. Albright, 
increasingly disillusioned with the EKRDP and its leadership, sought to shift many of the 
University’s Appalachian efforts to the new Center for Developmental Change (CDC).  
In the end, however, the flurry of activity resulted in little substantive change to the 
University’s action program in the mountains. 
 
The Creation of the Center for Developmental Change 
 
In 1962, as Thomas Ford wrapped up his commitments to the Ford Foundation’s 
Southern Appalachian Studies Project, he and Lee Coleman reenergized the 
conversations regarding a center for social change at the University of Kentucky.  In 
October of that year, Coleman drafted a proposal for the Center for Applied Social 
Science, sometimes referred to as the Social Science Research and Training Center.  A.D. 
Albright, a member of the core group of faculty in the 1950s concerned with social 
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change, supported the idea and encouraged further discussion.1  As Howard Beers noted, 
“Albright was a convener.  He set the stage for the development of the CDC.”2   
Early in 1963, Albright approved funding for three faculty positions with joint 
appointments in a yet unnamed and undeveloped center.  The faculty members were to 
devote half-time to the respective department and half-time “to this developing idea.”3  
Only one of the positions was filled that year, with anthropologist Art Gallaher, Jr. 
joining the faculty in the early summer.4 
Throughout the spring, summer, and early fall of 1963, a group of faculty, many 
of whom were among that core group from nearly a decade earlier, met weekly to discuss 
“directed change” or “social and cultural change.”  The group included James Brown, 
Eldon Smith, Malcolm Jewell, Thomas Ford, J.J. Mangalum, Lee Coleman, and Art 
Gallaher, Jr.5  In October 1963, Albright secured Oswald’s approval for a more formal 
Faculty Seminar on Developmental Change.  The Faculty Seminar expanded the 
conversations to a larger group of faculty, sponsored prominent outside speakers, and 
published a volume based on the guest lectures and the subsequent related discussions.6  
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Albright also funded a trip by Malcolm Jewell and Lee Coleman to the University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, to consult with Rupert Vance and his colleagues there. 7  
Upon their return, Coleman drafted yet another proposal, this time for a Center for 
Developmental Change (CDC), and with Albright and Oswald’s blessings, the Board of 
Trustees authorized its creation on January 17, 1964.8 
The founders of the Center appreciated the oddity of its name.  As Thomas Ford 
noted, “We used the term ‘developmental change’ instead of ‘planned change’ because 
‘planned’ sounded socialist and development was considered good.”9  Lee Coleman 
explained that there was considerable conversation over several meetings around the 
name and the terms used to frame discussion.  Because they wanted to reinforce the 
interdisciplinary nature of the work, they steered clear of “sociology” or “social science.”  
They discussed “social change,” but that seemed “too restrictive in a way,” according to 
Coleman.  The term “developmental change” first appeared in July 1963.  The concept of 
development was much in vogue at the time, a favored catch-phrase with foundations. 
The group, reported Coleman, “sort of suddenly came onto, invented, the name 
developmental change.  We wanted to give it a direction, not just change, but change 
toward development.  I’m not sure we had ever heard the term….It caused some 
puzzlement as to what it meant.”10 
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 While the Board of Trustees authorized the creation of the Center in January 
1964, there was no additional recurring funding for the CDC until the 1965-66 academic 
year.  Albright, however, did make provisions for a small operating budget in 1964-65. 
As he was the only faculty member with distribution of effort assigned to the CDC, Art 
Gallaher, Jr. became its interim director on July 1, 1964.  During the 1964-65 academic 
year, the Faculty Seminar continued to meet, and the CDC searched for its first full-time 
director.11  The search resulted in the selection of Edward Weidner, a highly regarded 
expert in international development and Director of the East-West Center at the 
University of Hawaii.  Weidner’s work officially began in July 1965, but he continued to 
split time between the University of Hawaii and the University of Kentucky for much of 
the 1965-66 academic year.12 
 
Evolving Appalachian Public Policy 
 
 Coverage of John Kennedy’s West Virginia Democratic Primary campaign in 
1960 brought renewed national attention to Appalachia, and on the eve of the May 10 
primary, Kennedy promised a special program of aid for the Mountain State if he was 
nominated and elected.  Just ten days later, Governor Millard Tawes of Maryland 
convened the first Conference of Appalachian Governors in Annapolis to discuss the 
challenges facing the region.  The group met again in Lexington in October 1960 and 
approved the “Declaration for Action Regarding the Appalachian Region.”  The 
document called for a voluntary association of states to push for a special regional 
program of development, and as Ron Eller notes, the resolution “bore the distinct mark of 
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John Whisman.”13  The declaration drew heavily from Kentucky’s Program 60, 
characterizing Appalachia as underdeveloped rather than depressed.  Casting the region 
as underdeveloped allowed the governors to push the federal policy discussions beyond 
relief and toward the use of government funds for comprehensive development.14 
 Following Kennedy’s election in November 1960, he made good on his promise 
to West Virginians, and the Task Force on Area Redevelopment was one of twenty-nine 
teams assembled to prepare the President-elect’s legislative agenda.  The Task Force 
called for the passage of legislation, similar to that which had been vetoed previously by 
President Eisenhower, establishing total resource development programs in depressed 
areas. The new Congress’s Senate Bill 1 contained the core recommendations of the Task 
Force, including a national system of development commissions with an Appalachian 
regional commission to serve as a pilot.  However, the development commissions failed 
to make the final version of the Area Redevelopment Act that became law on May 1, 
1961, and the new law made no provisions for specific Appalachian projects or funding. 
Instead, the Area Redevelopment Act authorized the Area Redevelopment Administration 
(ARA), and in early May 1961, President Kennedy met with the Conference of 
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Appalachian Governors to discuss specific regional opportunities within the new agency.  
No specific federal action grew out of that meeting, however.15 
 For the next two years, the Conference of Appalachian Governors continued to 
meet, developing plans for an Appalachian highway program, education and job training, 
and natural resources development.  However, they became increasingly frustrated with 
the lack of federal response to their policy proposals, the ineffectiveness of the ARA to 
provide federal aid to the mountains, and the President’s unwillingness to create a joint 
state-federal Appalachian regional commission.16  Yet, in January 1963, Kennedy read 
Dwight MacDonald’s New Yorker review of recent poverty studies, including 
Harrington’s The Other America, prompting him to direct Walter Heller, chair of the 
Council of Economic Advisors, to identify anti-poverty strategies that might be used in 
his 1964 re-election campaign.  When back-to-back floods ravaged parts of Appalachia in 
March 1963, Heller and Ed McDermott, chair of the Office of Emergency Planning 
encouraged Kennedy to consider an Appalachian anti-poverty program.  Kennedy agreed 
and invited the Appalachian governors to attend an April 9 cabinet meeting scheduled to 
review the ARA.17  At that meeting, Kennedy announced his plans to include more 
Appalachian programs in the ARA budget and to fast-track existing ARA programs in the 
region, to establish a joint federal-state committee on Appalachia charged with crafting a 
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comprehensive economic development program, and to create an Appalachian 
development institute for research and training.18   
 President Kennedy appointed Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. to chair the President’s 
Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC) with John L. Sweeney as executive director 
and John Whisman as executive secretary and states representative.  Roosevelt tapped 
University of Pittsburgh economist Benjamin Chinitz and a task force of leading 
academics to analyze the conditions in the region. Chinitz and his team argued a history 
of resource extraction left the region without the core infrastructure to support economic 
development.  Federal, state, and local governments had not been able to tackle the 
mountain’s problems alone, but working together, Chinitz argued, these governments 
could accomplish the type of development the region needed.19  It was at this point, 
through PARC, as Eller argues, that “academic theories about the process of development 
came together with the professional interests of federal agency personnel and state 
political leadership to provide a common agenda for the region.” 20  On November 15, 
President Kennedy phoned newly elected Kentucky governor Edward Breathitt, 
expressing his excitement about the PARC’s work and his plans to schedule a visit to the 
mountains where he would announce his commitment to a program for Appalachian 
development soon after his return from a trip to Texas.21 
 Following President Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson told the 
Appalachian Governors and the PARC leadership he intended to follow through on 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 71-72. 
19 Eller, Uneven Ground, 72-75; Williams, Appalachia, 340-342; Kiffmeyer, 
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Kennedy’s commitments, including a program for Appalachian development.  As the 
PARC continued to work on a plan for the mountains, Johnson was developing a broader 
anti-poverty program.  In December 1963, he announced to reporters that anti-poverty 
legislation would be a priority in the next legislative session, and in his January State of 
the Union address, he famously declared an unconditional “war on poverty.”  As 
Johnson’s War on Poverty began to take shape in the winter of 1964, Sweeney, 
Whisman, and several Johnson advisors were concerned that the PARC plan would 
appear to replicate the larger poverty program.  For this reason, the PARC put a greater 
emphasis on physical infrastructure projects than they did human development programs.  
The advocates for the Appalachian program remained committed to total resource 
development, but the human development programs, they reasoned, could also be 
coordinated through the national poverty initiatives.22  
 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. presented the PARC plan to President Johnson in early 
April.  PARC recommended a major Appalachian highway system, regional airports, 
flood control projects, sewage facilities, agricultural programs, tourism development, 
coal utilization research, and funds for vocational schools, health care facilities, and 
housing.  PARC expected the Equal Opportunity Act (EOA), the major piece of pending 
national anti-poverty legislation, would support job training, literacy projects, secondary 
education, health care and nutrition programs, but the PARC plan advocated for 
additional funds for these programs in Appalachia.  Roosevelt proposed the formation of 
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an independent Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) to coordinate federal, state, 
local, and private development efforts in the region.23 
 On April 24, 1964, Johnson made his famous visit to eastern Kentucky and Tom 
Fletcher’s porch.  The following day, he met with the Appalachian governors and 
pledged his support for the Appalachian plan.  On April 28, the administration introduced 
the Appalachian Regional Development Act (ARDA) to Congress, but for many months, 
the legislation was bogged down amid election year politics and fights over the EOA.  
Congress passed the EOA in early August 1964 and Johnson signed it into law.  The 
Senate passed the ARDA in late September, but Congress adjourned before the House 
took action on the bill.  Reintroduced to the new Congress in January 1965, ARDA 
passed the Senate on February 1 and the House on March 3.  President Johnson signed 
the measure into law on March 9, 1965.24  
  
The University of Kentucky Joins the War on Poverty 
 
 By late 1963, new University of Kentucky President John W. Oswald and 
members of his leadership team began to reevaluate the University’s eastern Kentucky 
program in light of the discussions in Washington.  At the same time, they were growing 
increasingly watchful of the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project.  
According to Lewis Cochran, Oswald had concerns with Dean Seay and his leadership 
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from early in his UK tenure.25  Then, in a January 1964 letter sent to Dean Seay and 
copied to Oswald, Glenwood Creech of the Kellogg Foundation expressed dissatisfaction 
with the EKRDP.  First, the Foundation slapped Seay on the hand for permitting 
expenditures for administration and supervision costs that were not budgeted and not 
“consistent with the conditions of our letter of commitment.”  More significantly, the 
Foundation questioned the overall effectiveness of the project, noting that the EKRDP 
had not “developed and demonstrated a method or methods whereby a university can 
mobilize and use its resources effectively in conjunction with other educational and 
service institutions in a state in attacking problems of a severely depressed area.”  Creech 
closed the letter with the admonishment, “We trust that in the next four years of this 
project, the University of Kentucky will be successful in developing guidelines for the 
formulation of educational programs for low income areas.”26 
 Oswald and other members of his senior team paid little attention to the EKRDP 
in the first half of 1964.  Already concerned with the EKRDP’s operation, Oswald 
devoted his eastern Kentucky energies to the development of new strategies in the 
context of the EOA and ARDA.  However, he recognized that he had to place the 
EKRDP into the larger institutional plan.  In early August 1964, he discussed the EKRDP 
with Dean Seay and asked him to prepare a brief document on the program.  On August 
12, Seay provided Oswald with “The Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project – 
Its Accomplishments, Its Plans, and Its Prospects for the Future.”  It is highly unlikely the 
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document did anything to change Oswald’s perception of the program.  As Chair of the 
EKRDP, R.K. Kelley most certainly authored the document, and it bears his imprint in 
language and style.  As in all of his materials regarding the project, Kelley quickly 
reminded readers of the “complex and deep-rooted problems” in the region and the 
inability to evaluate the program’s accomplishments in just three and a half years.  He 
identified fifteen accomplishments but none included the slightest amount of specificity.  
Accomplishment number eleven – “Identified some new research needs” – is illustrative 
of the list.  The same is true of the eight plans he cites for the project, many of which 
seem particularly troubling for a program nearly four years old.  Examples include 
“develop a better understanding of the philosophies and concepts of the project” and 
“clarify roles and relationships between project specialists, Lexington-based specialists, 
and area agents.”27 
While Oswald may have pushed the EKRDP to the margins for much of 1964, 
thinking about and planning for the University’s approach to eastern Kentucky required 
much of Oswald and the University’s time and energy in 1964.  In February, Oswald 
corresponded with West Virginia University President Paul Miller to learn more about 
the West Virginia Center for Appalachian Studies and Development.  WVU established 
the Center in February 1963, under the direction of Ernest Nesius, then Director of 
Cooperative Extension and Vice President for Appalachian Development.  Previously 
Nesius served at UK as Associate Director of Agricultural Extension and was one of the 
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lead authors of both the Kellogg Foundation grant proposal and the framework for the 
modified Extension program in eastern Kentucky.  The West Virginia Center was 
drawing a lot of attention from Washington policymakers and University administrators, 
and Oswald was seeking new ideas.28 
 At the same time, John Whisman was working to involve the University in the 
larger framework for Appalachian development he sought to create.  Throughout 1964 
and 1965, Whisman served dual roles.  He was the executive secretary and states 
representative to the President’s Appalachian Regional Commission, but he was also 
director of Kentucky’s Area Programs Office, Governor Breathitt’s point person on 
eastern Kentucky projects.  In April 1964, Whisman invited agencies and organizations 
doing research on eastern Kentucky to a conversation about their work.  At that meeting, 
attended by UK rural sociologist James Brown, Whisman asked each participant to 
provide an accounting of the work being conducted on and in the mountains.  He 
intended for the Area Programs Office to serve as a clearinghouse for information about 
the region.  Brown provided Whisman with a list of the work on eastern Kentucky in 
progress or recently completed by the University’s faculty in sociology and rural 
sociology, but he also encouraged the University’s senior leadership to collect this 
information from across the campus.29  In May, President Oswald called for “an 
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inventory of all University of Kentucky research or service projects that are concerned 
with Eastern Kentucky and/or Appalachia.”30 
 On May 13, Whisman convened a group to discuss the possibility of the 
establishment of an Appalachian Regional Development Institute.  Whisman chaired the 
gathering of academic leaders from across Appalachia.  The meeting included UK 
representatives President Oswald, Dean A.D. Kirwan of the Graduate School, Dean Seay, 
and Lee Coleman.  Whisman provided an update on Appalachian public policy and 
pending legislation.  He noted that the PARC had presented a report to the President 
leading to the creation of a “full scale regional development program,” one that will 
“involve the coordinated efforts of local, state, and federal governments as well as private 
interests.”  The expectation of a permanent Appalachian program and a regional 
commission to administer it, Whisman noted, gave greater “significance to the 
establishment of a means to stimulate and coordinate the region’s capability for research, 
technical assistance, and training in relation to the development process – the purposes of 
the proposed Appalachian Institute.”  The Institute was not envisioned as a new facility 
charged with conducting its own research but as an organizational device to connect and 
enhance existing work and to help stimulate new activities “related to the priority 
objectives of the regional development program.”  While the prospect of an Institute was 
received favorably by University officials, the project never moved beyond the idea 
stage.31   
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 In July, Whisman sent eastern Kentucky leaders, including Oswald, Seay, and 
EKRDP chairman R.K. Kelley, a document titled “Comments and Outlines on 
Appalachian and Economic Opportunities Programs, assuming their enactment by 
Congress.”  Whisman noted Governor Breathitt had authorized the Area Programs Office 
to conduct the overall administration of these programs in Kentucky.  As he had done in 
Program 60 four years earlier, Whisman echoed his belief in strong state coordination of 
all development programs in the region as well as the importance of local leadership in 
local action programs.  This structure, facilitating new opportunities, would provide both 
greater capacity and greater flexibility for programs in the mountains, but no group could, 
or should, go it completely alone.  Whisman then outlined the specific programmatic 
opportunities available in both the OEA and ARDA.32 
  Just a few days later, in a speech in Ashland, Kentucky, Governor Breathitt 
delivered the same message.  Speaking to a group assembled to discuss eastern Kentucky 
development, he said that with the passage of the OEA and ARDA, “Eastern Kentucky 
can expect to have the tools it needs, for the first time, to meet its critical problems, to 
build an economy of growth in the place of decline, and to create a climate of fair 
opportunity for its people.”   Breathitt outlined the role of the Area Programs Office, he 
cited the need for cooperation and coordination, and he pledged to local leaders the 
resources and support of state officials and state institutions “to serve you and to serve 
the anticipated new programs.” Unknowingly highlighting a significant blind spot of the 
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OEA, ARDA, and the structures created to implement them, Breathitt told the audience, 
“You will get new programs, but the leadership will stay the same.  The challenge will 
rest upon all of us, and most especially upon you who lead in your own communities.”33 
 Two weeks later, Whisman, in his role as Area Programs Director, convened 
business, academic, and political leaders from across the Commonwealth for another 
discussion on the implementation of the EOA and ARDA.  At that meeting, the Area 
Programs Office announced the creation of fourteen program and project teams to 
develop suggestions in their fields and to provide technical assistance to others for the 
same purpose.  The nine teams most closely associated with EOA programs – data, 
community and area development, youth activities and adult work and education, rural 
area programs, enterprise development, area health programs, conservation projects, 
community facilities, and forestry – began their work immediately.  Another five teams 
most closely associated with ARDA programs – highways and transportation, water 
resource development, recreation and tourism, coal and power, and housing – would start 
later.  All the teams would work with the Kentucky Development Committee, and the 
Area Programs Office would liaison between the teams as well as maintain a central 
database of team activities. 34 
 The University of Kentucky was well-represented in the composition of the 
teams.  James Brown served on data team, R.K. Kelley and William Schneider, Director 
of Extension, served on the community and area development team, and Dean Seay and 
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Schneider served on the rural area programs team.  William Willard, Dean of the College 
of Medicine, Howard Bost, Assistant Vice President for Program and Policy Planning in 
the Medical School, and Robert Johnson, Director of State and Local Services for the 
Medical School, served on the area health program team, and R.K. Kelley was the Area 
Program Office liaison to the forestry team.  On the back of his notes from the meeting, 
Oswald sketched out the timeline for the University’s War on Poverty plan.  From 
August through November, the University would “go for projects” with the intent of 
having projects that “eat up” eastern Kentucky.  Oswald hoped to leverage opportunities 
in the Appalachian bill for the 49 counties covered under that legislation while relying on 
EOA opportunities in the rest of the state.  He appreciated the urgency in the process, 
noting that “Whisman is disappointed if we can’t consult with him before autumn,” and 
he recognized the unique position of the University with the “sympathies of Washington 
D.C. for Ky because of eastern Ky.”35  
Federal officials also rallied university leaders around the prospect of new 
opportunities in the War on Poverty legislation.  On August 13, President Oswald joined 
other state university presidents at the White House for a meeting with President Johnson.  
Johnson invited the academic leaders to Washington to discuss the role of state 
universities in social change.  In his remarks, Johnson asserted that 
The increasingly productive capacity of our society makes it clearly possible to 
provide the resources for a better life for our people, for an attack on the problems 
of poverty, transportation, health, education, housing, recreation, natural resources 
conversation and utilization, agriculture, employment and economic growth, 
enlargement of cultural and recreational opportunities.36  
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Johnson cited the need for state and local solutions to these thorny problems because that 
is “where the people are.”  Regional and national action may be necessary at times, but he 
explained it should be complimentary and never disruptive.  Solutions required long-
range planning, and long-range planning, the President argued, needed an “impartial rally 
point.”  The state university, he contended, should serve that function and be the 
“intellectual center for social, cultural, and economic planning, and for mobilization of 
the many special efforts of private and public agencies.”37  
 
 
Carnahan House Conference 
 
Following passage of the EOA in early August and the meetings that followed at 
home and in Washington, Oswald knew he should act quickly.  To this end, he invited a 
select group of faculty and staff to a Conference on University Planning for Development 
Programs at the Carnahan House on September 4.  In his invitation, Oswald outlined the 
objectives for the conference. The President wrote that the University’s programs in 
eastern Kentucky “unquestionably will expand even more significantly.”  He asked the 
invitees to “determine what steps might be appropriately taken at this time on the all-
University level.” 38  Specifically, he raised three questions.  What, if any, coordinating 
mechanism should be established for the eastern Kentucky program, what role should the 
new community colleges play in the program, and what should the University’s primary 
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responsibilities be in relation to the new federal legislation?   On the final question, he 
proposed four alternatives.  The University could serve as a knowledge center only, as a 
training center for teachers, community planners, and other actors in programming, as a 
direct operator in community development, or all of the above.  “It is essential,” Oswald 
concluded, “that at this point in its history the University of Kentucky assume an 
aggressive leadership role toward ascertaining the solution of the most serious problems 
of our Commonwealth.”39 
 In preparation for the conference, participants received several documents to 
review.  The authorship of these documents is unclear, but there is no doubt the 
documents helped to frame the discussions at the Carnahan House Conference.  The 
participants received a brief description of the EKRDP that outlined its basic 
assumptions, overarching philosophy, and an explanation of the Kellogg Foundation’s 
involvement.40  They received an overview of the EOA and the ARDA, with particular 
information on Title II of the EOA, that which covered “Urban and Rural Community 
Action Programs.”  Over $5 million was expected to be available in Kentucky for 
community action programs, and Section 213 of Title II specifically authorized and 
encouraged educational institutions to seek funds for that purpose.41  
The participants received a set of suggestions that offered several basic principles 
for future University work in eastern Kentucky.  The document asserted that the 
University had a key role to play as a “development knowledge center” for all state, 
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federal, and private entities concerned with development in the mountains.  The author(s) 
recognized the development orientation of Kentucky’s state government and the need for 
the University to be a partner in that.  The document identified development as “basically 
a series of complicated, interrelated, and interdisciplinary problems,” some of which 
could only be addressed within a University framework.  Specific among those were 
research and training needs.  The document called for the better coordination of campus-
based and field-based projects, and the author(s) encouraged the use of the community 
colleges and the Quicksand Substation as “Adult Education and Development Centers.”42 
Finally, the participants received a document that tried to tie everything together.  
The document reviewed the “many developments that have occurred and are continuing 
to occur since decisions were made to intensify our efforts in eastern Kentucky with 
EKRDP.”  The author(s) outlined the political importance of eastern Kentucky in 
Johnson’s War on Poverty and the implications of that for the University, noting that 
“within the above fast moving, complicated, and oftentimes quite confused situation, we 
are attempting to conduct a program of service for the region.”  The document asserted 
that the times “demand that we continuously evaluate the ever changing situation in terms 
of our roles, responsibilities, organizational structure, operational procedures and 
relationships with other agencies and programs.”  The challenges and solutions existed on 
several levels.  There was the national, the regional (Appalachia), the sub-regional 
(eastern Kentucky), the area (several counties), the county, and the neighborhood or 
community.  The document concluded with four questions, not dissimilar to those posed 
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by Oswald.  What is the University’s proper role at each level?  How should the 
University organize itself to fill that role?  What resources are necessary to support that 
organization, and how can those resources best be allocated?43 
As Oswald opened the conference on September 4, he restated the guiding 
questions from his invitation and reminded the attendees of the “obligations of the 
University to provide aggressive leadership in instructional, research, and service 
programs, which are basic to rapid and purposeful development of the State’s human and 
natural resources.”44  He also stressed the urgency of the situation, noting that numerous 
proposals and requests for funding were already emerging from other institutions and 
organizations in response to the OEA and ARDA.  
 Following Oswald’s remarks, the group shifted to a discussion of the new Center 
for Developmental Change (CDC).  A.D. Albright argued that the CDC should play a key 
role in the future execution of the University’s eastern Kentucky program.  He explained 
that the CDC had three primary objectives.  The Center was to conduct research on 
developmental change, provide training for change agents, and serve as a knowledge 
center on matters “pertinent to how change is effected, planned, and evaluated.”45   
R.K. Kelley shared background information on the EKRDP as well as an update 
on the progress of the project.  He reminded the group that the program was designed to 
utilize the total resources of the University, and he stressed there was room for 
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improvement to that end.  He then outlined the same vague accomplishments he had 
presented in previous EKRDP reports and in his recent correspondence with President 
Oswald.46  Albright tasked Robert Johnson from the Medical School with explaining the 
intricacies of the EOA and ARDA.  Johnson focused particularly on what the legislation 
required of the University and what special funding opportunities they provided the 
institution.47 
John Whisman was the only participant at the conference not employed by the 
University.  He closed the afternoon discussions with his concept of the role of the 
University in development programs.  He reminded the group that the EOA and ARDA 
were intuitive ideas developed in a political atmosphere.  Successful implementation, he 
argued, required the kind of knowledge and assistance that could only be provided by 
institutions of higher learning, working not just on campus but at the county and area 
levels.  Whisman asserted that the University should guide change rather than assist 
society in adjusting to change, and he echoed Albright’s endorsement of the CDC as an 
important tool in the University’s contributions to mountain development.48 
 As the Conference moved to a working dinner and evening discussions, Oswald 
charged the group with giving particular attention to the “University’s primary 
responsibilities in the new Economic Opportunity and Appalachian Programs and ways 
whereby the University’s efforts in these and related programs might be coordinated for 
maximum effectiveness.”  Those conversations resulted in a set of guiding principles, for 
which “there appeared to be general consensus.”  The Conference committed the 
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University’s research, training, and service resources to the development efforts in the 
state, with special attention given to eastern Kentucky.  The University would use an 
extension service pattern as a model for the creation of approaches designed to “extend 
the full resources of the University to the total society.”  The Conference called for the 
evolution of the Extension office so that county agents could function more in a role of 
generalists linking to the total resources of the University.  This was, of course, one of the 
objectives of the modified Extension program for eastern Kentucky adopted four years 
earlier, but its success had been limited.  The Conference agreed that the Center for 
Developmental Change must play a lead role in the eastern Kentucky effort and that the 
institution had to do a better job to ensure the “full utilization of the University’s 
resources” in the EKRDP.  The community colleges needed to serve as adult education 
and development centers and as the “core unit for the creation and implementation” of 
area and community development programs.  As a research university, the institution 
should make “every effort” to ensure sound research undergirded the training and service 
while at the same time recognizing “that in a dynamic society such as ours, some action 
programs must begin to move forward with limited research knowledge to guide them.”  
The Conference committed the University to “direct action programs” but regardless of 
the scope of those programs, the institution also had to play a major role in development 
of the region by “serving as a knowledge center for other agencies and institutions 
concerned with development.”  Finally, the Conference agreed that the University needed 
a mechanism to coordinate the institution’s efforts in development.49 
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 The Conference took these principles and, recognizing “that neither present nor 
potential resources would permit a comprehensive project for all of East Kentucky” and 
understanding “that we need to learn more about how to mobilize and utilize the 
appropriate resources of the University in a unified effort,” the group proposed a pilot 
project to serve a four-to-six county area.  They suggested the project be centered around 
an eastern Kentucky community college with the full utilization of university resources 
both in the field and on campus.  The pilot project should work in “full accord with other 
state and federal agency programs” and be designed “to qualify for Economic 
Opportunity and Appalachian funds.”  Furthermore, the Conference determined that the 
pilot had to “combine action, service, research, demonstrations, and training into a total 
program.”  Oswald accepted the recommendations and charged the Center for 
Developmental Change with the leadership of two task forces for the pilot project.  One 
group was to develop the proposal and the other was to coordinate resources on 
campus.50 
 The Carnahan House Conference was significant in several ways.  The University 
recommitted to a total university action program for eastern Kentucky.  In response to 
Oswald’s original questions, the answer was clear that the University should be a 
knowledge center, a training center, and a direct operator in development in the region.  
Likewise, the Conference endorsed the modified Extension program that had been piloted 
in eastern Kentucky with the advent of the EKRDP.  The University committed to partner 
with federal, state, and local officials through the pursuit of involvement in OEO and 
ARDA programs, and the Conference introduced the community college as a preferred 
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point of service for mountain programming.  Finally, the University tapped the Center for 
Developmental Change to lead the eastern Kentucky effort. 
Despite the sense of urgency coming out of the Carnahan House Conference, the 
University was slow to organize.  As the EOA became codified in the Office of Equal 
Opportunity (OEO), other institutions and organizations got a jump start on UK in the 
War on Poverty funding bonanza.  Only R.K. Kelley had significant contact with OEO 
staffers before late November, something Oswald encouraged despite his misgivings with 
Kelley.51 
The state of the CDC may have also contributed to the University’s lethargy.  
While Oswald and Albright had clearly tapped the CDC to lead the eastern Kentucky 
effort, the Center still had no permanent director.  Only one faculty member, Art 
Gallaher, Jr., had an official assignment in the Center.  In November 1964, Oswald 
assigned Frank Santopolo, a rural sociologist who had been active with the CDC, as a 
special assistant to coordinate eastern Kentucky projects.52 
Santopolo’s first report to the administration regarding the University’s War on 
Poverty progress was sobering.  While he did note that various faculty and staff members 
had been working with lay groups and local leaders to stimulate community participation 
in anti-poverty programs, none of those efforts had been coordinated by the University, 
and the University had no official presence.  He offered four reasons for why more direct 
involvement had been “circumvented.”  First, the University was late to the game.  Many 
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other institutions and agencies began planning in June, a full six months before the 
University even named a point person.  Next, Santopolo argued that the suggestion of 
local initiation of activity in the Title II language and a lack of understanding of how the 
University fit in that context had stifled the development of ideas.  Third, OEO staffers, 
unhappy with John Whisman, had bypassed Kentucky, and the University of Kentucky 
specifically, because Whisman was viewed as a UK man.  Finally, Santopolo asserted 
that R.K. Kelley’s association with Whisman had marked him a Whisman man and 
thereby had “contaminated” the University since Kelley had been the principal OEO 
contact until November.53  
Santopolo elaborated on the Kelley-Whisman concern.  He contended that OEO 
staff in Washington consulted with journalist John Ed Pearce on all actions in Kentucky.  
“The word now is that one must see Pearce for OEO favors,” Santopolo wrote.  Pearce 
had been linked to the Council of the Southern Mountains’ Charles Drake, OEO 
administrator Dick Boone, Harry Caudill, and Tom Gish, all of whom had been 
publically critical of Whisman.  Caudill and Gish, according to Santopolo, had also been 
critical of the EKRDP and Kelley.  Santopolo feared Pearce might try to uncover “what is 
wrong between OEO and the University of Kentucky.”  Santopolo warned Albright, “We 
may be reminded that the University of Kentucky has not submitted any projects.  We 
have not expressed any interest.”  Yet despite these concerns and the knowledge that 
OEO was working with Drake and the Council on training programs better suited for the 




University, Santopolo suggested the University “remain silent on our plans…as it does 
take a little time to mobilize the troops.”54  
It is not entirely clear what plans the University had.  A well-conceived project by 
Lyman Ginger in the College of Education for an experimental program for elementary 
teacher education in Appalachia and in depressed areas of Louisville did not receive 
external funding.55  Paul Street, also in the College of Education, did receive a nearly 
$700,000 contract for a three-year OEO evaluation project in Knox County.  This was not 
a project of which Street conceived or pursued.  Instead, the OEO contacted UK about 
evaluating the program because someone on Sargent Shriver’s staff – Shriver was head of 
the OEO - learned about the Center for Developmental Change and thought the two 
sounded like good fits.56  Oswald and Santopolo did pursue a consortium of Appalachian 
colleges in Kentucky, so like-minded institutions could cooperatively pursue projects and 
funding through OEO and ARDA programs or with the support of foundations.  The 
group of college presidents from eastern Kentucky met twice at UK, on March 16 and 
May 26, before the effort fizzled.57 
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Pearce served on the Appalachian Volunteers Board.  The Appalachian Volunteer was an 
OEO-funded project through the Council on Southern Mountains; see Kiffmeyer, 
Reformers to Radicals, 85. 
55 “Proposed Experimental Elementary Teacher Education Program for Teachers 
in Economically Depressed Areas,” Box 3A, Economic Opportunity 1964-66 Folder, 
John W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968); Lyman Ginger to John Oswald, 27 
January 1965, Box 3A, Economic Opportunity 1964-66 Folder, John W. Oswald Papers 
(From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
56 A.D. Albright to Lyman Ginger, n.d., Box 3A, Economic Opportunity 1964-66 
Folder, John Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
57 John Oswald to Presidents of Kentucky Colleges, 31 March 1965;  Troy 
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Grannie’s Branch Project 
 
 As federal and state policymakers and University officials sorted out the changing 
Appalachian public policy landscape, a handful of University of Kentucky faculty hoped 
to be among the first to access War on Poverty funding.  A group led by David Blythe in 
Civil Engineering put together a massive university-wide “research and action” project 
“for improving the general conditions of the people of Grannie’s Branch.”58  Grannie’s 
Branch was an isolated community about fifteen miles from Manchester in Clay County. 
The project involved twelve departments in eight colleges.  Grannie’s Branch was a total 
development project with both human resource and physical infrastructure development 
programs.  The project spanned five years at a total cost of $2,225,254.  While the total 
estimated cost was approximately $200,000 less than the EKRDP, Grannie’s Branch was 
two years shorter and, consequently, more costly on an annual basis.59 
 On March 27, 1964, David Blythe, joined by Kurt Deuschle and Rena Gazaway 
from Community Medicine, presented the Grannie’s Branch proposal to President 
Oswald and Dean Kirwan.  Oswald commended the proposal, saying it was the type of 
work in which the University should be involved, and he recommended the committee 
continue to refine the plan for submission to “John Whisman, Sargent Shriver, and other 
appropriate agencies.”  According to Blythe, Oswald also asked Dean Kirwan to facilitate 
                                                                                                                                                 
from Kentucky Colleges, 7 May 1965, Box 3A, Economic Opportunity 1964-66 Folder, 
John Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
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a meeting between representatives of the Grannie’s Branch group and the Center for 
Developmental Change “to ensure all University groups are accurately informed.”60 
 Either Blythe misunderstood the President’s intent to involve the Center for 
Developmental Change or Oswald and/or Kirwan changed their minds about how to 
move forward, but in May, Kirwan directed the CDC to review the Grannie’s Branch 
Project.  J.J. Mangalum chaired the review committee that included James Brown from 
Agriculture, Walter Hargreaves from Commerce, Marion Pearsall from Medicine, and 
Paul Street from Education.  Writing to the committee, Mangalum noted that “GBP is an 
interesting project.  It has some characteristics that ought to make us feel excited about it.  
It could be interdisciplinary, and development change seems to be a major focus of the 
project.  The design could be more elegant, I guess – but let us talk about it after you 
have had a chance to review it individually.”  He scheduled a meeting to discuss the 
proposal on June 5.61 
 On June 16, Blythe reported back to the Grannie’s Branch Group that he had 
twice met with Kirwan regarding the proposal.  The second meeting included Mangalum 
who said he expected the CDC to complete its review by August 1.  In the meantime, 
Kirwan directed individual faculty to seek funding for “initial phase studies” from the 
Faculty Research Fund, reserving external funding requests until the University approved 
the project.62 
                                                 
60 David Blythe to Grannie’s Branch Group, 6 April 1964, Box 213, Folder 10, 
James S. Brown Papers. 
61 J.J. Mangalum to James Brown, Walter Hargreaves, Marion Pearsall, and Paul 
Street, 21 May 1964, Box 213, Folder 10, James S. Brown Papers. 
62 David Blythe to Grannie’s Branch Group, 16 June 1964, Box 213, Folder 10, 
James S. Brown Papers. 
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 The CDC review committee submitted its report on Grannie’s Branch to Dean 
Kirwan and Professor Blythe in late July.  The report, Mangalum wrote “is in general 
terms because of the Committee’s unanimous judgment that it is somewhat premature for 
a review committee such as the present one to go over the GDP statement in detail.”  The 
committee believed it had raised enough questions, however, to allow the project team to 
proceed with improvements.  While the committee applauded the project’s concern “with 
the kinds of problems represented by the existence of neighborhoods and communities 
like Grannie’s Branch in eastern Kentucky,” the CDC questioned the project’s overall 
research design and cautioned the faculty involved in being aware of the limits of the 
University as an institution of higher learning.  “Whereas there is little learning without 
action,” Mangalum wrote in the report, “the University should get involved in action 
programs only in so far as such programs are in the interest of the University’s aims.”  
More significantly, the review committee believed the University “should not get 
involved in tasks more suited to welfare agencies, private or state or federal.” 
 The Grannie’s Branch Group did not respond in writing to the review, but they 
did schedule a meeting with Dean Kirwan on September 14, 1964.  The meeting never 
took place, and the Grannie’s Branch Project was dead.  Grannie’s Branch was a casualty 
of the Carnahan House plan that sought to focus the University’s eastern Kentucky 
energies on a pilot project in four to six counties, but it was also a casualty of the growing 
power of the CDC in the University’s eastern Kentucky program.  Grannie’s Branch is 
significant in other ways as well.  While UK paid lip service to a total university action 
program in eastern Kentucky, the EKRDP and the modified Extension Program never 
really provided that.  Grannie’s Branch was the first true effort at interdisciplinary action 
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programming in the mountains, and despite the CDC’s misgivings, the project provided 
for the type of work that was consistent with both the EKRDP’s stated goals and the 
Carnahan House Conference principles.   Grannie’s Branch was more focused and better 
conceived, but there was no more “welfare” work in Grannie’s Branch than in the 
EKRDP or in the plans emerging from the Carnahan House Conference.  This tension 




Chapter 5 - The Slow Death of the University’s Action Program 
 
The Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project 
 
The University had effectively pushed the Eastern Kentucky Resource 
Development Project to the margins in 1964 as the leadership sought other action 
approaches in eastern Kentucky in the context of the War on Poverty.  Nonetheless, at the 
close of that year, the EKRDP remained the University’s only action program in the 
mountains.  The University was committed to the project through December 31, 1967, 
and President Oswald and his senior team recognized that the EKRDP necessarily would 
play a part in the larger University effort in Appalachia.  Over the next eighteen months, 
amid leadership changes at the EKRDP, a scathing CDC evaluation of the project, and a 
site visit from top Kellogg officials, Oswald sought to recast the program and focus it 
using the Carnahan House Conference principles.  Ultimately, the new vision for the 
project failed, and the EKRDP lived out its final days much in the same way as it had 
before. 
 In December 1964, EKRDP chairman R.K. Kelley resigned from the University, 
effective in February 1965, to take a post with the U.S. Agency for International 
Development in Tanzania.  At the time of Kelley’s resignation, A.D. Albright forwarded 
Oswald a copy of Howard Beers’ 1962 evaluation of the project with the handwritten 
note, “It is as germane today as it was then, maybe more so.  Keith Kelley is leaving and 
his replacement will determine heavily what transpires henceforth in this project.”1  In 
early January, Dean Seay wrote Oswald to inform him of some “irregularities”  at the 
                                                 
1 A.D. Albright to John Oswald, n.d., Box 3A, Economic Opportunity 1964-66 
Folder, John W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968), Special Collections 
Library, University of Kentucky, Lexington. 
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Robinson Substation and within the EKRDP, prompting Oswald to instruct Albright to 
“be sure to tell Bill Seay that we do not want him to replace Kelley without a full 
discussion with you and me re: organization of EDRDP.”2  Albright wrote to Seay three 
days later with those instructions as well as a reminder that Kelley’s resignation focused 
“attention not only upon his replacement but also upon the evaluation of EKRDP, the 
development planning for Eastern Kentucky under the Economic Opportunity provisions 
and the pending Appalachian proposal, and the organizational relationships of these 
University programs.”3 
 Oswald and Albright wanted to make certain the future of the EKRDP was 
considered in the context of development planning for eastern Kentucky in a War on 
Poverty, but they also wanted to be sure the program functioned effectively within the 
organizational changes planned for all of Extension.  In May 1965, the University 
announced the reorganization of the Cooperative Extension Service using an area model.  
This model created sixteen areas “as homogeneous as possible in terms of the interests, 
customs, and traditions of the people, characteristics of the soil, kinds of agriculture, and 
opportunities for commodity, social, and economic development.”4  The area model was 
very similar to the modified Extension program developed in eastern Kentucky in 
                                                 
2 William Seay to John Oswald, 11 January 1965, Box 6, Kellogg Foundation ’63-
67 Folder, John W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968).  Oswald’s instructions 
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’63-67 Folder, John W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
4 “On Beginning a Second Century: Report of the Faculty and Staff of the College 
of Agriculture and Home Economics,” May 1965, University of Kentucky, Lexington, 
copy in Box 4, College of Agriculture and Home Economics Committee Folder, John 





conjunction with the EKRDP though the new areas were smaller than the 30-county 
region in the eastern Kentucky modification.  Area specialists developed programs and 
supported county agents and when necessary bridged the agents with campus-based 
specialists.  In some cases, the staffing patterns and needs of particular areas resulted in 
the area becoming the principal unit of local programming instead of the county.  Central 
to the new structure was the idea of a broader Extension, connecting agents not only with 
faculty and staff in the College of Agriculture but with experts across the entire 
University.5 
 In June, Dean Seay appointed Mike Duff as the new EKRDP project chair.  As 
part of the larger Extension reorganization along the area model, Duff was also named 
Chairman of Development Programs, a position on the same level as the Extension chairs 
in Agriculture, 4-H, and Home Economics, reporting to the Associate Director of 
Extension.  Duff had been a campus-based agricultural specialist.  He wanted to lead the 
EKRDP from its inception in 1960, but despite strong support from faculty and Extension 
agents, he was passed over for the post.  In this new position, Duff had no responsibility 
for any county agents, as Kelley had, but he added the responsibility for the programming 




                                                 
5 Ibid.; Untitled document, n.d., Box 4, College of Agriculture and Home 
Economics Committee Folder, John Oswald Collection (Reports from Colleges). 
6 “Annual Report of the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project,” 1965, 
University of Kentucky, Lexington, copy in Mike Duff Papers, Special Collections 
Library, University of Kentucky, Lexington; 
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The Gallaher Evaluation 
 
While Seay conferred with Oswald and Albright on the selection of the next 
EKRDP chair, the President and Vice President did not include the Dean in their plans to 
evaluate the project.  During the winter of 1965, Albright asked Art Gallaher, Jr., in his 
role with the CDC, to conduct a “quiet” but extensive evaluation of the EKRDP.7  In the 
period between Kelley’s departure and Duff’s appointment, Gallaher and anthropology 
graduate student Ron Butler reviewed project documents and interviewed community 
leaders, former and current EKRDP specialists, and former and current Extension staff.  
Gallaher submitted his confidential evaluation to Oswald and Albright in early June.  
Gallaher’s evaluation was thorough and scathing.  He echoed many of the concerns raised 
by Howard Beers in his 1962 evaluation of the project, but Gallaher’s findings went 
much further, both in the depth of his analysis and in the level of his criticism.8 
 Gallaher’s evaluation painted a portrait of total dysfunction, and the dysfunction 
began in the conception of the project.  Gallaher argued that the EKRDP was “hastily 
conceived and poorly planned.”9  He asserted that the idea for the project emerged from a 
conjunction of three roles played by Frank Welch.  Welch was concerned about the 
inadequacy of traditional Extension to address the particular challenges in eastern 
Kentucky and in underdeveloped regions generally.  He was influenced by his 
relationship with Jackson mayor Phil Smith and Smith’s desire to raise the status of the 
                                                 
7 Art Gallaher, Jr., interview by Grace M. Zilverberg, 24 December 1984, Charles 
T. Wethington University of Kentucky Oral History Collection, Louie B. Nunn Center 
for Oral History, University of Kentucky Libraries. 
8 Art Gallaher, Jr., “The Eastern Kentucky Resources Development Project: A 
Confidential Evaluation,” Box 3A, Developmental Change Center 1963-66 Folder, John 
Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
9 Ibid., 1. 
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Quicksand Substation, and Welch wanted to make a splash with his contacts at the 
Kellogg Foundation, where the Dean served on the Agricultural Advisory Board.  
Gallaher noted that Welch asked for a proposal from faculty in the College of Agriculture 
in less than one month’s time, and the evaluator asserted that two major problems 
emerged even as the project was being developed.  Welch’s ideas for the program grew 
out of Smith’s intent to bolster the Quicksand Substation, but the scope of the project was 
much too large – thirty counties instead of the eight Smith proposed.  Additionally, there 
was no agreement among the project’s framers over the proper balance between 
Cooperative Extension and University-wide involvement.10  
 As Gallaher astutely observed, “Welch emphasized the innovative possibilities 
inherent in the proposal, though he never spelled out the nature of innovation nor the 
mechanics to achieve results.”11  Gallaher argued that Welch and others used the action 
orientation of the program as a rationale for not building evaluation into the project even 
as many faculty members consulted on the matter strongly advised the incorporation of 
evaluation techniques.  Gallaher asserted that Welch made damaging compromises with 
more conservative department heads in the College that gave the project “strong 
agricultural and Extension overtones.”  The department heads, Gallaher contended, saw 
the EKRDP as an opportunity to strengthen personnel and programs in their own 
departments.12   
According to Gallaher, Welch offered no organizational alternative to College of 
Agriculture management of the EKRDP.  Within the College, two organizational options 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 1-3. 
11 Ibid., 3. 
12 Ibid., 6. 
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were considered.  The project could report through Extension or directly to the Dean.  
Gallaher noted that Welch chose the latter but then complicated matters by deciding 
project specialists would have Extension appointments.13  Gallaher also argued that 
Welch never “came to grips with the mechanics of total University involvement.”  Half 
of the ten members of the advisory committee charged with connecting the EKRDP to the 
larger University were from the College of Agriculture, and the committee “never 
properly functioned.”14   
Gallaher asserted that the “innovative potential” of the EKRDP “has been 
restricted because of the traditional Extension environs in which it is housed.”  R.K. 
Kelley was a respected district leader in Extension, said Gallaher, but “he did not have 
the imagination nor the administrative ability to obtain maximum advantage from the 
project.”15  Gallaher argued that the Kellogg Foundation interpreted Kelley’s 
appointment to mean that the University did not prioritize the project as highly as the 
institution suggested.  Gallaher also noted that Kelley was given part-time responsibilities 
as an Extension district manager with two assistants to help with Extension 
responsibilities.  With Kelley in a district leadership role, the evaluator contended, the 
EKRDP and Extension were drawn even more closely together.16  Additionally, 
Gallaher’s evaluation demonstrated that there was no formal program to recruit top-level 
specialists with unique skill sets.  Most hires were made through the personal networks of 
Kelley or others in the Extension community.  Gallaher wrote, “It is generally true that 
the specialists hired have not had the outstanding qualifications or training that would 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 6-7. 
14 Ibid., 6. 




lead an observer to expect imaginative output,” and the specialists reported to Gallaher 
that they received little orientation to the project philosophy or the area of activity.  They 
were also left to their own devices in securing basic information on the region.17  To 
complicate matters even more, Kelley’s office was not in Quicksand, and staff meetings 
were facilitated by a project coordinator with no defined responsibilities, rights, or 
obligations.18  Furthermore, Gallaher discovered evidence of interference in the project 
by Dean Seay though the level of interference was not what Kelley and other EKRDP 
staffers believed.  Most significantly, Gallaher suggested, Seay discouraged the creation 
of a new advisory committee as a way of increasing total University participation in the 
project, “explaining that things were alright as they were.”19 
In Gallaher’s interviews, he discovered that project staff talked of program 
emphases rather than of specific goals.  There was little focus, there existed no 
measurable criteria for evaluation of the program’s success, and no one could “translate 
accomplishments other than at a broad, imprecise level of generalization.”20  Gallaher 
observed that “each specialist goes his own way, and for all practical purposes functions 
as a separate entity.  The project personnel do not constitute a team, and it is significant 
that in four years there have been no attempts by specialists to collaborate in the design 
and execution of development efforts.”21  Despite these shortcomings, however, Gallaher 
argued that the EKRDP was effective in collaborating with federal and state agencies and 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 11. 
18 Ibid., 11-12. 
19 Ibid., 15. 
20 Ibid., 16. 
21 Ibid., 17. 
 113 
 
in disseminating information about those agencies’ programs to the people with whom 
the specialists worked.22 
Gallaher, like Beers before him, found considerable strain among the EKRDP 
specialists.  Though many supported Kelley generally, the specialists found him 
“autocratic in program judgments” and not as receptive to the ideas of others as he 
believed himself to be.23  Specialists also struggled with the poor definition of authority 
in the absence of the director and with the undefined role of the coordinator who was to 
play some role of authority in the director’s absence.  The specialists wanted more 
definition in their own roles, and they wanted more recognition for their 
accomplishments.  Gallaher noted that specialists resented the requirement that they live 
in Quicksand, and they felt isolated from the University.  “They want very much for this 
to be a total University effort, to feel they are part of a larger task force,” the evaluator 
wrote.  “They feel physically and intellectually isolated, and unanimously denounce the 
present department affiliation arrangement as a solution to the problem.”24   
 Gallaher asserted that most of the objectives of the project resulted in 
“conspicuous failures.”  The EKRDP was not a total university effort, it did not identify 
pockets of opportunity, it did not create innovative solutions to basic problems in a 
chronically depressed area, and it did not become a model to be emulated by others.  The 
evaluator suggested that the idea of an action-oriented program on this scale was 
impossible given the resources.  Gallaher recommended a clean break with Extension and 
the College of Agriculture in pursuit of a project designed to “understand the 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 16-18. 
23 Ibid., 23 
24 Ibid., 24. 
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development process in chronically depressed areas….Surely, one of the main lessons to 
be learned from the EKRDP experience is that we do not yet know the kinds of questions 
that should be asked.”25  Gallaher proposed the new project “should be incorporated into 
some presently undefined total university effort to understand the development process.  
The latter might well be under the aegis of the Center for Developmental Change.”26  
Additionally, he recommended full disclosure with the Kellogg Foundation.  “The 
explanation,” he wrote, “should be thorough, honest, positive, and accompanied by a well 
thought-through proposal for funds adequate to shift the project to a new direction.”27 
 Gallaher’s evaluation is noteworthy because of its depth and quality, but also 
because of what it says about the ongoing conflict within the University between action 
and research.  At the Carnahan House Conference, the University recommitted to a total 
university action program for eastern Kentucky, but certain representatives of the CDC, 
the entity now charged with leading that effort, consistently demonstrated a preference 
for research over action.  That was true with the Grannie’s Branch proposal and with 
Gallaher’s suggestions for the future of the EKRDP. 
 Oswald and Albright did not offer a written response to the evaluation, but as they 
considered its findings, they shared the document with key members of their senior staff 
for feedback.  Provost Lewis Cochran was the first to receive a copy.  Calling the 
evaluation a “truly remarkable piece of work,” Cochran saw “no reason to disagree with 
any of his findings.”  Cochran questioned “whether the University has the competent 
manpower at this particular time to really operate successfully a broad program such as 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 30. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 31. 
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was proposed to Kellogg originally.”  He suggested withdrawing from Kellogg support to 
protect the University’s future interests with the Foundation.28 
 Oswald shared the document with Glenwood Creech, UK’s Vice President for 
University Relations, in August.  Creech had served as Kellogg’s Director of Agriculture 
at the time of the proposal.  He had been the University’s principal point person at the 
Foundation on the project and had recommended its approval to the Kellogg Board.  Not 
surprisingly, he offered a very detailed response to the evaluation.  Creech believed the 
review was “both sound and fair,” but he questioned why the College of Agriculture, 
especially the Dean, was not involved in the process.  Creech explained that the Kellogg 
Foundation recognized the weaknesses of the original proposal, but they also appreciated 
the magnitude of the challenges in Appalachia.  Pleased that the University wanted to 
commit its resources to those problems and confident in the institution’s leadership, the 
Foundation agreed to support the project.  However, Creech said the Foundation 
considered removing its support when Welch, Nesius, and Dickey, those most invested in 
the project, all left the University.  Then the Foundation “couldn’t believe it” when the 
University assigned the director of the project to half-time responsibility as a district 
leader and appointed a specialist staff lacking the high level of competence the 
Foundation expected. 29     
Creech was “very disappointed” with how the project was administered and “on 
several occasions suggested to Dean Seay, Mr. Schneider [Associate Director of 
Extension], and Mr. Kelley that the progress should be carefully evaluated and 
                                                 
28 Lewis Cochran to John Oswald, 7 June 1965, Box 3A, Developmental Change 
Center 1963-66 Folder, John W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
29 Glenwood Creech to John Oswald, 23 August 1965, Box 3A, Developmental 
Change Center 1963-66 Folder, John W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
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consideration should be given to restructuring its organization and redefining its 
objectives.”  Creech noted that no action was ever taken along those lines.  He also 
explained his concern over the University’s stewardship of Foundation funds.  “As a 
matter of fact,” Creech wrote, “the financial reporting reflected manipulations which 
bordered on dishonesty.  I never did report this as I didn’t have adequate facts to support 
any charges.  There were two times, however, that I seriously considered sending in an 
auditor.”  Only hope, Creech explained, kept him from intervening.30  
 Creech reminded Oswald that a Kellogg team was scheduled for a site visit in 
October and that the University needed to have plan developed for the future of the 
project at the time of that visit.  Creech suggested one of three options.  The University 
could continue the program as it existed.  They could explain that the institution’s 
experiences allowed for the identification of new opportunities and new approaches with 
even greater promise and pursue Kellogg support for a new plan, or they could 
acknowledge that the University was not able to accomplish the objectives of the project 
and accept no more funds committed to it.  Creech noted that he favored one of the first 
two options.31 
 Creech also made the following recommendations regarding the path forward.  He 
encouraged the President to assemble “some of the best brains on campus” to redefine the 
project, ensuring “University-wide involvement in an active and effective manner.”  
Creech volunteered to serve as part of that group, and he asserted that the committee 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
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should complete its report before the Kellogg visit in October.  He also believed that any 
future work must be “submitted to periodic evaluations of progress.”32 
 Creech sent a copy of the evaluation to Dean Seay, who was not aware of the 
document’s existence.  Seay was outraged that he did not know of the evaluation and that 
he had not received a copy after its completion.  Calling the document unusable, Seay 
argued that the evaluation was “laden with rumors, personality naming, and gaps in 
information.”  He took exception to the evaluator’s assessment of his views and those of 
others without speaking to them.  Seay was offended by the “dual connotation that the 
College of Agriculture and Home Economics is just for farm people and the Cooperative 
Extension Service is outmoded and traditional.”  Noting that the College of Agriculture 
serves the “total society” better than any other college, the Dean asserted that “we have 
been and can continue to involve the total resources of the University in the EKRD 
Project better than any other branch of the University.”  Conceding that the report was 
justified in its statements regarding the project’s early organization, Seay added, “We 
think our reorganization under the new project director is administratively sound.”  
Strongly recommending that the EKRDP remain in the College of Agriculture, Seay 
acknowledged past mistakes, but asked Oswald to “at least give us a chance to see what 
we can accomplish during the next year under ‘new management.’”  Reminding Oswald 
that the EKRDP and the modified Extension program in eastern Kentucky “paved the 
way” for a total reorganization of Cooperative Extension around an area model, Seay 




suggested that “it seems hardly fair to remove our model in this critical stage of 
reorganization.”33 
  
The Ad Hoc Committee on the EKRDP 
 
Oswald met with Albright and Creech on September 17, and they decided on the 
composition of an ad hoc committee to “consider the past accomplishments and future 
direction of the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project.”  In keeping with the 
Carnahan House Conference principles, the CDC was well represented on the committee.  
Oswald tapped Edward Weidner, the new CDC Director, as chair of the group, and 
Thomas Ford and Frank Santopolo were both members.  They were joined by Albright, 
Creech, Seay, Duff, and Henry Campbell, the Director of Prestonsburg Community 
College.  Campbell’s appointment reflected the decision made at the Carnahan House 
Conference to use community colleges as points of service for eastern Kentucky 
initiatives.34   
Oswald charged the group with the consideration of four questions.  What has the 
EKRDP accomplished to date, what has the University learned from the project, what 
directions should the program take in the future, and how should the next iteration of the 
project be organized and operated?  Oswald asked the group to complete a report by 
October 20 in advance of the October 27-28 site visit by Emory Morris, President of the 
                                                 
33 William Seay to John Oswald, 16 September 1965, Box 3A, Developmental 
Change Center 1963-66 Folder, John W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
34 The September 17 meeting is referenced in handwritten notes on Oswald’s copy 
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Kellogg Foundation.  Oswald expected the October 20 report to concentrate on the first 
two questions while addressing the last two questions in more general terms.  The 
committee’s final report, in the form of a new proposal to the Kellogg Foundation, would 
emphasize the third and fourth questions.  Oswald provided a February 1, 1966, deadline 
for the final report.35 
Having reviewed the Gallaher evaluation and Creech, Cochran, and Seay’s 
reactions, Ed Weidner worked quickly to outline his ideas for the EKRDP moving 
forward.  It is curious that Weidner prepared such a thorough plan so quickly and before 
consulting with his committee, but in his brief tenure at the University, Weidner 
established himself as someone who was quick to action.36  Weidner also took very 
seriously the CDC’s role to lead the eastern Kentucky effort, and this was his first 
opportunity to assert that leadership.  In his memo to Oswald, Weidner sought to “sketch 
out the framework of a radically new University approach to eastern Kentucky, and 
indeed, eventually to the entire state of Kentucky.”37 
Weidner noted that the EKRDP had some “bright elements.”  The project 
provided the model for an area approach to Extension.  Specialists, generally tied to the 
campus, had been deployed in the field, and some effective patterns of cooperation were 
established with local, state, and national agencies.  While most of his colleagues argued 
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36 Edward Weidner to John Oswald, 23 September 1965, Box 3A, Developmental 
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that the EKRDP was too big, Weidner asserted that “what seems to be wrong with 
EKRDP is that it was conceived in too narrow terms.”  He did not blame the University, 
the College, or the Dean for the project’s failures.  Instead, he argued that the project had 
a “limited but positive pay-off and now has pointed the way to a major break-through for 
marshaling university efforts in stimulating developmental change.”38 
Weidner recommended the University inform the Kellogg Foundation that the it 
had determined a more radical and experimental approach was required in the mountains.  
The objective of the new undertaking would be “the first major innovation in the 
approach of a university in stimulating developmental change in its state, an approach 
requiring involvement of all parts of the university.” 39  The experiment would operate in 
two of the new sixteen Extension areas, but Extension would not serve as the central 
administrative unit for the project.  The University would launch development programs 
relying on the resources of “any and all professional fields or disciplines at UK and any 
and all university operations (training, technical assistance, research, service, etc.).”  
Weidner envisioned something beyond a university-wide Extension.  The program would 
include “all operations as they relate to developmental change.” 40  Weidner expected the 
Kellogg Foundation to fund training at UK and in the field, technical assistance from UK 
specialist teams, community and adult education, and regular evaluation of the action 
program.  The University and other external partners would fund applied and basic 
research, faculty and curriculum development, and exchange arrangements for persons 
from other states and countries to “learn from Kentucky’s bold experiment.”  A new 
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public relations program targeting national, state, and local decision-makers as well as 
national and state media was central to the design.41 
In Weidner’s plan, the CDC would lead the effort and the director of the project 
would report to the head of the CDC.  Each college, school, and department within the 
University would be responsible for its own involvement through “joint undertakings” 
with the CDC, and operations would be decentralized as much as possible.  Additionally, 
project personnel would hold joint appointments in their respective departments and in 
the CDC.  The President would appoint an all-university advisory board with the CDC 
director as chair and with representation from every college.  The community colleges in 
the two areas would be “intimately involved.”  Weidner reasoned that in his plan the 
College of Agriculture would not feel that anything had been “taken away” from them 
because they would be engaged in a substantially larger project with other colleges.  
Weidner suggested that the remaining EKRDP budget, whether funds from the 
Foundation or from the University, be moved to this new project and that the University 
explore a new five-year program involving substantial contributions from both sources.  
He expected the Foundation’s contribution might be triple that of the original grant.  
Weidner assured the President that “the committee you have just appointed of which I 
will be chairman will be responsible for working out the details of the new approach and 
the new proposal to Kellogg” with a target date of April 1, 1966.42 
Weidner’s plan was big and bold and fraught with complications.  Oswald did not 
formally respond to Weidner’s suggestions.  Most likely, the President expected the 
committee would exercise its due diligence and reframe the proposal into something 





more manageable.  However, Weidner’s memo to the President highlighted the fact that 
his approach was very different than that of many involved in the CDC at that time.  
Weidner’s proposal stood in stark contrast to the Grannie’s Branch evaluation or 
Gallaher’s evaluation of the EKRDP.  Weidner embraced the basic principle of the 
Carnahan House Conference, that the institution should pursue an all-university effort of 
research, training, and action, and then he expanded that idea well beyond what anyone 
had imagined. 
While the Ad Hoc Committee on the EKRDP worked toward a new Kellogg 
proposal, its immediate concern was the Kellogg site visit in October 1965.  Weidner 
charged Mike Duff and Frank Santopolo with planning the visit and preparing documents 
for Kellogg officials that presented the program in the best possible light.  Duff and 
Santopolo intended to tightly control the visit without the impression they had done so.  
They carefully selected those with whom Kellogg officials met and, when possible, 
briefed them on the appropriate talking points.43 
Kellogg Foundation President Emory Morris and Director of Agriculture Russell 
Mawby arrived in Lexington on Tuesday evening, October 26.  Over the next three days, 
the pair traveled with University officials to Irvine, Campton, Quicksand, Hazard, 
Prestonsburg, Hyden, London, Corbin, and Renfro Valley.  They met with EKRDP 
specialists, community leaders who worked closely with the EKRDP, and business 
owners who had benefited from the EKRDP’s assistance.  While the visit focused Morris 
and Mawby on EKRDP successes, Duff and Santopolo were careful to include a few 
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stops, such as a tour of two dilapidated coal camps, where it was apparent that 
opportunities for more work remained.  Additionally, University officials noted that 
Oswald had created a special task force to translate the lessons learned from 
administering the program into recommendations for the project’s future.44  
Morris and Mawby came away from the visit with a very favorable impression of 
the University’s work through the EKRDP, and they looked forward to the University’s 
suggestions for future plans.  Weidner did not participate in the visit.  He was in Hawaii 
where he continued to wrap up some matters with his former employer, the East-West 
Center.  Interestingly, however, the Kellogg officials believed that Albright chaired the 
President’s ad hoc committee on the future of the EKRDP, and none of the post-visit 
correspondence with Morris or Mawby references Weidner. Whether this was a 
misunderstanding University officials chose not to correct or an intentional 
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The 1966 Kellogg Foundation Proposal 
 
The ad hoc committee worked through the winter and spring, missing both 
Oswald’s February 1 and Weidner’s April 1 deadlines for a new Kellogg proposal.  On 
May 31, Weidner submitted the final report of the EKRDP committee along with a 
proposal for submission to the Kellogg Foundation for the “Redirected Continuance of 
the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project.”  Oswald’s margin notes on 
Weidner’s memo directed his assistant to “draft a letter to Ed [Weidner] thanking him 
and committee for a great job” and “to send proposal to Kellogg.”46  On June 24, Oswald 
wrote to Kellogg’s Russell Mawby that “this proposal has substantial merit in 
emphasizing the importance of the development of local initiative and support for 
continuing change.  In this regard, it breaks new ground in a rather dramatic fashion.”  
However, according to margin notes on Oswald’s copy of the letter, the proposal had not 
arrived at the Foundation by June 28, prompting the President’s assistant to note, “I 
called her [Mrs. Sherman at the Foundation] to say it would be mailed under separate 
cover in a day or so.”  For reasons that are unclear, the University did not submit the 
proposal to the Foundation for nearly two more months, sending it on August 20.47  
The Kellogg proposal carried forward many of the ideas Weidner shared with 
Oswald earlier that fall, with significant space devoted to outlining a larger organization 
pattern for developmental change.  “In order to carry out its mission of facilitating 
                                                 
46 Edward Weidner to John Oswald, 31 May 1966, Box 6, Kellogg Foundation 
Folder, John W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
47 John Oswald to Russell Mawby, 24 June 1966, Box 6, Kellogg Foundation 
Folder, John W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968); “Prospectus: Redirected 
Continuance of the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project,” 20 August 1966, 




University contributions to developmental change,” the CDC would develop a field 
organization to complement and work with the community colleges and the Extension 
Service.  Piggybacking on Extension’s new area approach, the CDC would designate an 
area chairman in each of the state’s sixteen areas.  Generally, the chairman would be the 
director of the community college or the area Extension director.  All of the University’s 
development work in that area would run through the chairman for coordination, 
“eliminating undesirable conflict and overlap, and more important, promoting effective 
joint efforts.”  The area chairman would be responsible to the CDC project director in 
these matters.  Additionally, each major project would have a campus advisory 
committee within CDC consisting of all of the colleges involved.  Each project would 
also have an advisory board in the field consisting of the community college director, the 
area Extension director, the project’s field director, and three lay people (the chairman of 
the community college advisory board, the chairman of the area Extension council, and 
the chairman of the area development council).  The University believed this elaborate 
and exceedingly heavy structure was necessary because developmental change required 
local institutions to “carry on the continuing burdens of leadership in development.”  
With this new approach, the University sought to “help local citizens in a given 
geographical area introduce, build, and maintain informal or formal institutions for the 
implementation of a major developmental program.”  As new institutional frameworks 
were built, the University reasoned, existing institutions would be made stronger.48 
Within this context, the University proposed a six-year experimental project in 
institution-building centered around Prestonsburg.  Henry Campbell, Director of 
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Prestonsburg Community College, would serve as the area chairman and direct the 
project personnel in the field.  The CDC would maintain responsibility for project 
coordination in Lexington with a designated project director and advisory board.  The 
project would focus on five areas – health, housing, tourism, wood utilization, and 
municipal services – and five colleges would be actively involved –Arts and Sciences, 
Architecture, Agriculture, Business and Economics, and Medicine – though all colleges 
were expected to participate.  The University requested $743,000 over the six-year period 
from the Kellogg Foundation to cover program expenses less overhead and evaluation 
costs.  The University would contribute $348,000, including costs associated with 
transferred personnel.49  
Though terribly cumbersome in its organization, the experimental project in the 
new Kellogg proposal fulfilled the vision of the Carnahan House Conference pilot 
project.  The conference participants proposed a project to serve a four-to-six county 
area.  The participants suggested the project be centered around an eastern Kentucky 
community college with the full utilization of university resources both in the field and 
on campus.  The conference attendees desired a project that worked closely with local, 
state, and federal agencies, and the Conference determined that the pilot had to combine 
action, research, and training.  The Kellogg proposal met all of these requirements.50 
However, the vision of the Carnahan House Conference pilot project would never 
be realized.  The Kellogg Foundation opted not to fund the proposal, and the EKRDP 
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continued to function under the terms of the original design, with the slight modifications 
made to its organization in 1965 after Kelley’s resignation, until the grant expired at the 
end of 1967.  The University carried a shell of the project through 1969 when all of the 
EKRDP’s operations merged back into the Extension Service. 51  Not coincidentally, in 
that same year, the College of Agriculture abandoned the area Extension model, returning 
to the county agent model statewide.  This included the dismantling of the modified 
Extension program developed in eastern Kentucky in 1960.52   
 
The Final Years of the EKRDP 
 
Mike Duff’s first annual report as the EKRDP chair was incredibly transparent, 
making clear that, as both Beers and Gallaher had observed, the project specialists did not 
work together, they had rocky relationships with county agents and federal, state, and 
local agencies, and they felt isolated.  In an effort to improve the situation, Duff 
facilitated staff meetings every two weeks, and specialists gave reports of their activities 
                                                 
51 “Annual Report of the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project,” 
1965, University of Kentucky, Lexington, copy in Mike Duff Papers; “Annual Report of 
the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project,” 1966, University of Kentucky, 
Lexington, copy in Mike Duff Papers; “Annual Report of the Eastern Kentucky Resource 
Development Project,” 1967, University of Kentucky, Lexington, copy in Mike Duff 
Papers; “Eight-Year Summary Report of the Eastern Kentucky Resource Development 
Project,” 1968, University of Kentucky, Lexington, copy in Mike Duff Papers; Mike Duff 
to Charles Barnhart and John Ragland, 2 December 1969, Mike Duff Papers; Mike Duff, 
interview by Muriel Duff, 1 October 1985, University of Kentucky Extension Service 
Oral History Project, Charles T. Wethington University of Kentucky Oral History 
Collection, Louie B. Nunn Center for Oral History, University of Kentucky Libraries. 
52 Glenwood Creech to Otis Singletary, 25 September 1969, Singletary 
Presidential Papers, Permanent Series, Box 17, Folder 1, Special Collections Library, 
University of Kentucky, Lexington; Charles Barnhart to College of Agriculture Faculty 
and Staff, n.d., Singletary Presidential Papers, Permanent Series, Box 17, Folder 1; O.T. 
Dorton to Otis Singletary, 17 November 1969, Singletary Presidential Papers, Permanent 
Series, Box 17, Folder 1; Charles Barnhart to O.T. Dorton, 5 December 1969, Singletary 
Presidential Papers, Permanent Series, Box 17, Folder 1. 
 128 
 
and plans.  There were briefings on new laws, programs, and policies, and possible 
programming strategies were discussed and critically evaluated collectively.  For the first 
time in 1965, “each staff member was aware of the activities of the other staff members 
and, thus, was able to explain such activities, to make proper cross-references, and even 
to complement the activities of his fellow workers.”  Duff explained that specialists had 
the opportunity to exchange ideas on how to more fully involve the total University, but 
“because of the heavy teaching and research load of University staff members, it was 
frequently impossible to get the assistance of some staff members in the field action 
programs.”53 
In 1966, Duff reported on the considerable turnover at the EKRDP, with six 
specialists leaving.  Four vacant positions remained at year’s end.54  He commented on 
modest improvements in University participation in the project, citing programming 
partnerships with the College of Law and the community colleges.  Most significantly, 
Duff noted the increasing “public affairs” role required of specialists in the wake of the 
Great Society programs.  Serving as a “technical knowledge distribution center” for those 
in a “quest for knowledge and methodology related to the development of poor people” 
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became the “day-to-day expectation” for the specialists at Quicksand.55  Duff’s 1967 
annual report focused almost exclusively on the continuation of this role.56 
 Kellogg Foundation support for the EKRDP ended on December 31, 1967.   Early 
in 1968, Duff released an “Eight-Year Summary Report” and cited thirty-one project 
accomplishments.  Many, like a greenhouse project, a feeder pigs program, the 
development of an apple orchard, and fertilizer demonstrations, fell within the purview of 
traditional agricultural Extension.  Many others lacked specificity with the real role of the 
EKRDP remaining unknown.  Examples included “Traditionally independent personnel 
of various agencies worked together very effectively on task forces,” and “Contract 
agreements between the Cooperative Extension Service and other agencies and groups 
were successful.”  Still others likely owed more to state government’s development 
efforts than to the EKRDP, such as increased participation of Chambers of Commerce, 
garden clubs, and various civic groups in development activity, an explicit goal of 
Kentucky’s area programs model.57    
Under Mike Duff’s leadership, the EKRDP sought greater University 
participation, but it achieved only nominal success.  The project found a niche as an 
effective interpreter of OEO and ARC policies for local agencies, organizations, 
businesses, and individuals, but poorly planned and lacking definition from the 
beginning, without effective leadership for the first half of its existence, and too closely 
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tied to traditional Extension, the project never fulfilled its promise as a total resource 
development agent in the mountains. 
 
The Center for Developmental Change 
 
President John Oswald tapped the Center for Developmental Change to lead the 
University of Kentucky’s eastern Kentucky effort in 1964, and the CDC performed that 
role, at least formally, for the next eight years.  As the first permanent Director of the 
Center for Developmental Change (CDC), Edward Weidner embraced the University’s 
action orientation in eastern Kentucky, but he was in the minority among his CDC 
colleagues.  Two sets of competing interests informed the CDC’s work during its 
leadership of the eastern Kentucky effort.  One was the tension between research and 
action, first clearly evident in the Grannie’s Branch evaluation in 1964, and the other was 
the competition between a domestic emphasis, focused primarily on Appalachia, and 
international work. These strains occurred in the context of dramatically changing 
institutional expectations of faculty, University financial difficulties, and leadership 
challenges within the Center.   
 Understanding the CDC’s challenges in the mid-to-late 1960s requires an 
understanding of the larger institutional changes taking place at the University during that 
period.  John Oswald came to the University of Kentucky as President in 1963, having 
served previously as a faculty member and administrator at the University of California.  
At Berkeley, Oswald chaired the plant pathology department and then served as Special 
Assistant to the President and Vice President during the time when the University 
became, as Roger Geiger called it, “the paragon of academic distinction among public 
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institutions – the epitome of what American research institutions aspire to be.”58  Oswald 
was also a chief advisor to Clark Kerr in the development of the Master Plan which 
became a national model for the governance of state systems of higher education.59  
While Oswald had no false hopes of turning the University of Kentucky into the 
University of California, he did intend to modernize the institution.  To that end, he 
implemented rotating department chairmen, fixed terms for deans, merit evaluations 
linked to compensation, and clear expectations regarding faculty distribution of effort.  
Oswald expected faculty members to spend significant time conducting research and 
instructing and advising graduate students.60  These changing expectations for faculty had 
a tremendous impact on their involvement in interdisciplinary work, such as that pursued 
by the CDC.  Department chairs conducted the merit evaluations and based the reviews 
on faculty members’ productivity within their respective academic departments.  As A.D. 
Albright commented, “We didn’t pay enough attention to how you reward faculty who 
move outside their own department to carry on work…if it cannot be accommodated in 
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the performance review, they will say, ‘so what.’”61  Likewise, with its greater emphasis 
on research, the changing review process devalued the involvement of faculty in action 
programs like those the CDC was charged with implementing in eastern Kentucky. 
Edward Weidner came to the University of Kentucky with much fanfare.  A 
political scientist and a well-regarded expert in international affairs, Weidner served as 
Director of the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii when Oswald offered him 
the first permanent directorship of the CDC.62  According to Art Gallaher Jr., Weidner 
was “a cosmopolite.  He was part of the larger change that was taking place in higher 
education…wherever he was, things were happening.”63   
Weidner wanted to involve the University’s colleges in the Center’s activities as 
he outlined in the 1966 Kellogg Foundation proposal.  Ultimately, Weidner hoped the 
CDC would become the off-campus arm of the central administration with coordinating 
authority for all extension and service activities.64  In the summer and fall of 1966, 
Weidner and Art Gallaher, Jr., who served as Weidner’s Deputy Director, visited faculty 
members across campus to solicit their involvement in the CDC, but few expressed any 
                                                 
61 A.D. Albright interview. 
62 Thomas R. Ford, interview by Grace M. Zilverberg, 5 November 1984, Charles 
T. Wethington University of Kentucky Oral History Collection, Louie B. Nunn Center 
for Oral History, University of Kentucky Libraries.  A. Lee Coleman, interview by Grace 
M. Zilverberg, 12 November 1984, Charles T. Wethington University of Kentucky Oral 
History Collection, Louie B. Nunn Center for Oral History, University of Kentucky 
Libraries. Howard W. Beers, interview by Grace M. Zilverberg, 18 February 1985, 
Charles T. Wethington University of Kentucky Oral History Collection, Louie B. Nunn 
Center for Oral History, University of Kentucky Libraries. A.D. Albright interview; Art 
Gallaher, Jr. interview. 
63 Gallaher interview. 
64 Gallaher interview; Beers interview; Albright interview. 
 133 
 
interest, frequently questioning the value of interdisciplinary work and action activities in 
the new merit evaluation system.65   
Weidner’s eagerness to own all of the University’s action programs created rifts 
with many of the faculty associated with the CDC, a group that already leaned toward 
research over action.  According to Gallaher, Weidner’s willingness to pull “peripheral 
activities” into the Center “disaffected” several of the original core group of CDC faculty, 
and many outside the CDC saw his actions as a “power grab.”66  Albright noted that 
Weidner was more concerned with nurturing his own ideas than the ideas of others.  
Additionally, a trust gap began to develop.  As Albright explained, “I came to have a 
question, along the latter months, of whether or not, when he told me something, that was 
the way it was….had he told me all of it, or part of it, had he flavored it.”67  
CDC faculty members were also concerned that if they devoted too much energy 
to Appalachia, they would “be captured by the region.”  As Gallaher reasoned, the faculty 
had a “very strong feeling that we needed to get underway something that would assert 
the independence of this place [the CDC] from Appalachia.  The notion of international 
was very much a part of the picture.”68  Howard Beers recognized the disconnect 
between the faculty’s disinterest in Appalachian projects and the institutional 
expectations, especially in light of the War on Poverty.  “We had this fascinating area 
over here of Appalachia we were supposed to be interested in…. you made brownie 
points for being interested in Appalachia.”69  Even Albright, who with Oswald was most 
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responsible for putting the CDC at the center of the eastern Kentucky effort, commented, 
“Some of us thought we needed to get beyond the connection with Appalachia, or eastern 
Kentucky.”70 
As early as March 1966, Weidner began to question the University’s support for 
interdisciplinary action programs.  Writing to Raymond Bard, Assistant Vice President 
for Research, Weidner expressed his frustrations and indicated his departure might be 
imminent.  He explained that he had been approached regarding the post of High 
Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and that he would examine his 
options.  He added that he remained optimistic “that this and other opportunities need not 
be explored fully.  My wife and I are hopeful we can realize our desire to contribute to 
the University.”71  Weidner passed on that position, but in October, the University of 
Wisconsin appointed him the first Chancellor of the new Green Bay campus, a post he 
held for twenty years.  At Green Bay, Weidner strived to make the whole campus an 
interdisciplinary action tool, creating what he dubbed the “communiversity.”72 
Discouraged by the Weidner experience, brief though it was, the CDC faculty 
sought a director more interested in international activities than Appalachian projects and 
more interested in research than action.  In the fall of 1967, they encouraged Albright to 
appoint Howard Beers as the Center’s new director, and Albright agreed.73  Beers had 
returned to the states in February 1966 when the United States Government pulled the 
Indonesian team he led out of the country for security reasons.  Weidner offered Beers a 
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research professorship in the CDC, about which Beers commented, “I was moving into 
the unknown territory of the CDC.  I was curious to know what the meaning of the Center 
for Development Change might be and the concepts and ideas around that.”  Despite 
some misgivings, Beers joined the CDC faculty upon his return in 1966. 74  
Beers initially declined the directorship.  He had a great commitment to 
interdisciplinary work in the social sciences, but he did not have the ambition for an 
administrative role.  Having served as an administrator overseas for a number of years, he 
hoped to return full-time to research and writing.75  Beers said Albright’s offer 
“confounded” him, and he expressed concern that the notion of the Center was “pretty 
vague.”  The expectations for the CDC were not clear to Beers, and he believed different 
people had very different ideas about the Center’s purpose.  Additionally, Beers did not 
have any interest in working with Oswald, remarking that his work with an Indonesian 
dictator was safer than working with the UK President.76  Nonetheless, Beers eventually 
relented to pressure from Albright and the CDC faculty and accepted the post.  He was 
never comfortable with the role, believing it was best filled by a younger, more assertive 
figure.  Beers served for seven years, publically discussing his imminent resignation for 
six of them.77 
As he had done with Weidner, Art Gallaher, Jr. accompanied Beers as he met 
with faculty across campus seeking their support for the Center.  The reception was even 
less enthusiastic the second time.  With the “Oswald Revolution” firmly in place, faculty 
members feared getting “buried by multidisciplinary enterprises.”  Additionally, Beers 
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had to smooth over Weidner’s reputational problems and address the fact that the Center 
had not received the amount of outside funding the University had anticipated.  
Essentially, as Gallaher argued, Beers “had to preside over a de-escalation of 
expectations.”78 
Unlike Weidner, Beers had no interest in leading the eastern Kentucky effort or a 
broader University action program in development like the plan Weidner outlined in the 
1966 Kellogg proposal.  He was more interested in managing the University’s 
international training programs and facilitating research.  In fact, the 1968-69 CDC 
annual report noted that “the Center has decided to focus its efforts in six program areas 
and to adopt a more active policy in developing research proposals in those areas.”  
Those areas were: 1) industrialization as a developmental strategy in modernization; 2) 
developmental demography; 3) institution building in developing areas; 4) 
communication in developmental change; 5) application of social sciences to 
developmental policy planning; and 6) voluntary associations in developmental change.  
While some domestic programs were mentioned in the report, the document had a strong 
international flavor, and there were no specific references to eastern Kentucky or 
Appalachian programs.79  
Beers assumed the directorship of the CDC just as the climate for developmental 
change was shifting.  The 1950s and 1960s had been fertile ground for international 
development programs.  The “Appalachian problem” provided an impetus for action in 
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79 “Senate Advisory Committee on the Center for Developmental Change, 1968-
69 Annual Report,” University of Kentucky, Lexington, copy in Box 2, Center for 
Developmental Change 1968-69 Folder, John Oswald Papers (President’s Office Papers 
1968-69, I:2a:1:5), Special Collections Library, University of Kentucky, Lexington. 
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eastern Kentucky in the 1960s, and the pursuit of War on Poverty funding accelerated 
that interest in the middle part of the decade.  But by the end of decade, the landscape for 
higher education generally and development programs specifically was beginning to 
change.  In Washington, President Nixon scaled back domestic development support after 
1969, especially those programs supported through the OEO, and Vietnam and the 
increasing concern that the nation has been dragged into a quagmire pulled interest away 
from international development programs. Funding from foundations for development 
programs also became tighter as those organizations reevaluated their program 
emphases.80  The Commonwealth of Kentucky, flush with resources throughout much of 
the 1960s, now faced very difficult financial choices.  These financial difficulties 
extended to the University and as A.D. Albright explained, when funding is a challenge, 
the non-traditional enterprises of an institution “tend to fall by the wayside, especially if 
they had not proven themselves.”81  At UK, enthusiasm for developmental programs 
waned across the campus as faculty focused on research in their respective departments 
and administrators and students turned to other matters.  According to Thomas Ford, Otis 
Singletary, who became the institution’s president in 1969, “was not much interested in 
international or national development,” and UK students “didn’t want to help people, 
they just wanted to bring about a revolution.”82   
                                                 
80 Annelise Orleck, “The War on Poverty and American Politics since the 1960s” 
in The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History, 1964-1980, eds. Annelise Orleck and 
Lisa Gayle Hazirjian (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 447-461;Gallaher 
interview; Albright interview. 
81 Albright interview. 
82 Ford interview. 
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As Howard Beers asserted, the University still “pulled out” the CDC “from time 
to time when it was necessary and expedient.” 83  In fact, the University’s last major 
public advocacy for action programs came in 1967.  The winter 1967 volume of The 
Kentucky Alumnus featured the university’s role in developmental change.  In a section 
titled, “The University as a Center of Change,” Albright and Gallaher penned an article 
making the case for the University as a knowledge center, a training center, and a direct 
operator in development, and Beers’ piece in the same section explained that the CDC 
was the tool used to facilitate these roles.  In the section “Domestic Change,” Frank 
Santopolo outlined the action program in eastern Kentucky, and G.W. Schneider 
discussed the Extension Service.  In “International Change,” Willis Griffin and W. H. 
Jansen elaborated on the University’s international programs.84  Speaking to a group of 
fellow presidents in Chicago in March 1967, Oswald used the opportunity to discuss the 
centrality of developmental change, and specifically the CDC, in UK’s service function, 
and the 1967 University of Kentucky Research Foundation Annual Report highlighted 
the role of the CDC in a “trend toward interdisciplinary approaches to the solution of the 
problems facing American society,” adding that “the University’s efforts in this area 
augur well for success.”85  After this flurry of marketing activity, there is no evidence in 
                                                 
83 Beers interview.   
84 A.D. Albright and Art Gallaher, Jr., “The University as a Center of National 
Life,” The Kentucky Alumnus, Winter 1967, 3-5; Howard W. Beers, “The University 
Focus on Change,” The Kentucky Alumnus, Winter 1967, 5-7; Frank A. Santopolo, “The 
University Spurs Commonwealth Development,” The Kentucky Alumnus, Winter 1967, 
8-9; G.W. Schneider, “The University Goes to the People,” The Kentucky Alumnus, 
Winter 1967, 11-13; Willis Griffin, “The University Goes to Foreign Lands,” The 
Kentucky Alumnus, Winter 1967, 14-17; W.H. Jansen, “The University in Developing 
People,” The Kentucky Alumnus, Winter 1967, 18-21.  
85 John Oswald, “The Service Function of the University,” 6 March 1967, remarks 
delivered in Chicago, Illinois, Box 13A, Speeches and Papers ’66-67 Folder, John D. 
 139 
 
the documentary record that UK returned publicly to this theme, and by 1970, the ideals 
of total resource development, developmental change, and action programs as they had 
been envisioned at the University in the early and mid-1960s were effectively dead. 
In 1970, Howard Beers prepared two documents to help educate the campus 
community on the work of the Center for Developmental Change.  A January 1970 
prospectus outlined the CDC’s history, its organization, its staffing, and its roster of 
projects – past and present. An October 1970 plan suggested future directions for the 
Center.  Both emphasized research and international training programs though they did 
give a nod to the handful of eastern Kentucky studies the CDC had supported, most 
notably the significant evaluation of OEO programs in Knox County.  However, there 
was no suggestion of a coordinated action program in eastern Kentucky.86 
In 1971, in the midst of growing campus criticism regarding the work of the 
Center, Beers requested an external review of the CDC, and William Dennen, Dean of 
the Graduate School, appointed an ad hoc committee of faculty to carry out the task.  The 
ad hoc committee surveyed and interviewed University faculty and staff, including 
lengthy sessions with Albright, Vice President for Academic Affairs Lewis Cochran, 
Beers, Gallaher, Santopolo, and Edward Weidner.  The committee’s 1972 report argued 
that the CDC had been of benefit to the University, particularly as an “active extramural 
fund-getter” and in its support of the University’s development team in Thailand, the 
Peace Corps training program, and the Knox County OEO evaluation.  The report 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968); “University of Kentucky Research 
Foundation Annual Report 1967,” University of Kentucky, Lexington. 
86 “Center for Developmental Change Prospectus,” 1 January 1970, copy in Box 
3, Folder 45, Otis Singletary Papers, Special Collections Library, University of Kentucky, 
Lexington; “The Future Program and Organization of the Center for Developmental 
Change,” October 1970, copy in Box 3, Folder 45, Otis Singletary Papers. 
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criticized the University for failing to adequately support the Center and for providing 
“precious little in the way of rewards for interested faculty members to associate 
themselves with CDC.”  The committee faulted the CDC for objectives that were “vague 
and difficult to comprehend,” for a “top-heavy and cumbersome” administrative 
structure, and for the uncertain “pertinency of its activities.”  Again, there was no 
mention of the CDC’s expected leadership role in the eastern Kentucky action effort.  
The evaluation recommended that the CDC continue as an operating unit, that its primary 
goal be “research in the theory and practice of planned change,” and that its relationship 
to the administrative structure be “clarified and changed to make it more effective.”87 
As the ad hoc committee was preparing its evaluation in the spring of 1972, the 
CDC was preparing a proposal for “A Program for Improving the Quality of Life in 
Appalachia” to submit to federal agencies and foundations for funding.  The proposal 
grew out of conversations in 1971 among “a small ad hoc group of engineers, biologists, 
social scientists, and others at the University who sense both an urgency and an 
opportunity for a new convergence of ‘mountain’ research.”88  In a letter to the entire 
faculty, Lewis Cochran called for a survey of Appalachian research.  He suggested a 
four-pronged approach that involved updating the inventory of present resources, 
appraising the current systems of resource extraction, illuminating the resulting 
environmental, ecological, economic, and social problems, and forming alternatives to 
align resource utilization and conservation with human needs.  Cochran requested faculty 
                                                 
87 “Report of the Ad Hoc Evaluation Committee for the Center for Developmental 
Change,” May 1972, Box 3, Folder 44, Otis Singletary Papers. 
88 Lewis Cochran to Faculty, 11 November 1971, Box 3, Folder 7, Otis Singletary 




members submit their “project objectives, sources and types of data, proposed procedures 
and anticipated results” by December 15.89 
The CDC proposal, informed by the faculty survey, included twenty-five separate 
research projects in five broad areas: meeting basic human needs, meeting industrial and 
commercial requirements, improving community services, conserving natural resources, 
and cultural heritage.  The projects in the plan required an estimated support of 
$2,039,600, with $1,436,338 of direct cost and $603,262 of indirect cost.  The CDC 
described the program as a “multi-project interdisciplinary research undertaking of the 
University of Kentucky to identify and compare alternative prospective systems for 
improving the quality of life in Appalachia by utilization, conservation, and restoration of 
natural and institutional resources.”  Unlike the EKRDP, Grannie’s Branch, and the 1966 
Kellogg proposal, this program would not lead to the “adoption of specific policies but 
rather for the utilization of information in making choices among alternatives.”  A clear 
shift from the University’s action approach in eastern Kentucky in the 1960s, this was a 
pure research program.90  However, despite conversations and proposal submissions to 
the Appalachian Regional Commission, several federal and state government agencies, 
and foundations, only a handful of the projects received any funding.91 
 
 
                                                 
89 Ibid.  Cochran appointed a committee to assist with the faculty survey.  
Committee members included Howard Beers (Director, Center for Developmental 
Change), Samuel Conti (Director, School of Biological Sciences), Ottfried Hahn 
(Assistant Professor, Mechanical Engineering), James McDonald (Director, Kentucky 
Research Foundation), and George Wilber (Director, Social Welfare Research Institute) 
90 Center for Developmental Change, “A Program for Improving the Quality of 
Life in Appalachia,” April 1972, University of Kentucky, Lexington. 
91 Beers interview.  Ford interview. 
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Research Funding and Sponsored Projects 
 
To fully appreciate the University’s eastern Kentucky efforts in the 1960s, one 
should examine the amount of outside funding devoted to projects in the region. At the 
Carnahan House Conference, Oswald charged the CDC, in its leadership of the eastern 
Kentucky effort, to seek extramural funding for eastern Kentucky projects.92  Like most 
institutions, the University of Kentucky experienced incredible growth in the post-war 
period, not only in external funding but also in the institutional apparatus required to 
support extramural activities.  In 1946, the University received $1,929 through its 
research foundation, covering two scholarship funds, two endowments, and no contracts 
or grants.  In 1955, UK received $207,511 through the research foundation, supporting 32 
scholarship funds, four endowments, and 29 contracts and grants.  By 1962, the support 
had risen to $2,027,825, responsible for 77 scholarship funds, 12 endowments, 128 grants 
and contracts, and 23 specials projects.93 
By 1965, with Oswald’s focus on faculty research and a continued increase in 
available external funds, the University received over $4 million in outside support for 
research and sponsored projects.  As Table 5.1 shows, that support more than tripled over 
the next four years, with funding nearing $15 million in 1969.  However, despite the 
University’s stated focus on eastern Kentucky development and additional funds 
available through OEO and ARDA programs, eastern Kentucky projects never accounted 
                                                 
92 “Report on the Conference on University Planning for Development 
Programs,” by A.D. Albright, chairman, and R.K. Kelley, secretary, 4 September 1964, 
Carnahan House, Lexington, KY, Box 3A, Economic Opportunity 1964-66 Folder, John 
W. Oswald Papers (From 9-1-1963 to 9-1-1968). 
93 “Annual Report of the Kentucky Research Foundation, 1962,” University of 
Kentucky, Lexington.  For a thorough discussion of the post-war increases in research 
funding at universities, see Thelin, A History of American Higher Education, 260-316; 
Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge. 
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for more than three percent of either the total funded projects at the University or the total 
amount of support. 
 
Table 5.1 – Extramural Funding at the University of Kentucky 
Year 
Total University Eastern Kentucky Projects 








1964-65 179 $4,297,025 1 $68,935 
1965-66 n/a $9,400,000 n/a n/a 
1966-67 391 $11,175,332 10 $325,517 
1967-68 398 $12,416,921 2 $5,860 
1968-69 414 $14,700,000 10 $106,643 
1969-70 441 $14,308,885 12 $266,567 
 
Source: University of Kentucky Research Foundation Annual Reports, 1965-197094 
 
 Of the thirty-five eastern Kentucky projects funded during this period, eighteen 
supported education programs, and six supported medical research or healthcare 
programs.  The largest externally-funded eastern Kentucky project was Paul Street’s 
Knox County OEO evaluation.  Street and his team received nearly $700,000 over three 
years.  Other significant projects with funding in excess of $50,000 included two Head 
Start contracts, two Upward Bound contracts, a study of the impact of modernizing 
school systems on student performance, and a study of eastern Kentucky outmigration.  
Eastern Kentucky projects did receive the vast majority of the University’s OEO funding 
                                                 
94 The 1966 University of Kentucky Research Foundation Annual Report does not 
include the total number of projects, the total amount of external support or project 
descriptions.  The $9,400,000 for total funding in 1965-66 comes from the 1967 
University of Kentucky Research Foundation Annual Report.  
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95 The five projects were the OEO evaluation in Knox County, two Head Start 
contracts, and two Upward Bound contracts. “Annual Report of the Kentucky Research 
Foundation, 1965,” University of Kentucky, Lexington; “Annual Report of the Kentucky 
Research Foundation, 1966,” University of Kentucky, Lexington; “Annual Report of the 
Kentucky Research Foundation, 1967,” University of Kentucky, Lexington; “Annual 
Report of the Kentucky Research Foundation, 1968,” University of Kentucky, Lexington; 
“Annual Report of the Kentucky Research Foundation, 1969,” University of Kentucky, 
Lexington;  “Annual Report of the Kentucky Research Foundation, 1970,” University of 
Kentucky, Lexington.        
 145 
 
Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 
In January 2015, UK President Eli Capilouto announced that a set of 
stories, “Rooted in Our Communities: The University of Kentucky in Appalachia,” would 
examine the ways the institution was active in the mountains.  The stories, he said, “bring 
to life the significant challenges and even more promising opportunities that exist not 
only in Eastern Kentucky, but throughout our Commonwealth in areas such as health 
care, energy and conservation, education and economic development.”1  The President 
discussed the depth of the region’s problems, the fact that there is no “silver bullet” 
solution, and that tackling the situation “takes an array of disciplines.”  But he expressed 
optimism, “We can do it like no other place can.  We’re part of being the best hope for 
the Commonwealth.  We in Kentucky have the opportunity to unlock so many mysteries 
that not only inform our state and improve our conditions but I think serve as examples 
across the United States, across the globe.”2 
This announcement easily could have been made in the 1960s.  The ideas, even 
the language, mirror those of the EKRDP, the Grannie’s Branch Project, the Carnahan 
House Conference discussions, and the 1966 Kellogg proposal.  Capilouto sounded a note 
not dissimilar to that of his predecessor, Lee Todd, whose interest in addressing “the 
Kentucky uglies,” many found in eastern Kentucky, was a guiding theme of his ten-year 
                                                 
1 Eli Capilouto, “Rooted in our Communities: The University for Kentucky,” blog 
post accessed at http://uknow.uky.edu/content/rooted-our-communities-university-
kentucky  
2 Eli Capilouto, “Rooted in our Communities: The University for Kentucky,” 




UK presidency beginning in 2001.3  Likewise, the announcement could have followed 
the University’s establishment of the Robinson Trust quasi-endowment in 1992 to fund 
projects for “the betterment of the people of eastern Kentucky.”  The University formed 
the quasi-endowment with revenue from mining in the Robinson Forest, and the fund 
supported programs across eight broad research and action areas, including the still extant 
Robinson Scholars Program.4  
The juxtaposition of challenges and opportunities has always been part of the 
narrative of Appalachian development.  The fact that the language remains the same 
today as it was in the 1960s and at every step in between is a reflection of the persistence 
of the challenges in the region and the inability of individuals and institutions to 
adequately address them.  The University of Kentucky’s action program in eastern 
Kentucky in the 1960s was a pioneering effort, a bold step to use its position as the 
Commonwealth’s land-grant institution to effect positive change in one of the nation’s 
most blighted regions.  Without a doubt, the eastern Kentucky effort improved individual 
lives, but like every University project in the mountains that followed over the next fifty-
five years, the 1960s action program failed to substantially change the region.  Eli 
Capilouto’s call to action in 2015 is the same as Frank Dickey’s in 1960. 
The Eastern Kentucky Resource Development Project (EKRDP) was the flagship 
of the University of Kentucky’s action program in the mountains in the 1960s, but the 
                                                 
3 See Lee Todd describe the University’s approach to “the Kentucky uglies” in a 
video produced by the University of Kentucky Public Relations Office, accessed at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UeAVgofBkg  
4 Minutes of the University of Kentucky Board of Trustees, 7 April 1992, Special 
Collections Library, University of Kentucky, Lexington; Minutes of the University of 
Kentucky Board of Trustees, 15 August 1995; Minutes of the University of Kentucky 
Board of Trustees, 15 August 2000.   
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EKRDP was flawed from the start.  The College of Agriculture drafted the proposal that 
gave birth to the project far too quickly and in the process angered Governor Combs and 
key members of his administration.  The development and implementation of the project 
were equally haphazard.  The project planners never fully fleshed out the program, they 
never clearly defined the roles of the EKRDP specialists and how other Extension agents 
were to interact with the project, they never adequately linked the EKRDP to the new 
modified Extension program in eastern Kentucky on which the project relied, and they 
failed to set up any accountability standards or evaluation mechanisms within the 
program.  While James Brown’s leadership and influence led to the adoption of a “total 
university” approach, Dean Welch deferred too many decisions to conservative Extension 
administrators and College of Agriculture department heads seeking to shore up their 
fiefdoms.  The result was a project tied too closely to both the College of Agriculture and 
the Cooperative Extension to be able to pursue the broader work involving the whole of 
the University necessary to tackle the enormity of the challenges in the region. 
 The War on Poverty and the passage of the Equal Opportunity Act and the 
Appalachian Regional Development Act marked a significant shift in the University’s 
action program in eastern Kentucky.  New University President John Oswald had grown 
increasingly concerned with the EKRDP and began to transition the leadership of the 
eastern Kentucky effort to the new Center for Developmental Change (CDC).  At the 
Carnahan House Conference in September 1964, UK recommitted to a total university 
action program for eastern Kentucky and pledged to partner with federal, state, and local 
officials in the War on Poverty, especially in Appalachia.  The Conference introduced the 
community college as a preferred point of service for mountain programming and 
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directed the Center for Developmental Change to lead the eastern Kentucky effort.  Yet 
despite the urgency that emerged from the Carnahan House Conference, the University 
was slow and ineffective in organizing its War on Poverty efforts and struggled in pursuit 
of OEO and ARDA funds. 
 Following Art Gallaher’s scathing CDC evaluation of the EKRDP in the summer 
of 1965, President Oswald created an ad hoc committee on the EKRDP, led by Edward 
Weidner, the Director of the CDC.  Weidner and his team sought to recast the EKRDP in 
a new proposal to the Kellogg Foundation in 1966.  In the proposal, the University 
outlined a statewide organization for developmental change and, within that context, 
sought funding for a six-year experimental project in institution-building in and around 
Prestonsburg in eastern Kentucky.  The proposal followed the vison of the pilot project 
endorsed by the Carnahan House Conference, but the Kellogg Foundation chose not to 
fund the project.  In its final years, the EKRDP found a niche as an effective interpreter 
of OEO and ARC policies, but it never fulfilled its promise as a total resource 
development agent in the mountains. 
 As the first permanent Director of the CDC, Edward Weidner embraced the 
University’s action orientation in eastern Kentucky as well as the Center’s leadership role 
in the effort.  However, his view was not shared by most of his CDC colleagues who 
feared they might get buried by an overemphasis on Appalachian concerns and who 
favored research over action programs.  The “Oswald Revolution” handicapped Weidner 
and his successor, Howard Beers, in their recruitment of faculty to participate in CDC 
activities.  Oswald’s expectations for research productivity that was tied to performance 
reviews within a faculty member’s respective department disincentivized both 
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interdisciplinary and action-oriented pursuits.  Furthermore, political and financial 
support for developmental change efforts contracted during the late 1960s.  Ultimately, 
the CDC had little impact on the University’s eastern Kentucky efforts or on remedying 
Appalachia’s challenges. 
It is easy to look at the University of Kentucky’s Appalachian story in the 1960s 
and see missed opportunities.  Sure, the intent was well-meaning, even noble, but the 
University bungled the effort from the very beginning.  This is a story of a plan built on 
the misguided culture of poverty theory, a belief that the people of Appalachia did not 
exhibit the values and habits necessary to succeed in a modern, commercial society.  The 
University’s efforts were further underscored by an idealistic view that if they simply 
pointed enough attention to the problem, if they simply committed all the energy and 
ideas that a robust research institution had to offer, they could create “a progressive, 
hopeful attitude among the people of the area” that would allow residents “to take their 
rightful place in American society.”5  This is the Kentucky embodiment of what Alice 
O’Connor describes in Poverty Knowledge where white male social scientists construct 
poverty in ways that perpetuate their own professional importance and maintain market 
capitalism.6  The problems facing Appalachia and other areas plagued by extractive 
economies and outside ownership were far from simple and culture of poverty theories 
                                                 
5Quote comes from early discussions of the modified Extension program, but 
repeatedly, those involved in EKRDP reiterated this objective of “developing people.”  
“The Modified Extension Program for Eastern Kentucky,” Correspondence 1961-62 (2), 
Eastern Kentucky Folder, William A. Seay Papers, Special Collections Library, 
University of Kentucky. 
6 Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the 
Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
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led university representatives to miss the structural causes of poverty that scholars would 
start to emphasize in the following decade. 
The 1970s, marked by growing controversy over American involvement in 
Vietnam and increasing economic hardships at home, led the federal government to 
curtail its War on Poverty.  More and more, concerns over deeply rooted inequality 
would be voiced at the grassroots level.  The field of Appalachian Studies emerged in the 
second half of the 1970s, attracting new voices and facilitating new conversations.7  
Harry Caudill had been the first to argue that Appalachia’s poverty stemmed from a 
greedy coal industry that had sucked the profits out of the region leaving its land and 
people destroyed.  Increasingly other Appalachian scholars joined in this critique, 
emphasizing the structural causes of poverty.8   
At the first Appalachian Studies Association Conference in 1978, John Gaventa 
gave the keynote address, which he titled, “Which Side Are You On?: Appalachian 
Inequality in the Appalachian Studies Industry.”  He took traditional Appalachian 
scholarship to task, equating it with the exploitative coal industry and charging it with 
                                                 
7 Logan Brown, et. al., “Where Have We Been?  Where Are We Going?  A 
History of the Appalachian Studies Association, Appalachian Journal 31: 1 (fall 2003): 
30-92.  Early gatherings of Appalachian Studies were marked by tension between 
“radicals,” who were more concerned with “race, poverty, [and] economic subjugation” 
and “more conservative academic participants” (32-33).  Many viewed Berea College 
particularly for cultivating outdated culture of poverty theories.  
8 For early examples of this structural critique see David S. Wall, "Central 
Appalachia: A Peripheral Region within an Advanced Capitalist Society." Journal of 
Sociology and Social Welfare 4 (November 1976): 232-47; Helen Matthews Lewis, Linda 
Johnson, and Donald Askins, Colonialism in Modern America: The Appalachian Case 
(Boone, NC: The Appalachian Consortium Press, 1978); and John Gaventa, Power and 
Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1980).   
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being “part of the problem.”9  But while individual scholars have taken on “the powers 
that be,” universities rely heavily on the financial support and prestige that come from 
being associated with corporate, political, and community leaders.  Universities reinforce 
the existing power structures that hold mountain communities hostage.        
Proponents of planned change committed university energy and resources to 
addressing a wide range of economic, social, and political weaknesses that kept 
Appalachia from realizing its potential.  While their language and stated goals 
emphasized sweeping change, the results were much, much more modest.  It would be 
inaccurate to suggest that the programs introduced through modified extension, the 
EKRDP, and the CDC had no impact, but these programs did not serve as panaceas; they 
treated the symptoms but not the deeper illness.   
.   The story of the University of Kentucky’s action program in eastern Kentucky in 
the 1960s is a story of poor planning in an age of planning, of turf wars, and of 
administrative and leadership failures.  This is a story of political concessions and 
miscalculations.  This is a story shaped by the interconnection of federal, state, local, and 
institutional policies.  This is a story of changing and sometimes conflicting priorities in a 
dynamic decade and of the struggle between research and service at an evolving land-
grant research university. 
 However, this is not a story where the actors critique the existing power 
structures.  It is not a story where the characters question the goal.  While there was no 
consensus on what development or developmental change really meant at the University 
in the 1960s, the institution assumed developing the underdeveloped and bringing eastern 
                                                 
9 Brown, “Where Have We Been?” 37. 
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Kentucky into the mainstream culture of consumption and growth would solve all ills.  
While many of the faculty affiliated with the CDC questioned existing power structures 
in their international work, they never did so in Appalachia, and every University of 
Kentucky action program in the region since has shared this flawed perspective. 
History can tell us a great deal about the present, and it can inform the future.  
The University of Kentucky’s experience in the mountains in the 1960s begs the question 
posed by geographer Amanda Fickey, “How do you define development in eastern 
Kentucky?”10  Likewise, the experience implores us to explore, as Ron Eller has 
suggested, an alternative understanding of “the good life.”11  At the very least, the 
experience encourages us to create the mediating structures that Richard Couto describes, 
organizations and programs that promote the democratic prospect of equality and 
communal bonds in the context of a market economy that has failed many of the region’s 
people.12 
Scholars have discussed at length the creation of Appalachia.  They have explored 
the rediscovery of the region, and we see again and again America turn its sights to the 
mountains and the troublesome pockets of poverty that remain there today.  We fought a 
War or Poverty, and we continue to look for solutions through Promise Zones.  Yet, the 
missed opportunities in the mountains come from the failure, in the 1960s and in the 
                                                 
10 Amanda Fickey, “How Do You Define Development in Eastern Kentucky,” 
The Times-Tribune, 25 March 2014. 
11 Ronald Eller, “Seeking the Good Life in America: Lessons from the 
Appalachian Past,” 12 April 2012, University of Kentucky College of Arts and Sciences 
Distinguished Professor Lecture, Lexington, Kentucky.  An audio podcast of the lecture 
can be accessed at  https://appalachiancenter.as.uky.edu/tag/ron-eller.  
12 Richard A. Couto, Making Democracy Work Better: Mediating Structures, 
Social Capital, and the Democratic Prospect, with Catherine S. Guthrie (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
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2010s, to look beyond the symptoms of mountain poverty and to ask tough questions 
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